

CHATHAM HOUSE
DISCUSSION PAPER

**TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF
EUROPE:
An Updated Assessment**

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

There has been a noticeable lack of scholarly research on Turkey. In view of its sizeable population and landmass and given its continuing importance over four decades as both a strategically vital member of the Western Alliance and as a burgeoning economic & trade partner, this may seem surprising. Turkey does not fit into any neat geographical or linguistic categories², and so is consistently and unjustifiably ignored by European researchers³. This picture appears, however, to be changing with the emergence of Turkey as a country which is poised to play an influential regional leadership role after the Gulf War and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The 1987 application for full membership has also played a role in prompting the Europeanists to face up the reality of Turkey⁴ and look into it from the new perspective that it warrants. In order to present a fairly updated analysis, we have made an extensive use of daily newspaper reports, commentaries, journal articles and books. Interviews, too, have proved to be useful and extremely rewarding. We are using these sources to analyze how the relative advantages of Turkish membership for both the EC and Turkey have changed over time, particularly since 1987, in what state they stand presently and what the future holds.

Turkey lies in Asia and yet its best-known part and business capital is situated in the European landmass. It is a Mediterranean country, yet its Black Sea shores are just as long. When one looks at the geographic location of Turkey, its unique aspects may be better understood. In its west lies the Balkans, to the north-east one finds the Trans-Caucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and beyond that the new republics of what used to be the Soviet Union. It has common sea borders with Romania, Ukraine and Russia. To the east lies Iran and the countries of the Middle East (Syria and Iraq) border Turkey in the south. It is essential to bear in mind this unique geographical position when considering Turkey's

¹ The author wishes to express his appreciation to the **European Association for Co-operation** for granting him the Jean Monnet Fellowship 1991-92, which made this study possible. He thanks his professors at the College - John Pinder, William Cromwell, S. Milward, L. Tsoukalis and Wolfgang Wessels - for their illuminating comments and helpful suggestions. His thanks also go to a number of the members of the European Parliament and the Euro-diplomats, who frankly shared their thoughts on Turkey and on the Turco-Community relations, but asked not to be named. Mr. Philip Robins and Professor Helen Wallace of the Royal Institute of International Affairs deserve particular thanks for their invaluable, final touches on the paper. It goes without saying that the opinions expressed in this paper fall entirely under the exclusive responsibility of the author and do by no means reflect those of any organisation the author is associated with.

² "Turkey and the Middle East", Philip Robins, Chatham House Papers, Pinter Publishers: 1991, London, p.1

³ Aspects of contemporary Turkey have been occasionally studied by European scholars from various disciplines, but some topics - its defence role, disputes with Greece, Cyprus question, human rights issues - have been exceedingly dealt with in numerous studies while others have been largely neglected. The European studies on Turkish-EC relations, mostly undertaken by German scholars, overemphasized the standard 'pros vs cons' arguments, laying emphasis on adverse economic impacts, political and cultural (in)compatibility of Turkey's possible integration with the Community. They tend to lack, in most instances, a multi-faceted approach, which we believe the Turkish case deserves.

⁴ "A Bibliographical Essay on Southern Europe and its Recent Transition to Political Democracy", EUI Working Paper 86/208, European University Institute, Florence, February 1986, Part on TURKEY by Huri Tursan, p.127-149

place in the new architecture of Europe. Turkey is a large country by any standards - it has a greater geographical area (France and Germany combined together) and will eventually have a bigger population than any Community member state (approximately 60 mn in 1991, projected to reach 70 mn by the year 2000). Its enormous size is perhaps the root cause of most problems encountered in the Turco-Community relations. It may therefore be misleading to compare Turkey with the relatively small EC countries such as Portugal and Greece as the Turks quite often do.

Turkey today is the largest industrial base between Austria and China, strategically located as it does at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. There is a growing optimism over Turkey's economic future. The last decade has witnessed a drastic change in the Turkish economy, which has accomplished a series of structural reforms towards liberalization, deregulation and the establishment and reorganization of the market for the creation of a fair and competitive environment. This has enabled the efficient allocation of the resources in the economy and a better integration with the rest of the world within the framework of globalization.

Ankara embarked upon this course at a time when the "Berlin Wall" was still intact, when the international economic climate was not particularly conducive to such sweeping reforms and when it was not receiving, as is still the case now, any significant financial assistance whatsoever from its partners in the Community. Since 1980 the transformation process has produced a remarkable performance: GDP has increased by 5.5 % a year (average for the period 1981-90)⁵, compared with 2.0 % a year on average for the Twelve; exports have increased very rapidly and their structure has been diversified with 80 % of exports now manufactured products; total trade volume amounted to about \$ 33,6 bn last year with exports of \$ 13.6 bn and imports worth \$ 20.2 bn. Turkey is expected to export \$ 17 bn in 1993 against imports of \$ 25.8 bn⁶. Policy-makers in Ankara point to foreign investment that will this year reach \$ 1.1 bn⁷, almost double the 1991 level and to growing foreign interest in Turkey's strategy for streamlining the economy by radical privatisation of sectors like energy and transportation.

Turkish ventures abroad have mushroomed, investing half a billion dollars in 266 different projects in the six months of 1992⁸. Tourism has become one of the high-flying sectors in the economy as tourism revenues correspond to 25 percent of her total foreign exchange earnings. Turkey's emergence as an international trading nation is also forcing once protected manufacturers to adapt or perish. They are faced with the challenge to increase efficiency to become more competitive in major world markets. They defend the view that the combination of a fast-track GNP growth rate of 7 to 9 percent and a reduction

⁵ But growth has been somehow erratic: a sluggish 1.9 percent in 1989, an unsustainably torrid 9.2 percent in 1990, a Gulf War-depressed 0.3 percent last year and expectations of a little more than 5 percent for 1992. ("Eyes on West, Turkey strives to cure boom, bust", Tom Buerkle, in The International Herald Tribune, 28 July 1992).

⁶ "1993 Programme and Budget Given Last Touch", in ANKA Review, 13 October 1992, p.6.

⁷ "Europeans Need the New Turkey, Starting Now", Giles Merritt, in The International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1992.

⁸ "The Solid Foundation of Turkish Economy", Dr. Nuri Eren, in The Turkish Daily News, 20 September 1992, p.1-11.

of the high birth rate is bringing Turkey into line with the economies of the EC's southern member states. Turkey's reduction of customs duties in favour of the EC and its alignment to the Common Customs Tariffs of the Community, according to a 1988 accelerated timetable, in order to attain the Customs Union by 1995 and the conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EFTA countries are no doubt strong indication of the integrative capability of the Turkish economy with the outside world. We should add to this its leadership role in such regional integration initiatives as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and the Economic Cooperation Organization.

However, countries undergoing such a sweeping transformation inevitably suffer pains. Turkey is no exception. In spite of the significant progress achieved so far, there is however still a substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey, such that a comparison of GDP per head reveals that purchasing power in Turkey is one third of the Community average. This gap, which does not seem likely to be reduced rapidly, given the rapid population growth in Turkey and in spite of efforts to slow it down, is also reflected in the breakdown of employment. 48 % of the labour force is today employed in agriculture as opposed to 70 % in 1970⁹ (still about five times the EC average). Policy makers are confronted with the formidable task of bringing the economy back on to a course of stronger growth that not only raises the average standard of living of the population but which is also sufficient to absorb the rapidly rising labour force while at the same time tackling the perennial problem of persistently high inflation. And the reduction of the high public sector deficit, particularly through privatization, must play a pivotal role in this effort¹⁰.

A new political mood is also prevalent in Ankara. The new centre & social democrat coalition government, led by Suleyman Demirel, seems much less anxious than its predecessors that Turkey should take part in the Community at any price and on any terms. The recent statements by Turkish leaders indicate that Turkey wants to join the fold of the EC club as a "dignified and worthy partner" on equal footing and not as a "burdensome country" feared to drain the Community resources. The problem is how to achieve this commendable goal. They acknowledge the necessity for Turkey to put its house in order before embarking upon the road to the full Community membership. The increasing number of new generation Turkish officials and politicians, who have become accustomed with the way the Community machinery operates, has come to realize that many problems await to be overcome and much progress, particularly in the economy, has to be made before Turkey could take on and bear the competitive burden of surviving inside the Community (The traumatic experience of Greece serves as a useful reminder in this respect). And they are also aware of the fact that the EC is, in the meantime, not standing still.

⁹ "Turkey's employment in agriculture still too high" in The Turkish Daily News, 28 September 1992, p.3.

¹⁰ "OECD Economic Survey: Turkey 1991-92", Paris, OECD, 1992, p.105.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the Yugo-disintegration, has brought in a new dimension to the Turco-Community relationship. Some would argue that such a fragmented architecture that is still taking shape holds many perils for Turkey, but it also brings the promise of an influential role as the leader of the countries around the Black Sea, throughout the Caucasus region and the Central Asia. Turkey has suddenly become a pole of stability for the unsettled nations of the Balkans and for the Trans-Caucasian and the Central Asian Republics that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. For many years, Turkey's ambition to be a member of the Community has been the unchallenged central feature of its foreign policy; but there now appear to be significantly different views of Turkey's future relationship with the Community.

Turkey's emerging role as a regional power and as an important "bulwark"¹¹ role for the Community against the post-Soviet instability is perhaps one of the reasons for the new government's more relaxed approach¹² vis-a-vis the EC -- another reason might be its rapid elevation to a leadership status in regional integration initiatives in that area. The Community membership is no longer seen as a 'romantic' goal in itself, but as a means to take its rightful place in the European economic, political and defence integration -- a natural extension of its centuries-old European vocation. To get into the EC, Turkey has both to show that it can meet the political and economic qualifications of the Community and - unlike earlier applicants such as Greece, Spain and Portugal - pilot its way through a maze of political difficulties (one of which being the EP) and some downright hostility, particularly that of its neighbour, Greece.

Since Turkey can no longer remain content with the evasive answer it received in 1989 to its full membership application, the Community has to make up its mind and give a clear-cut message to Ankara, positive or negative, thus overcoming the often-criticised lack of clarity about Turkey. Given the pace of drastic political and economic developments both in Turkey and in Europe and beyond, the Community's 1989 response to Ankara's request of accession falls short of fully reflecting the actual performance and value of Turkey as a prospective member. Thus, a re-assessment of the added value of Turkey for the Community becomes imperative in the context of the current enlargement debate. The Community will understandably have great difficulty in its endeavour to formulate a clear-cut and feasible position, which has to respond, at one stroke, both the Turkish ambitions and the express worries of the member states as well as those of the Community institutions.

It appears that the question will be to define what are the benefits which both sides expect from membership and the costs to be incurred and then, to see if there are any alternative formulae (short of immediate full membership), which would give some or all of the benefits of the accession whilst reducing its perceived costs. It is generally anticipated that the EC policy-makers will come out with an 'indigenous' formulation envisaging a '**sui generis**' status in the EC for the Turks - something between the full membership and the second generation 'Europe' Agreements because anything less than such a status may not

¹¹ Merritt, March 1992. Here we should note that the Turks do not like to be regarded merely as a bulwark or military outpost for the Western security and instead underline their consistent European vocation as a whole.

¹² "Turkey Switches Priorities", in The Financial Times, 9 March 1992.

satisfy the oldest Associate and the first applicant country, which has a vocation for full membership by virtue of the rights and obligations emanating from the 1963 Association Agreement and the 1970 Complementary Protocol ratified by the respective Parliaments of Turkey and the EC member states. This incontestably puts it on an entirely different plane vis-a-vis other applicants as well as prospective candidates. Since Turkey represents a unique case markedly different from other membership candidates in terms of its economic, political, military, geo-strategic and cultural assets, an imaginative and novel approach is needed to fill in the content of such an unprecedented status, just short of immediate membership, to satisfy both the expectations of the Community and the long-cherished aspirations of Turkey.

Now few words on the general outline of the paper. The paper is divided into five main chapters. We shall first attempt to place Turkey in a European perspective, starting with a brief historic overview of the nearly 700 year-old relationship between Turkey and Europe and come up till 1987 when it filed a historic application for full membership. Turkey's place in the new architecture of Europe cannot be comprehended without due elaboration of what today's European configuration looks like and what shape it may take in the future. The end of the Cold War era, changed patterns of balance of power, Germany's ambivalent new role, security environment, current debate on future enlargement will be the primary concern of the third chapter.

An updated - and hopefully objective - assessment of what have happened since Turkey's 1987 membership application and of the relevance of the new European architecture to Turkey's quest for accession will be the main subjects of discussion in the fourth chapter. The Turkish request of accession, the Community's response and the current state of affairs in this relationship marked by ups and downs will be looked at in a critical analysis prior to discussing a number of factors which we feel continue to affect the future course of the Turco-Community relations. We shall argue that these intertwined factors also make a sober reconsideration of the Turkish case imperative in light of the new situation which represents a radically different landscape than the one that prevailed up till the 1989 'Avis' of the Commission.

The principal factors to be highlighted are as follows: the economic fitness; the political credibility; the security dimension; the ever-present Greek obstruction; the religious 'bias'; the new openings for Turkish diplomacy and economy in the Turkic Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian Republics as well as in the Balkans; the concerns of the Community institutions; and how the mainstream EC powers view Turkey. Then comes the final concluding chapter in which an effort will be made to analyse some future options ahead of the Turkish-EC relations as well as to explore the best possible and realistic model of integration for Turkey at a time when the enlargement process has started once again moving. Since the present day world situation is uncertain and still in the process of unfolding, it is difficult to predict anything with confidence even for short term. Our analysis will therefore draw, to great extent, upon educated guesses, press commentaries (particularly for the updated assessment because academic works are still scanty on this subject) and interviews. We shall argue that in the dynamic context of international relations, the re-launching of the Turco-Community relations is more pressing than ever. It goes without saying that the continuing changes in the European architecture and in the Turkish priorities will remain our major focus throughout this paper.

II. TURKEY IN EUROPE

1- HISTORIC ORIENTATION TOWARDS EUROPE -- Turkey's European identity has always been a controversial matter of discussion, not only among scholars, politicians and ordinary people in Europe, but also among those in Turkey. Before elaborating on Turkey's **Europeanness**, it might therefore be useful to take a look at what the word "Europe" means. The word "Europe" has been often used and misused, interpreted and misinterpreted, as almost any word in any language. There have been many Europes: the Europe of Greek mythology; the Europe of geographers - the two extreme western peninsulas of the Asian land mass; the Europe of the Carolingian Empire; the Europe of Byzantium; the old definition of "capitalist" Europe and "socialist" Europe; the Europe of self-styled national states and of disaffected national minorities.¹³

That is not certainly an exhaustive list. **Seton-Watson** reminds that the basic EC territory was the former Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne. Gradually this neo-Carolingian Empire has been extended, but with increasing pontifications as each new recruit was added. Attitudes to the concept of Europe today have striking similarities to those of the distant past. According to **Seton-Watson**, the two dichotomies of lands of civilization and barbarism and lands of the true believers and the infidels reappear under new names¹⁴. As old conceptions are fading away and enlargement process gains momentum once again, Europe is moving on towards a new type of definition, determined not only by geographical, religious and cultural considerations. Many believe that universal values will hopefully prevail over narrow national, religious and cultural limitations, if Europe is to have a future.

Towards the middle of the last century there began a sweeping movement of modernisation or 'Europeanisation' of the Ottoman Turks. For centuries the Ottoman Sultans and their military-administrative elite (recruited by an intensive training process mostly from Balkan Christians) had ruled over the most extensive and most durable empire this side of China and after the fall of Rome. From the vantage point, the Ottoman Turks looked with disdain and amusement upon their European neighbours, who seemed backward in their religion which contained shocking traces of polytheism and anthropomorphism, underdeveloped in the arts and sciences, regrettably fanatical in their perennial squabbles among Orthodox, Catholic, Bogumil, Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian. But by 1683 the Ottoman advance in Europe had been halted and by 1774 plainly reversed.

¹³ "What is Europe, Where is Europe?", Hugh Seton-Watson, Encounter, April 1985, p.9

¹⁴ Seton-Watson, April 1985, p.7

The first serious attempt for reforms began way back in 1718, when the Sultan of the time agreed that Turkey must have a better army and sent an envoy to Paris to see how the French did it. It was resumed in the **Tanzimat** period of the mid-19th Century (the word means "changing the structure", exactly the Gorbachev's **Perestroika**). Historically speaking, the Turks came quite a long way from Central Asia and the gates of Anatolia were opened to them with the defeat of a Byzantine army in 1071. It took the Turks another 200 years to control Anatolia completely. They had crossed the Dardanelles in 1346 and twice besieged Vienna. Yet despite this long confrontation with Europe, or more likely because of it, the Turks were the first Muslim people to make a meaningful attempt at the creation of an efficient modern society¹⁵. They saw that they had fallen behind the Western world and they wanted to reorganise themselves to catch up with Europe. The Paris Congress (1856) admitted the Ottoman Empire to the public law of Europe. Thus, the Ottoman Turks had since been actively engaged in European affairs for the past 600 years, sometimes in alliance but mostly in confrontation¹⁶.

From the moment he created modern Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, Kemal Ataturk set himself the task of defining the nature of the Turkish state. He had a strong vision of what the values and norms of that state should be: it should be independent, modern, industrialised, Europe-oriented, secular and attached to the famous foreign policy motto of "peace at home, peace abroad". He cultivated good relations with the Soviet Union in 1920's. He took Turkey into a major alliance, the Balkan Pact, in 1934. Nevertheless, from the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 1939, Turkey guarded its non-aligned status. It managed to remain directly uninvolved in the Second World War and took its permanent seat in European train in the post-war period. From the early 1950's the geo-strategic significance¹⁷ of Turkey has been one of the key determinants in its relations with the West.

¹⁵ "The Matter of Europe", an editorial in The Economist, 14 December 1991, p.21.

¹⁶ "The Turkish Identity", Turkkaya Ataov, in Turkish Daily News, Ankara, 16 January 1991

¹⁷ Three books are particularly important in understanding Turkey's geo-strategic position: "The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey", Rouhoullah K. Ramazani, Princeton, N.J. 1966; "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era", Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne, S. Vucinich, eds., Stanford, Hoover

Institution Press, 1974; and "Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan: A Political Chronology", Lawrence Ziring, New York, Praeger, 1981. Most recent one is Philip Robins' book "Turkey and the Middle East", 1991, London

Geographically, Turkey might not lie in the middle of Europe; but there is no doubt that it is in the hub of the growing economic, political and cultural interdependence. A brief look at its relations with its immediate neighbours may help highlight how modern Turkey manages its geographical context. Iran, as a former imperial state and regional power of broadly similar size, still sees Turkey as a potential competitor for power and influence in the Middle East, the Trans-Caucasia and the Central Asia. The Arab view of Turkey is all the more pejorative, growing as it does out of "a deep sense of inferiority and bitterness at its past centuries of subjugation to the Ottoman core"¹⁸. Arguably, since 1974 Cyprus crisis, Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran and Syria have been subject to greater change and uncertainty than those with Greece or the Soviet Union. From Turkey's point of view, all three share certain characteristics which are potentially problematic. They have regional leadership aspirations as well as possessing the resources to give substance to these ambitions. All three share common borders with Turkey. All three states are formally and instinctively anti-Western, while Turkey is not only formally aligned with the West through its membership of all European organisations, but its political, economic and military elites identify profoundly with the West.

For many of the regimes in the Islamic world whose legitimacy rests on their commitment to upholding the faith, such as Saudi Arabia, the laicism of Turkey has been perceived as at best an object of suspicion, at worst an alternative model of government capable of subverting the power of traditional regimes. Turkey is the first and only secular country in the world of Islam¹⁹. Not only geographically, but also culturally, it is a bridge between Europe and Asia - to be more exact, a cultural bridge between Eastern and Western civilizations. There is no question that being placed among various geographical and historical cultures, Turkey stands a good chance of producing a new cultural synthesis for the coming age of the "Third Wave"²⁰. It is not very far-fetched to view the development of the Turkish culture as a dichotomy which will eventually reach a new synthesis: the development of traditional Islamic culture on the one hand and the development of a modern culture, which can be called "western" or "contemporary" on the other. Thus, not only the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, but also the Libyan, and Iranian revolutions had their (in some cases negligibly limited) effects on Turkish society. All the political and ideological trends such as Marxism, Trotskyism, Euro-communism, social democracy, parliamentary democracy, ethnicism and Islamicism, which are often different in nature and indeed antithetical in relation to one another, have been experienced. Turkey has as much, if not more, in common with its immediate European neighbours than with the societies of Asia: the Euphrates, rather than the Bosphorous, makes a sharper frontier.

¹⁸ Robins, 1991, p.11

¹⁹ See "Religious 'Bias': Islam versus Christianity" in the pages to follow for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

²⁰ "Turkish Culture and Turkish Personality", Prof. Emre Kongar, in Newspot, Ankara, 6 December 1990, p.8

Modern Turkey has sought entry to a variety of clubs of states to both east and west. As a result, it is a member of the Council of Europe, the OECD, the NATO, and the CSCE and associate members of the EC and - before the end of this year - the WEU on the one hand, and the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) on the other. As part of its regional co-operation efforts, Ankara has pioneered the creation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone among the littoral and neighbouring states of the Black Sea. Ankara is the driving economic force behind the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), which brings together Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and some Central Asian Republics.

In this way, and in claiming to be part of both the secular and the Islamic worlds, Turkey has sought to make the best of its foothold in two continents. Its place in both the Council of Europe and the ICO had led to repeated arguments that it is a 'bridge' from one continent to another, from one culture to another. Turkey does, of course, provide a bridge²¹ between Europe and Asia, and much traffic between the two crosses the sub-continent at this point, understanding both continents and both cultures and hence having a unique role as interpreter to both. The notion of Turkey as a bridge between East and West is nowadays becoming more relevant in the economic rather than in the political context. Turkish economic initiatives in the Black Sea region and the Balkans as well as in the Near East are destined to make Turkey a more promising economic partner for Europe, regardless of its EC status.

The Western visitor to Turkey is likely to be unprepared for what he finds. His mental images of the land and the people are coloured by such words as "oriental" or "Middle East". History has told him/her of the "Terrible Turk" who under the Ottoman Empire ruled large parts of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Eastern Europe and the Holy Land and finally was driven back into the Asia Minor during the nineteenth century. The collective memory in Europe was that of the "Barbarian Turks" who had not only ruled over southeastern Europe and the Balkans for centuries, but also had carried the banner of Islam to the heartland of Christian civilization²². The general sentiment of most Europeans, particularly when its possible membership of the European Community comes to the fore, is clear-cut: "the Turks do not belong with us". It is true that the Turks are 95 % Muslims and this somehow influences the way they think and behave. But unless the Community is going to say that its membership is confined only to nations of Christian faith or, even more oddly, to people born on one side of the dotted line that separated Hero from Leander, this does not automatically disqualify the Turks.

²¹ Some scholars express reservations as to whether Turkey is well equipped to play such a 'bridge' role [Tsoukalis and Robins], arguing that major Western powers do not need any 'bridge' country to deal with the 'oriental' countries since they can conduct their relations more effectively through direct contacts. Europe has historically been far more concerned with constructing barriers to Turkish power and influence on the continent than with engaging Turkey as a strategic bridge. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War period, Turkey's 'bridging' role has proved to be quite important in terms of the Western efforts to better understand and influence the Caucasian and Central Asian Turkish Republics. The USA and the EC seem like appreciating and promoting such a role befitting their interests.

²² See "The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire", Lord Kinross, New York, William Morrow and Co., 1977, p.613-14 for a revisionist assessment of the Turkish experience in Europe.

Turkey has good claim to be considered as a candidate-member of the Europe of ideas, if not the Europe of formal geography. The country was put on its present path towards European integration in the 1950's, when it joined the then OEEC, the NATO and the Council of Europe. But the connections go back much further still. Consider first a historical fact. Turkey is the successor of the Byzantine and East Roman Empires in the life of Europe²³. Out of the past 2500 years much or all of the place now called Turkey has been politically, economically and culturally an extension of Europe for roughly two-thirds of the time, and under the control of a people who came out of Asia for only a third of the time. The Turks who came out of Asia a millennium or so ago were altered by what they found when they got to Anatolia. In Ankara, for instance, the Temple of August stands back to back with the mosque of Hacı Bayram; Cappadocia is dotted with Byzantine chapels; the west coast has probably more classical Greek ruins than Greece itself. The mixture of Turkish new comers with the already assorted population of Anatolia and later with the Balkan peoples has produced a collection of faces and a variety of cultures visibly different from anything else in Asia. Turkey has a unique mix of Western and Eastern cultures. Because the culture of the modern Turks still retains precious elements from their past, what it has to contribute is not only conformity but also originality, "a new and richly coloured strand in the tapestry."²⁴

It is generally acknowledged that the Turks are already a permanent part of the European scene. This is beyond dispute. Millions came in the 1960s and 70s to work. There are today nearly 3 million Turks - most of them, though not all, first generation immigrants in Western Europe. The Turks constitute the largest immigrant group in Germany. They regard where they live as their home rather than as temporary place of abode. 60 percent of the Turks have been, for example, in Germany more than ten years. For the second generation, the tendency to regard Europe as their home is naturally even stronger. They no longer have language difficulties and are increasingly better educated. Another interesting phenomenon is that more and more Turkish immigrants are building up independent businesses. They are increasingly becoming an important factor in the economies of the EC countries and of Turkey. However, opportunities for them to participate in national and local politics are extremely limited, although many immigrants become members of political parties. They are not yet given the right to vote or stand even in local elections²⁵. It can be

²³ "Turkey and Europe", David Barchard, in Turkey Today Newsletter, First Issue, Undated

²⁴ "Forward" by Geoffrey Lewis to Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey, Turgut Ozal, London, 1991

²⁵ "Thirty Years of Turkish Immigration", Dr. Ataman Aksokek, in The Courier, No.129, September-October 1991, p.60-63.

argued that a three million-strong presence of Turkish immigrants represents an organic link between Turkey and Western Europe which did not exist a few decades ago.

The Turks also assert that none of the present member-state of the EC have let themselves be inhibited by any disparities of culture or of religion from allying themselves with Turkey whenever their interests coincided. France led the way in 1535 when King Francois I concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent. Then came Britain, France and Italy in 1854, Germany in 1914, Britain and France in 1939, Greece in 1938, 1954 and 1960, NATO in 1952. Turkey's sacrifices during the 1991 Gulf War are still vivid in minds. Nor should it be forgotten that the Ottoman Empire, at a low point in its history, was called the sick man of **Europe**; not the sick man of **Asia**. The Turks are Europeans because they chose to be, even before Ataturk set their face westwards nearly seventy years ago. Turkey's European credentials have already and repeatedly been established. It is, however, only natural that this debate will continue to re-surface so long as Turkey's membership of the Community remains high on the European agenda. Turkey's major handicap in Europe is, to our mind, in part a kind of prejudice which has deep roots. The Turks quite often complain that "Europe does not understand us". ("To what extent do we know or understand Europe ?", responds Turkey's famous essayist, Cetin Altan²⁶, who makes a clear distinction between Euro-Turks striving to integrate with Europe and Asian Turks advocating a leadership role in Turkic and Islamic world).

This is in part due to the centuries-old image of the Ottoman Turkey as a conquering, 'barbaric', Islamic threat to Europe and in part because of the mere lack of appreciation in Europe of modern Turkey. European history textbooks still perpetuate a negative and distorted image of this country. The 'guest' workers, who, mostly from the backward areas of Turkey, had been invited to contribute to the post-war reconstruction of Europe, certainly did not inspire a favourable thought about Turkey. And more recently, the 1980 military intervention, the resultant inflow of political asylum-seekers to Europe, the anti-Turkey campaign of the Kurdish activists and Greece's persistent efforts to blacken Turkey at every possible opportunity have all contributed to the further deterioration of Ankara's image in the eyes of most Europeans.

Reflecting what is believed to be the true picture of modern Turkey requires a huge and long-standing publicity campaign by Turkey which must be backed by a series of genuine political and economic reforms. The current government has promised to do so and already started to fulfil some of its wide-ranging promises. The priority in reforms has been accorded to those areas that will primarily improve economic-social conditions in the south-east region of the country, where most of Turkey's Kurdish-origin citizens live. Amendments in the constitution and the laws are already under way to ensure full democratisation in the spheres of political, trade union and press freedoms. These reforms should be swiftly carried out so as to disperse the prevalent scepticism about Turkey's democratic credentials in Europe. For Turkey to progress and play a greater, positive, role in

²⁶ "Abolishing the Division Between 'Us' and 'Them'", Cetin Altan, in Turkey In Europe, Istanbul, 1988. Another renown figure, Mehmet Ali Birand, complaining of the lack of genuine interest in Turkey of the European affairs, asserts that nobody wants to look at the other side of the coin and concludes that the basic interests of both sides lie in enlightening Turkish public opinion on the Community as extensively as possible in "Turkish Public Opinion and the EC", 1988.

its own region, it is necessary for it to solve through democratic means its Kurdish problem without any delay.

In our view there is much work to be done to bring about wider appreciation of modern Turkey. A correct, professional and popularised campaign is needed to enlighten public and official opinion about the reasons for the Turkish quest for full EC membership and the reasons why Europe should respond favourably to it. The creation of a sympathetic constituency to this effect in every corner of Europe - from business world to mass media, from universities to parliaments, from cultural circles to trade unions - remains a precondition if Turkey is resolute in its ultimate goal to attain the Community membership before the end of this millennium. Its resultant implications will help pave the ground for a smooth accession.

2- THE COMMUNITY'S OLDEST ASSOCIATE MEMBER -- Turkey's decision to link its future to that of Europe is, as we set out above, not a new one, but an intensive relationship of nearly 700 years. Turkey was among the first countries, in the post-Second World War period, joining all the movements of European integration. And in August 1959, only two years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome, it presented its request to the EEC for a special associate status with the eventual goal of full membership. The negotiations between Turkey and the EC began on 28 September 1959, but took two years longer than the Greek negotiations, culminating in the Ankara Association Agreement on 12 September 1963.

One reason for these protracted negotiations was the difficulty of finding an association formula which would reconcile economic realities and Turkish aspirations. From the very beginning of the negotiations, the EC tried to offer Greece and Turkey the same association formula. But the fact that Greece could shoulder more economic obligations at that time than Turkey²⁷ created a serious problem for the Community, which had sought to base the agreements on reciprocal obligations. The advantages and drawbacks were debated at endless EC Council meetings, with Germany always emphasizing the political and strategic reasons for backing Turkish demands.

Ankara's demands included free access for its agricultural and industrial exports, \$ 500 mn on loan, and a written guarantee of full membership at the end of 22 years. The Ankara Agreement took effect in December 1964 with two principal objectives: the progressive establishment of a customs union and convergence of the signatories' economic policies with, as a final goal, the integration of Turkey into the Community. Article 28 of the Accord stipulates that "once Turkey reaches a point where conformity with Treaty of Rome rules is possible, then the two sides will consider the idea of Turkey's accession to the EC".

a) Commitments within the Association Framework. The Association Agreement laid down three stages for achieving this ultimate goal: an initial preparatory phase of five years (1964-69); a transition period of 12 years to create a customs union and align Turkey's economy policies on those of the EC's and; finally, a third stage for coordinating the two sides' economic, fiscal and competition policies. During the negotiations, Turkey had

²⁷ "Turkey and the European Community", Mehmet Ali Birand, in The World Today, February 1978, p.53.

unsuccessfully tried to insist that the transition from the preparatory period to the transitional period should be automatic. It had good grounds to fear that France and Italy might seize any opportunity to create further difficulties, Rome on agricultural concessions, and Paris on the basic political issue of Turkey's European credentials. To launch the plan, the EC agreed to lift quotas on imports of Turkish tobacco, raisins, nuts and dried figs but laid down restrictions on other agricultural products. Turkey was granted a low-interest loan of ECU 175 mn for the first stage of the Association Agreement. While some progress was made during the initial stage, both sides had to alter the timetable for the secondary transitional phase.

During the years that followed the 1967 military coup in Athens, "Turkey exploited the freezing of Greece's Association Agreement"²⁸ in order to extract a better deal from the Community. Relations had been relatively smooth in late 60s and early 70s. The Additional Protocol, signed in 1970, besides improving the economic terms of Turkey's Association status with the EEC, had also made provision for political consultations (Clause 56) once the EEC established the political machinery which was at that time being discussed under the chairmanship of Etienne Davignon. The Nine promised to keep Turkey informed of their political discussions when these were of direct interest to it. The Turkish proposal for taking part in the EPC meetings on such questions as Cyprus was taken up and apparently supported by the then British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, during the Nyborg meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers in May 1978. However, other EC Ministers felt "it would create an awkward precedent and thus would need further study"²⁹.

The 1970 Additional Protocol defined, among other things, a new entry date for the progressive free circulation of Turkish workers in the EC (1976-1986) as well as a new schedule for the Community dismantling of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in non-agricultural goods from Turkey other than textiles and petroleum products, on which special restrictions were agreed. The EC felt the need to exercise restraint, largely in response to French and Italian pressure. It chose to abide by the principle of Community preference. Turkey, in return, undertook to gradually abolish import tariffs on industrial products from the EC countries over a 12-year period. Here, too, there were exceptions. For about 45 percent of products the transitional period was to be 22 years so as not to jeopardise the development of certain industries in Turkey. Thus, the customs union has been envisaged to be fully effective by 1995, with Turkey gradually introducing the EC's common external tariffs and abolishing quotas on imports from the Community countries. Within the framework of financial co-operation Turkey was awarded loans and grants at five-yearly

²⁸ "The EPC and the Greco-Turkish Conflict", Ada Acquarone, April 1978, Brugge, College of Europe (Long Paper)

²⁹ Quoted by Acquarone, 1978

intervals totalling 680 million units of account up till 1980 in an effort to back up the country's economic modernisation. The projects financed by this scheme were tied to participation of companies from the Community countries.

b) Results and Problems of the Association. Association ties have had disappointing results³⁰, which culminated in a generally sad story of relations. The behaviour of both sides has played its part, creating the impression that neither side has been seriously interested in achieving the aims of the Association Agreement. Successive Turkish governments, far from taking measures to strengthen the economy in the preparatory period, followed a policy of *laissez-faire*. There was no debate in the mass media, no serious public discussion, no meaningful research done by the business circles who should have been the most concerned. Public opinion was almost unanimous in its interpretation of the Ankara Agreement as a political act. On the other side of the coin, the EC established the greatest restrictions for trade in the very sectors in which Turkey was in a strong position to compete in European markets: basically in textiles, clothing and farm products.

Disputes over imports of Turkish textile and clothing have been a regular feature of the Association relations since the first Multifibre Arrangement was concluded. Turkey constantly refused to agree to voluntary export restraints until after the Community had unilaterally imposed import quotas. The Turkish viewpoint was, and still is, that if the EC contravenes the Association Agreement in this respect it ought at least to ensure that Turkey as a special partner is granted preferential treatment compared to other non-EC countries in, say, South-East Asia. Another complaint the Turks have repeatedly levelled at the EC is that its preferential status has been, to a great extent, eroded by the many treaties and agreements between the EC and third countries as well as by the introduction of the General System of Preferences. The enlargement of the Community with the accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark also had an adverse effect on EC-Turkish relations.

The preoccupation with internal structural and economic problems overshadowed the 'special' relationship of the Six with Turkey. For the new members, Turkey was just another Mediterranean country with no special status. The new Mediterranean policy that the EC formulated had further upset the delicate balances. The Turkish military intervention of 1974 in Cyprus was another factor in the deterioration of its privileged status vis-a-vis the Nine. A constant trade deficit was recorded with the EC - \$ 1.7 bn in 1975 against \$ 500 mn in 1973. Global developments taking place from the early 1970s also played their part in reducing Brussels' interest in special relations with Turkey. Germany, in particular, created the greatest difficulties in these relations. It was in fact largely a keen German interest that led to the provisions on free movement of labour being specified explicitly in the Association Agreement. But, with the German labour market undergoing a fundamental change, Bonn has become the most fervent opponent of the entry into force of this legal Community commitment.

³⁰ "Turkey and EC's Southern Enlargement", Heinz Kramer, in *Aussenpolitik*, XXXV:1, 1984, p.98-116

Turkey's main shortcoming has been its failure to draw consequences for national economic and development policies from its Treaty commitment to aim at an eventual membership³¹. The EC affairs remained in general the major preoccupation of a narrow professional and politician circle with little interest among other segments of the society. Since the early-1960's up till January 1990, its development plans had aimed at an inward-looking import substitution strategy, irreconcilable with the logic of gradually setting up a full customs union³² and accessing one day to the Community. Brussels was not really convinced about Ankara's commitment to the aims of the Association.

Soon after the signature of the 1970 Additional Protocol, the EC-Turkish relations tended to deteriorate. Advantages that Turkey had expected to enjoy from its associate status had proved illusory. The Turkish alienation from the Association had reached its climax in 1978 when the social democrat Ecevit government proposed a five-year moratorium on the trade provisions. The Community accepted this proposal (with great pleasure and relief!) and extended it to agricultural produce and free movement of labour. At that time, the general belief was that both sides had chosen, from the start, unsuitable means for pursuing their interests, which gave rise to some feelings of bitterness on either side. Turkey, in hesitation due to internal political turmoil at the time of the Greek application to join the Community in the later part of the 1970's, lost a golden opportunity to enhance its prospect of membership.

c) Consequences of the Southern Enlargement. This bleak state of affairs was influenced for the worse by a successful Greek attempt to join the Community, followed later by the Iberian enlargement. The Turks became seriously concerned, not without justification, that southern enlargement would establish political and economic 'fait accomplis' to their detriment. Turkey has found itself in direct competition with the new members, especially in respect of Mediterranean produce such as citrus fruits, fruit, vegetables and grapes (traditional exports of hazelnuts, cotton and dried figs less affected). In the industrial sectors, competition from Spanish, Portuguese and Greece, too, has become more clearly felt. Special problems have arisen in connection with Turkish textiles and clothing exports (particularly with Portugal), foodstuffs, chemicals, glass and ceramics, cement, iron & steel and petro-chemical products. Trade was not the only sector which Turkey faced the threat of losses. Besides, the prospects of exporting labour had been further worsened by the southern enlargement. The Turkish attitude toward relations with

³¹ See "Turkey's Adventure of Common Market", Mehmet Ali Birand, Istanbul, 1987, for a journalistic account of the Turco-Community relations from 1959 to 1987.

³² "Turkish Industrialisation Strategies", Osman Okyar, in Economic Relations Between Turkey and the EEC, Ankara, 1978, p.14-53

the Community has been, to some extent, influenced by its political relations with Greece since 1959³³. The adverse impacts of the Greek accession on Turkey are to be addressed later while discussing the factors which affect the Turco-Community relations.

Efforts to re-activate the relationship were made in early 1980 when Turkey and the Community had agreed to launch a new series of initiatives to improve their stagnant relationship. The then Demirel government announced that it would apply for the full EC membership by the end of 1980. Nevertheless, that application had failed to materialise because, in September 1980, the military stepped in and seized power. Indeed, the military intervention brought the Turco-Community relations more or less to a halt. The ensuing political restrictions and the accusations of human rights violations in the 1980's made Turkey a prime target of suspicion in Brussels, especially among members of the European Parliament.

The Fourth Financial Protocol and its special ECU 600 mn package of aid was suspended in 1981 (still on hold). Although civilian rule and democracy was restored following the 1983 elections, the relations were not swiftly revived. The Association Agreement remained largely inactive. Problems were made worse by Greece's persistent obstructions in every EC forum on all the issues concerning Turkey. In a bid to put a decisive brake to its deteriorating relations with the Community, Turkey had signalled, during the September 1986 Association Council meeting, its intention to go ahead with its long-expected application for full membership, which has opened a new chapter in relations.

Prior to analyzing the reasons which led to Turkey's application for the Community membership and the evasive response that it received in December 1989, it might be more appropriate to put the newly emerging economic, political and security architecture in perspective. Then, in the light of this new, still evolving situation, perhaps a better explanation may be offered as regards the current state of affairs and the future prospects in the so-far-uneasy relationship between the Community and Turkey.

³³ See "Turkey and the European Community", Ismail Erturk, in International Relations, Vol. VII, No.2, 1984 and "Turkey and Europe", David Barchard, in Turkish Review Quarterly, Autumn 1989 for further elaboration of the Greek factor.

III- EMERGING NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE

1- LIVING WITHOUT COLD WAR CLARITY -- The Cold War, starting with the Communist takeover in Prague in 1948 and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, lasted more than a generation. This period left a lasting impression on both people and institutions in the West. The political revolution in Eastern Europe and the ensuing Soviet disintegration defied any prediction. No one had dared to imagine that such radical political changes could be so swift, so decisive and so orderly in the absence of anticipation. None of the participatory actors appeared to have designed exactly what happened³⁴. We are, as **Toffler** tells us, entering the age of 'powershift'.³⁵

Old structures of power are breaking down while radically different structures of power are yet to take form. We have now moved from bipolarity to multipolarity. The East-West divide has been replaced by a great many localized tensions. There are the conflicts between different nationalities resulting from the mixed ethnic backgrounds of the populations of the former Soviet bloc countries and dating back to the period before and after the First World War. The economic upheavals are causing serious social tensions. Despite the USA's military success in the Gulf, the end of the Cold War has marked a 'visible decline in America's role'³⁶. Nowhere is this decline more visible than in the economic sphere.

In the 1980's the US was transformed from the world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor with an expected payment this year of \$ 293 billion only in interest - more than the cost of the Pentagon budget. **Kennedy**³⁷ predicts that the USA goes the way of the British Empire in the first half of this century, while Japan and Germany are poised to return as global powers. This is perhaps an over-statement of what's happening. Nevertheless, it is most likely that German unification and accelerated pace of European integration would not only ensure Germany's emergence as a global economic power, but would also accentuate the frictions among the EC, Japan and the US. Washington will thus face a serious challenge for global domination from Tokyo and a 'fortress Europe' led by Bonn. Yet none of these challengers can match, in the foreseeable future, the military might of the US, which provides it with an important leverage in global affairs.

Germany's role in this newly emerging architecture deserves further attention. In Spring 1990, as German unity began to take shape, the Federal Republic of Germany and France launched an initiative to speed up the integration of the European Community and the Political Union. It was hoped that this would dispel any suspicion that united Germany could turn its back on the West and return to a "seesawing policy" as in the 19th century.

³⁴ Yet the events were not entirely a spontaneous accident. They reflect the fundamental changes in security and economic conditions that have been long in gestation. For a further discussion on how these changes took place, see "The Redesign of European Security", John D. Steinbruner, in The Brookings Review, Vol.8 No.3, Summer 1990, p.23

³⁵"Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century", Alvin Toffler, New York, Random House, 1989

³⁶ "1989 and All That", Robert Tucker, in Foreign Affairs, 69(4), Fall 1990

³⁷"The Rise and Fall of Great Powers", Paul Kennedy, New York, Random House, 1989

Unification brought not just the economic and psychological problems of 16 million citizens used to living under dictatorship; it changed the nature of the nation, both internally and in its external relations. The restoration of full, legal sovereignty removed the excuse for not taking a full role on the world's stage. While the German government was accused of hanging back in the Kuwaiti crisis and on the outbreak of the Gulf war, it is now, after championing diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, accused of being too self-assured and arrogant. Unification brought not just the economic and psychological problem of 16 mn citizens used to living under dictatorship: it changed the nature of the nation both internally and in its external relations. The restoration of full, legal sovereignty removed the excuse for not taking a full role on the world stage. This has played into the hands of those who felt that it was in any case time Germans could stop apologising.

United Germany, with 80 million citizens and Europe's largest economy, is asserting itself as never before in post-war history. One of the recent example has been the German decision to suspend unilaterally (without consulting its EC partners and NATO allies) weapons shipment to Turkey, a NATO ally, because some of the German arms had been used against Kurdish rebels. Bonn's style did upset its allies. TIME, in its cover story "Germany: New Muscles, Old Fears"³⁸ points out that the former, far more modest West Germany, would have worked quietly behind the scenes to obtain allied consensus on arms transfers or to persuade Turkey to behave less harshly. The British sharply criticized the Bundesbank for "rigid" monetary policies and decided to withdraw the pound indefinitely mid-September from the fixed parity zone of the EMS. Such examples are not difficult to multiply.

Germany is no doubt assuming an assertive leadership role in European foreign policy. It has a prominent role in the task of guiding European parts of the former Soviet territory through its post-communist crisis. At the UN headquarters, there has been constant talk of giving Germany a permanent role in the Security Council³⁹. Bonn's first tentative move to become a permanent member of the UNSC has come up against a "solid wall"⁴⁰ of resistance from Britain and France, who said by pressing its cause Germany would be opening a Pandora's Box. London and Paris want the German drive to stop in its tracks - otherwise demands from Asia, Africa and Latin America will be difficult to ignore. At the European Community, Bonn is poised for a power play that could determine not only the pace of European integration, but also Europe's place in the new world order.

The Germans are often accused of acting out of ruthless self-interest and with self-aggrandizement. This is not exactly what the neighbours had in mind. One of the ideas of NATO, the EC and other post-war institutions has been to lock Germany into a European structure, not the other way around. As the largest contributor - 28 %, which will come to \$ 23 bn this year⁴¹ - Bonn is unwilling to accept an EC budget that it considers too generous in

³⁸ "Flexing Its Muscles", James O. Jackson, in Time, 13 April 1992, p.15.

³⁹ Germany's first tentative move to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council has come up against a solid wall of resistance from Britain and France. They say that, by pressing its case, Germany would be opening a Pandora's Box - leading the way for similar demands from Japan, India, Brazilia, Egypt and Nigeria. ("Bid to Thwart German Demand at UN", Hella Pich, in The Guardian Weekly, 4 October 1992, p.11)

⁴⁰ "Bid to Thwart German Demand at UN", Hella Pick, in The Guardian Weekly, 4 October 1992, p.11.

⁴¹ TIME, 13 April 1992, p.18

its subsidization of agriculture and transfer payments to the poorer members. The Germans are also warning that they will not tolerate any retreat from the strict standards set at Maastricht for monetary union. There is a growing feeling among European financial and political analysts⁴² that Germany's high interest rates and determination to maintain an inflation proof mark have contributed significantly to the recessionary or low growth cycles that grip the entire continent. The growing preeminence of Germany worries most the French political leaders whose entire post-war policy relied on using German power to enhance their own may be coming unstuck. The German government has issued countless statements and declarations emphasising the continuity of the German policy.

The Rome NATO summit and the Maastricht EC summit late last year marked important milestones at which Bonn showed with actions, not just words, that Germany could still be relied on politically. So why does mistrust still continually resurface? It is perhaps the result of presumed inevitabilities of European history and geography and is based on the expectation that a Germany freed from the trauma of division and with its sovereignty fully restored will be staking a claim to great power status in keeping with its economic clout⁴³. This is already and inevitably taking place. We can say that the German policy will long be regarded with mistrust, for at least as long as the darkest chapter in German history is still within living memory. One should not also ignore the fact that the Germans have been somehow 'communitarized' over the past 35 years and, if the 'federal union' goal will one day be attained, Germany may then be regarded only as a powerful 'federated state' of the Union that is economically more resourceful and prosperous than the others. If the Maastricht Treaty stalls, warns political observers, then we may see a return to traditional policies of the German nation-state, with Bonn feeling free to break out and go its own way.

The recent dramatic changes on the world scene have signalled that a new world order is coming into existence to replace the structure of international relations forged during the Cold War period. The first suggestion of a new world order is generally attributed to the Gorbachev's address at the UN General Assembly in December 1988. This concept has re-emerged after the Saddam's aggression against Kuwait, most notably, in a speech by President Bush on 11 September 1990, who cited an emerging world order as one of his war objectives⁴⁴. Yet in recent months the US has been keeping quiet about it. The reason might be the frustration with the 'unfinished business' in the Gulf as well as the American voters' concern with jobs and economic growth and not with some "airy-fairy"⁴⁵ conception of a new world order. There is certainly a new world; but it is difficult to say if there is any order in the sense of a coherent and structured framework for future international policy. The defining characteristics of the new world are, it appears for the time being, pictures of disorder and unpredictability.

⁴² "Union on German Model Looks Doubtful", Jim Hoagland, in The Guardian Weekly, 27 September 1992, p.17.

⁴³ See an article by Gunther Nonnenmacher in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 1992, appeared also in the English language German Tribune, No.1501, 31 January 1992.

⁴⁴ All the great wars of the past two centuries have been followed by a blueprint for maintaining peace and order. This was so in 1815, 1919, 1945 and again in 1991 at the end of the Cold War.

⁴⁵ "New World Disorder", Ian Davidson, in Financial Times, 16 March 1992

In domestic debates, the key question has now become whether Washington will recognize the need to put economics at the heart of future security policies. In today's world, battles will have to be won on the economic front. Yet, to the great dismay of the Europeans, the power of the old diplomatic paradigm - which equates national security with military power - was visible in a leaked Pentagon policy paper, arguing that the US should seek to prevent any other nation or 'group of nations' from challenging its role as the world's single superpower⁴⁶. Though the White House tried to play down this paper, the implication was clear: military spending should remain high enough to enable the US to serve as a 'world policeman' for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, such a strategy requires a large defence budget, something which the US economy simply cannot afford at present.

Although the US is and will remain large, rich and powerful, its post-war dominance over the Western world which was essentially due to the East-West conflict, has considerably lessened for obvious reasons. **Kissinger** underlines that during most of the post-war period, the shared security concern had caused competing interests to take a back seat and that in the years ahead, Europe may not find the need for American protection so compelling⁴⁷. However, one might be tempted to argue that the new conditions make the US involvement more necessary than ever, although it cannot continue along the old pattern. For one thing, the Soviet collapse has not completely ended every potential threat from the east. Russia is still far larger and has a much more numerous population than any single European state. And it continues to retain thousands of nuclear warheads, far exceeding any conceivable European nuclear potential.

One additional concern is that Germany has become so strong that existing European institutions cannot by themselves establish a balance between Germany and its partners, even less between Germany and the former Soviet Union. If Russia and Germany tend to come too close, asserts **Kissinger** (a prominent member of the realist school), they might raise the danger of hegemony, concluding that without America, Britain and France cannot sustain the political balance in Western Europe. The validity of this argument will depend largely on how the intra-Community relations are to be handled and weighted in the next few years between Bonn, Paris, London and Rome. If the *esprit communautaire* prevails, the Union can proceed as envisioned toward the United States of Europe without giving rise to any fears of hegemony.

⁴⁶ "After the Cold War, Economics is King", Michael Prowse, in Financial Times, 16 March 1992

⁴⁷ "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World", Henry Kissinger, in the International Herald Tribune, 2 March 1992, p.5

2- MAASTRICHT DECISIONS: A TURNING POINT ? - The result of the Maastricht summit last December should be judged on the basis of two key issues. First, the economic and monetary union, on which an important agreement set the date (1999, or possibly 1997) for the creation of a Central European Bank with powers to issue a single currency. Second, the issue is how to tackle the EC's democratic deficit. In comparison to these decisions, the agreements on European social issues, cohesion, security and internal policy take second place, despite the intensity with which they were debated, since they do not significantly challenge the sovereignty of member states⁴⁸. The newly defined European Union would have three distinct pillars: the orthodox and consolidated Community pillar, a common foreign and security policy pillar, connected to the EC but not subsumed in it; and a third pillar dealing separately with internal order, reworking the Schengen model for a group of Twelve.

This new model has emerged from the Maastricht Summit, though not exactly as planned by the French & German axis. The Treaties of Maastricht mark a great step forward in the emergence of a European superpower. The most important decision, setting up a single currency, is really putting into a concrete form something which the Community has been trying to achieve for the past 20 years. If things proceed smoothly without any major crisis by 1999, Europe looks likely to have a single currency with a home market bigger than the dollar and far larger than the yen. The ECU will be the most important currency in the world. To clinch the agreement, other ambitious plans for a stronger European Parliament and wider Commission powers had to be watered down. They show that the European states are still genuinely committed, 35 years after they started on their course, to the idea of "an ever-closer union". Even though the term 'federal union' was suppressed so as not to break ranks with Britain, the evolutionary character of the Union was underlined. The 'federal' Europe might arguably be a more proper description of what went on in Maastricht and what will happen over the rest of this decade.

The process moves forward, sometimes slowly, but all the time increasing the extent to which the truly key issues are being decided outside the old nations and usually at a European level⁴⁹. The EC leaders, in the post-Maastricht period, face two immediate challenges on the road to a United States of Europe: the 12 existing members must finance the costly new responsibilities that have been undertaken - notably assistance to the relatively poorer states before their deadline of 1999 for a common currency and a queue of nations, headed by Turkey, some EFTA member states, Malta and Greek Cyprus, is eager to join the new Union. The Eastern and Central European countries are also hopeful for future accession. If the federal union is not achieved in due time, the EC will lack the capability to act as a global power and, face the risk of balkanization in the old continent instead of

⁴⁸ "The European Summit at Maastricht", in The Federalist, Year XXXIII, 1991, Number 3, published by the Fondazione Europea Luciano Bolis, p.167

⁴⁹"Historic Importance of Maastricht", David Blake, in the European, 12-13 December 1991, London

europeanization. The lessons of last year are that a divided continent is a powerless one. Nowhere has this been clearer than in former Yugoslavia where a bloody civil war has taken thousands of lives while the EC has sat wringing its hands, negotiating ceasefire after ceasefire.

The feasibility of the Maastricht decisions has been, in certain member states, seriously questioned. Calls for a re-negotiation of the Maastricht compromise has caused a sense of disappointment and alarm in Brussels. The ratification of the Treaty by all the national parliaments is not definite yet. Only four nations - France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg - have so far approved the accord, while the Danish already turned it down last June. The Danish prime minister Poul Schluter stated that only by "meeting special Danish problems with legally binding amendments to the Maastricht Treaty"⁵⁰ could the way be opened for a second, favourable referendum in Denmark next year. Beyond the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty - which is regarded as essential by all EC members - he indicated that the "special Danish problems" covered monetary union, common European defence and social policy. He described an opting-out clause on the third and final stage of monetary union - akin to the one negotiated at Maastricht by Britain - as a "possible solution".

The chief architects of Maastricht - the German, French and Italian governments -⁵¹, almost a year on, are all in serious trouble. In Germany and Italy, the Christian Democratic parties that were the defining force behind the founding of the EEC are losing significant electorate ground. In Germany, the alarming rise of the far right, confirmed in the 5 April elections in the two Länder and in Italy the rise of the Northern League are worrisome developments. In France's last regional elections, the far right and the Greens benefited the results while the ruling Socialists experienced a heavy defeat. The French have come to realize that Germany is sure to dominate the EC with or without political union. And in all three capitals, national problems are bulking now larger than at any time in the past decade.

The Maastricht Treaty was in fact supposed to answer decisively what direction the Community would take for the next decade or two. But having accepted by only an exceedingly narrow majority of France's voters, after having been rejected by an even narrower majority in Denmark, the Treaty clearly does not command sufficient public support to carry out its enormous purposes. Two different concepts have wrestled for control of the EC's future. One was essentially political, pushing toward the ideal of supranational government, using commerce as a device to bring people closer together. The idea in the early decades was to make another European war impossible; more recently, it was to create a unified European power capable of standing as a counterweight to the United States and Japan. The governments of the original six members - France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries - hoped to advance that purpose with the Maastricht Treaty. The other side of the debate⁵² argues that the Community's purpose is to get rich - that it is a trading area whose members are separate and sovereign countries, and that it ought to stay that way. That is the Gaullist view of Europe, currently represented most forcefully by the British. It

⁵⁰ "Danes Want Special Deal From EC", John Eisenhammer, in The Independent, 8 October 1992.

⁵¹ "Maastricht is Obsolete", an editorial in The Independent, 9 April 1992, p.26. Also, see the parliamentary debate on the Maastricht decisions, reported in Agence Europe, 8 April 1992, No. 5707.

⁵² "Europe at a Crossroads", an editorial in The International Herald Tribune, 23 September 1992, p.8.

is possible that the 12 countries will refuse to choose between these two visions of their future. They may insist on both. That would mean a core consisting of France, Germany, Benelux and perhaps a few others moving toward Union in the North American sense of the word, with a common currency and an increasingly strong European Parliament. Surrounding that core, the other members would continue to be part of the present free trade area in which four freedoms prevail without much regard to borders. The Maastricht debate in EC countries has shown that there is a wide gap between governments and their publics. While governments are on the look-out for a new Continent, their publics widely feel either "interned below deck"⁵³ or left behind. True though it may be that foreign policy and diplomacy are ill-suited as for direct democratic participation, there can be no denying that there will be no European integration unless it enjoys public support. The implications of the Maastricht process, it seems certain, will continue to be felt deeply on the process of European integration in the long years to come.

3- THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - The European politico-strategic situation has radically changed over the past few years. We have seen the threat of massive attack from the USSR and its satellites recede and the emergence of new risks. At the same time the Gulf Crisis has proved that the threats now facing Europe no longer come from only one direction and has provided all too tangible evidence of the danger of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the need arose to build a framework of interlocking institutions defining a new European security architecture. The EC in its process of integration, NATO and the CSCE have all responded in their own specific fields to the challenges posed over the past two years by Europe's new politico-strategic situation.

The European security is now based on three mutually reinforcing pillars - NATO, WEU and CSCE - in which NATO, the principal point of reference⁵⁴ of the entire system, interacts with the other two. NATO's future dimensions and outlook will be greatly influenced by the creation of the European Political Union. It is now clear that the WEU will become the security identity of the Community as well as the European pillar of the NATO, but it is far from clear how these two functions will be aligned and orchestrated in the years ahead. What seems certain is that NATO will also be transformed by the new phase of Community construction in the EC; that the Europeans will have to carry a larger share of the burden of the common defence and that some members will worry about their possible marginalisation within the new structure. The WEU has taken the necessary steps towards forming the European pillar in NATO by inviting non-EC European NATO allies to become associate members of the organisation. Nevertheless, NATO is still the main security body, not only for its members but also for the new democracies in Central & Eastern Europe. Hence, the issue is no longer how to contain and deter a specific enemy, to

⁵³ "French Referandum Holds Lessons for Governments", Gunther Nonnenmacher, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 September 1992.

⁵⁴ "Pursuing a Durable Peace in the Aftermath of the Cold War", Johan Jorgen Holst, in The NATO Review, August 1992, p.9-13.

dissuade him from mounting and executing particular threats. It is, rather, one of providing residual insurance against unspecified dangers in an uncertain world, uncertainties stemming more from the interplay of economic, social and ethnic forces in weak and volatile societies striving to overcome the vestiges of generations of communist oppression, mismanagement and exploitation. Old animosities and conflicts could re-emerge and others be added as they seek to fashion new identities, roles and relations in the international arena.

The CSCE, institutionalised by the Paris Summit of November 1990, is the main forum for political consultations and crisis management on a pan-European basis and is indeed regarded as the standard-bearer of democratic legitimacy, as we saw in the invocation of the CSCE principles as a condition for the recognition of the new states in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The drawbacks of the CSCE, namely the lack of proper institutionalisation, have been recognized, and attempts are being made to correct them. In particular, the means of the newly established *Conflict Prevention Center*, originally proposed at NATO's London Summit, will have to be further strengthened. The Allied proposal made in Rome last November to suspend the rule of unanimity in the CSCE in certain circumstances to allow political measures to be taken against states violating the Helsinki Final Act or Charter of Paris is particularly significant. The CSCE was extended to include all the republics of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

This enlargement by a dozen new sovereign states in addition to the three Baltic ones has indeed turned the CSCE into a Eurasian affair with a marked Asian-Islamic accentuation. The admission of the ex-Soviet Republics - in part as a result of energetic efforts of Turkey⁵⁵ - to the North Atlantic "Cooperation Council" has also been realized. The idea of a 'house of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok' across the North Atlantic and Eurasia would be, if realized, the most extensive geo-political construction since the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire or the British Empire. The question is however whether North America and Europe have enough common political ground and the necessary power to back up such a big step. If not, **Ruhl** foresees, this construction will become the "Tower of Babel of the 20th Century"⁵⁶.

With 51 states today and perhaps even more tomorrow, the CSCE will remain an unwieldy process which may well find it difficult to achieve broad consensus due to the inhomogeneous composition of its membership. It also lacks the effective means to enforce its decisions. The question for the CSCE is now how its 'experience' can be best employed in future to extinguish conflicts, not just in ex-Yugoslavia and Nagorna-Karabakh, where it already failed, but also in Georgia, Moldova and even Tadjikistan, and to prevent potential crises from exploding. The new CSCE buzz-words are therefore conflict prevention, crisis management, protection of minorities and peace-keeping.

As for the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which bears great importance for European security, nearly one year into its existence, it is seemingly

⁵⁵ Interview with a NATO international staff (Defence Policy and Planning Department) in Brussels on 24 March 1992. The official underlined that Turkey's persuasive diplomacy contributed a great deal to the Central Asian and Caucasian republics gaining membership status in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

⁵⁶ "The CSCE: 'Home of Security' or a New Tower of Babel ?", Lothar Ruhl, in Die Welt, Bonn, 8 February 1992.

marching towards collapse. In fact, the CIS was never planned as a federal state in the German or American sense. It has merely marked another stage in the final collapse of the Soviet hegemony. Ethnic conflicts, economic anarchy and military rivalries have placed intolerable pressures on the loose association of 11 former Soviet republics established last December in Minsk. The 'final nail in the coffin', as **Barber** eloquently put it⁵⁷, was almost certainly Russia's decision to create its own Defence ministry. Previously, Russia had advocated that the CIS should maintain a united military force, combining conventional as well as nuclear units. But Yeltsin appears to have concluded that the disintegration of the ex-Soviet armed forces into separate national entities⁵⁸ is inevitable. That view is apparently shared by the president of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who said his republic will create its own national guard. Meanwhile, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Azerbaijan have covered quite a distance towards the creation of their own armed forces and other republics are sure to follow suit. The security implications of such a fragmented entities are obviously unpredictable and pose a serious risk for the Western Alliance.

The prevailing trends can be perceived only as general directions. The former Soviet power sphere is threatened by violence and chaos while the Western countries are no longer united by a 'useful enemy'. The list of crisis situations that have so far emerged in the post-Cold War era, is a rather long one: the Gulf War, which failed to materialize its initially declared goals; the Yugoslav civil war now raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the resultant emergence of new states in the Balkans altering significantly the traditional balance of power; the Nagorna-Karabakh conflict in the Trans-Caucasia; the Georgian-Abakzha conflict and the Russian-Ukrainian rivalry to name just a few. The region west of what was previously the Soviet Union is also torn by internal conflict and tensions, primarily between Poles and Lithuanians, Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians. Practically, all political forces from Estonia to Bulgaria (Russia, too) look to the West, seeking membership in the European Community, the Council of Europe, the OECD and, if possible, also in NATO, in an effort both to assert European identity and to cope with the current problems of development and conflict⁵⁹. The Western connection is generally seen in these countries as a necessary prerequisite of mastering the great difficulties which have piled up in the socialist past.

In the face of such a situation, it seems that the security dimension of the European architecture will become more important than ever in the period ahead. The Western Alliance system NATO-WEU-European Community, it is widely believed, provides the only support for the still unstable and unbalanced European security constellation. The CSCE is, in its current form, far from constituting a collective security system. Complementary nature of these organisations are often talked about, suggesting that none of them alone can ensure a credible security blanket for the Eurasian region. The events in and concerning Europe since 1989 teach us that the future is not crisis-free and that the

⁵⁷ See The Guardian, 18 March 1992

⁵⁸ Russia would have its own conventional forces of between 1.25 and 1.5 mn. Separate strategic nuclear and ballistic missile defence force estimated at 280.000 will continue -for the time being- to remain subordinate to the CIS. See "Russia Still a Powerful Force", see The Guardian, Christopher Bellamy, 18 March 1992, p.17, for an updated version of Russian military strength.

⁵⁹ "Security in Europe: A Challenging Task", Gerhard Wettig, in the English edition of Aussen Politic, Vol.431/92, First Quarter 1992.

European security cannot only or not even primarily be guaranteed by political and economic means without military power. This is even more relevant in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus region. The threats or, in the words of the NATO's 'New Strategic Concept'⁶⁰, "risks" are now multi-directional. The risks embedded in this dimension cannot be covered in Europe and by European means alone. In an increasingly interdependent world, Europe is more vulnerable than ever before to the events beyond its borders as the world is entering a period of great instability.

Many long-standing international rivalries and resentments persist and are compounded by ethnic and religious factors. Nationalism is on the rise. Domestic disintegration threatens a number of sovereign states, and there is an increasing demand for international intervention in humanitarian emergencies and human rights violations. Poverty and deep economic inequities are dramatized by instant world-wide communication. Population pressures, vast economic migrations, ecological disasters, and imminent scarcities of essential natural resources all contribute to the growth of instability in many parts of the globe. Unlike during the Cold War years, the stability is not the natural by-product of a frozen geo-political situation. For a sustainable stability in Europe and around it, a substantial contribution of outer-European effort (read this as the USA) will be just as essential as it was during the East-West confrontation of the Cold War period⁶¹.

The NATO Secretary-General, a Europeanist, **Worner**, shows the way out: "A responsible, pragmatic internationalism is the real alternative for Europe"⁶². This must be based on the concept of partnership and on co-operative structures that tie the three power centres of the globe - the US, Europe and Japan - closely together. Neither Japan, nor Europe can replace the US in its leadership function. The US role is crucial in determining whether international relations become increasingly well ordered or sink instead into increasing disorder. But only if Japan and Europe assume more responsibilities in partnership with the US will the advanced industrial democracies be able to uphold the global momentum towards democracy and market economy.

An interesting and significant trend in the new European architecture is the emergence of closer economic groupings of the "regionalized" nature. In other words, attention has been brought to the issue of regional economic integration because it has increasingly involved contiguous or "geographically close" countries. Apart from the 'regions of Europe' gaining currency in the Community literature and practice, some member states are moving towards forging new sub-regional groupings inside the EC or in co-operation with non-EC member neighbouring countries. The latest effort in this direction has been the revival of historic, trading and cultural links between all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea. The Danish foreign minister, Mr. Uffe Elleman-Jensen remarked, during a ministerial meeting on 5 March 1992, that, 10 years from now, all the Baltic states

⁶⁰ "The Alliance Strategic Concept", agreed by the Heads of State and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1215/91, p.4

⁶¹ See an article by Gunther Nonnenmacher in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 January 1992, appeared also in the English language *German Tribune*, No. 1501, 31 January 1992, for an in-depth analysis of this matter.

⁶² See Worner's Bruges Lecture, 2 April 1992, p.3.

would be either members of the EC, or closely linked to it and that it would be possible to speak of a Baltic Community as a region within the EC⁶³. The fundamental aim of this German-Danish initiative, bringing together Germany, Russia, Poland, all the Scandinavian countries and the three newly-independent Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is defined as aligning the former communist states of the region firmly into the Western democratic and free market system. The meeting also decided to establish a Council of the Baltic Sea States, to function as a regional forum for intensified co-operation and co-ordination of policies in the areas ranging from trade to the environment, energy, transport, communications, education, culture and humanitarian aid.

Italy, too, has already pioneered the launch of a similar sub-regional initiative, namely the Hexagonal (soon to be renamed "Central European Initiative) with its immediate neighbours - Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and ex-Yugoslavia. With a history of less than three years, the Hexagonal has ambitiously embarked upon 119 projects in various areas⁶⁴. Another noteworthy initiative is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ), which we shall look at later in detail. Such regional cooperation initiatives in Europe could provide suitable instruments for the dissemination of certain norms and standards, principles and policies and to prepare new European democracies for a smooth integration into the European and eventually the world system. They offer broad opportunities in this respect from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and from the Adriatic to the Caspian Sea.

4- HOW FAR ENLARGEMENT PROCESS WILL GO? -- When asked why Austria had not applied for EC membership in the late 1970s or early 1980s - perhaps at the time when Spain and Portugal had applied - an Austrian diplomat⁶⁵ has compared the EC, looking back to that time, to a snail. One had to look very closely to see in which direction it was moving or whether it was even moving at all. Today the EC is quite different compared to what it was 10 years ago. It has now become the basic 'anchor' and framework for all West European and increasingly pan-European activities for further integration and co-operation. And the European architecture in the 1990s is likely to be based on the EC, moving further in the direction of a federation⁶⁶. There is an increased demand for the full membership by European countries outside the EC as a result of two major developments: the successful evolution of the EC-Europe [Single European Act, Internal Market, EMU and Political Union] and the revolution in East Europe & the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia [leading to a decreased engagement of superpowers in Europe and creation of democratic & market oriented economies in those countries]. Even the established democracies and successful economies and welfare states such as Sweden and Switzerland are confronted with growing internal doubts about their specific virtues and special role in the world and have made the fateful decision of being part of the EC system.

⁶³ "Moves to Bridge Divide Between the East and the West", Robert Mauthner, in The Financial Times, 6 March 1992.

⁶⁴ "European Integration and New Regional Cooperation Initiatives", Unal Cevikoz, in NATO Review, June 1992, p.23-27.

⁶⁵ Interview with an Austrian diplomat in Brussels, January 1992

⁶⁶ "Europe 2000: A Federal Community in An Interdependent World", John Pinder, in the International Spectator, Vol. XXVI, No.1 January-March 1991, p.154

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe view the Community as an essential partner, who can assist them in "rejoining Europe", thus ending the artificial divisions of past decades. The Community has responded positively to this desire insofar as decisive steps have been taken in the creation of systems based on the principles of democracy and market-oriented economy. These steps concern the areas of : the rule of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of multiparty systems, the holding of free and fair elections, and economic liberalisation with a view to introducing market economies in these formerly communist countries.

Thus, following almost a year of negotiations, Europe Agreements were signed in December 1991 with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, known also as the partners-in-transition (PIT). The European Parliament ratified the Europe Agreements signed with Poland and Hungary in September 1992, but postponed the debate the one with Czechoslovakia because of the forthcoming division of this country, which may require a substantial renegotiation if the two successor states fail during the coming months to set up a sufficiently deep customs union between themselves. The Commission hopes that the two Association Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, negotiated since Spring 1992, will be signed before the end of this year⁶⁷. They represent a forward-looking, revised model in some areas when compared with the 1963 Association Agreement with Turkey. As the EC prefers to operate on the basis of the precedents, the 'Europe' Agreements⁶⁸ may be taken as

⁶⁷ East-West Fortnightly Bulletin, 17 September 1992, No.533, p.2.

⁶⁸ The Commission paper [20 February 1992, JD/ar, 1-E-3] entitled "Association Agreements, Known As 'Europe Agreements'" and various issues of the Financial Times as well as the Economist have been used in examining the Euro-Agreements. It might be useful to highlight main aspects of these new generation agreements. Europe Agreements have a common framework, adapted to the specific situation of each partner-country: (Political Dialogue) regular meetings will take place including meetings at the highest political level on all subjects of mutual interest with the aim of supporting the reforms and of achieving convergent views on matters of foreign policy; (Trade in Goods) a preferential treatment will be given and a free trade area will be established progressively for industrial goods, with reciprocal trade concessions to be implemented in an asymmetrical way. That is to say, the Community's concessions will be introduced sooner than those of the associated countries. Upon entry into force of the Agreements, about 60 % of the Community's imports from the three Central European countries will enter free of duties, and all quantitative restrictions except those for textiles will be abolished. The remaining trade barriers applied by the EC on industrial imports will be abolished within five years, except for textiles for which the tariff barriers will be lifted within six years, and for which the elimination of quantitative restrictions will be linked to the results of the GATT's Uruguay Round Talks. Further concessions in agricultural products will also be applied on a reciprocal basis. Trade in processed agricultural products and in fishery products will be governed by specific provisions; (Trade Related Issues) the agreements include a number of common provisions applying in principle to trade in all products. Among these are the standstill clause prohibiting the introduction of new trade restrictions, the safeguard clause, anti-dumping provisions, definition of originating products, and shortage provisions allowing for export restrictions. The PITs will, however, be allowed to derogate exceptionally from the standstill clause in order to protect, under strict conditions, infant industries and sectors in restructuring; (Movement of Workers) the Agreements aim at improving the situation of workers legally employed and their families. The EC member states are encouraged to favourably consider the possibility of concluding bilateral agreements on access to labour markets. During the transitional period, these countries may also derogate from granting national treatment to the Community companies and nationals in order to protect their newly emerging industries and sectors undergoing restructuring; (Competition) competition rules, similar to those applied in the EC will have to be introduced in the associated countries. Development-oriented state aids may be authorised in the low income regions. Specific rules for the coal and steel sectors are also provided. They will, within five years, provide levels of protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property, in conformity

a useful, starting reference for Turkey in the future talks with the Community negotiators for a *sui generis* status. Some of the asymmetrical measures proposed in the Europe Agreements drew sharp reaction from certain member states, worried about the threat to their domestic producers of the free inflow of most East European competitive products. France, for instance, had blocked the conclusion of these agreements until the very last moment, attempting to reduce the meaningfulness of the 'accelerated' Association Agreements in textile, steel and agricultural products. Most people in Central and Eastern Europe consider the EC as a "mythical attraction", a panacea for all their problems, an ideal they should strive to attain, although they are usually not well-acquainted with what the Community really stands for.

In fact, the Eastern and Central European & former Soviet states do not fit into a uniform category. They have different levels of economic development. The EC does not therefore offer the same treatment to all these countries and instead pursue a selective policy approach. This produces justifiably resentment among them. For example, Romania and Bulgaria feel relegated to a second-class club of ex-communist countries, behind the first class trio of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland⁶⁹, which is visibly favoured by Germany. Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic have sought to speak with one voice in their contacts to secure effective concessions from the EC. Foreign Ministers of these three countries (known as the Visegrad Trio) presented on 5 October 1992 a formal request⁷⁰ to begin EC membership negotiations by 1996 with a view to entering the Community by the end of the century during their first official meeting with EC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg. The response from the EC was non-committal.

As for the EFTA member states, Brussels initially hoped that the negotiations for the European Economic Area (EEA) would satisfy the aspirations of the EFTA member countries for closer relations with the EC and discourage new applications for accession. The EEA is, however, destined to be short-lived, as most EFTA countries have applied or are about to apply for full membership. The seven EFTA countries agreed to the wholesale adoption of some 10.000 pages of the existing Single Market legislation, forming the core of the EEA rules. The key dispute was over future judicial interpretation of common EEA laws, as court judgements can significantly alter the impact of a law. A mixed EEA Court of

with the Community standards. Non-discriminatory access to public contract award procedures is also provided for; (Approximation of Law) this is a major precondition for economic integration into the EC. The associated countries will ensure compatibility of their legislation with the EC laws and technical assistance will be provided for this purpose; (Economic Co-operation) this is to enable the associated countries in meeting the challenge of restructuring their economies and achieving competitiveness by the end of the transitional period through - industrial standards, investment promotion and protection, education, training, science and technology, agriculture, energy and nuclear safety, environment and water management, transport, telecommunications, postal services and broadcasting, banking, insurance and other financial control, regional development, social issues, tourism, small and medium sized enterprises, information and communication, customs, statistics, economics, public administration and drugs; (Cultural Co-operation) both sides undertook to promote cultural co-operation to increase mutual understanding between their peoples; (Financial Co-operation) the associated countries shall benefit from temporary financial assistance in the form of grants and loans. This assistance will include the continuation of that currently provided under PHARE and European Investment Bank loans.

⁶⁹ "Welcome to the Seething South", in The Economist, 2 March 1991, p.53.

⁷⁰ "East European States Put Case for EC Entry", Lionel Barber, in The Financial Times, 6 October 1992.

EC and EFTA judges would have ensured uniform interpretation of laws. Or so it seemed until last December when the European Court of Justice effectively struck down the joint panel idea, claiming it jeopardised its own autonomy in determining what was the Community law⁷¹. The EFTA countries have come from being a basic free-trade area, when EFTA was first set up in 1960, to something close to a Single Market. The EEA, which should come into force at the beginning of 1993, links EFTA with the EC in all the four freedoms provided by the EC's 1992 Internal Market Programme.

The principle of a European Union open to European states that aspire to full participation and who fulfil the conditions for membership is a fundamental element of the European construction. The European Council in Maastricht agreed that negotiations on accession to the Union can start as soon as the Community has terminated its negotiations on own resources and related issues in 1992. And the Lisbon Summit has paved the way for opening enlargement negotiations with a view to an early conclusion with EFTA countries seeking membership of the EC, inviting the Commission to speed up preparatory work needed to ensure rapid progress including the preparation before the European Council in Edinburgh late this year of the EC's general negotiation framework. The official negotiation will be opened immediately after the Treaty on European Union is ratified and the agreement has been achieved on the Delors-II Package.

The enthusiasts for enlargement in the Commission point to the way that rich EFTA countries coming in could help both with the quest for economic and monetary union and the mounting argument over the Community's budget. They point out that all members of the first wave would be rich enough to be net contributors to the EC's budget, and rigorously managed enough to qualify early for EMU. The southern members, which are counting on the EC providing more regional and structural funds, will know that they are more likely to get it if they let the rich EFTA countries in. Yet, enlargement could be blocked, for the formal position at the moment is that negotiations will not start until the Maastricht Treaty is ratified. Countries such as France, Spain and Portugal have never been enthusiastic enlargers. They believe that the EC needs to "deepen" as it "widens", meaning that it should reform its institutions lest the arrival of new members paralyses its decision-making procedure. These countries agreed to speedy enlargement because Maastricht held out the promise of a more federal constitution. Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries⁷² are keener to let in new comers, but still argue that it would be wrong to enlarge without changing EC institutions.

Nevertheless, the crucial question is not clearly addressed yet whether the current EC model of integration is appropriate as the basis for incorporating the candidate members or not. In the past, the integration option was not available to **all** Europeans because of the 'iron curtain' cleavage. Some West Europeans (such as EFTA countries) preferred to stay out while some Southern Europeans (such as Turkey, Cyprus and Malta) were deliberately kept at a distance. But, now with the demise of the Cold War order and the emergence of the Community as a pole of attraction, the notion of "Europe" needs to be redefined - from the narrow usage coined by the EC to a more broader interpretation. The further enlargement has become inevitable; but the contradictions between deepening and widening and the issue

⁷¹ See The Financial Times, 4 February 1992

⁷² "If a Non Comes Next ...", in an editorial in The Economist, 19 September 1992, p.30.

of where the borders of Europe⁷³ stop do not seem to be resolved. There are a number of scenarios about how best the current enlargement process can be realised without undermining the established *acquis communautaire*. One to which we feel close is a proposal put forth by a senior Italian diplomat-politician, Mr. **Ruggiero**⁷⁴. He warns against advancing 'case-by-case', arguing that once the most difficult cases are resolved, it would be impossible to refuse those what has been granted others.

So what to do ? First, he suggests, proceed even before membership of the EFTA countries with a radical change in the institutional structure (this is what the Commission keeps telling). Then, check for the existence of two conditions - political democracy and the existence of a process of economic convergence. It is better to proceed by groups of countries (eg: EFTA, Central and Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Baltic, some republics of the former Soviet Union). The critical factor is time, thus the organisation of transition through the setting up of special structures. Instead of "concentric circles"⁷⁵, Ruggiero sees a structure that could be qualified as confederal with several communities based on the EC model, of which the latter would be a member, and which in turn would take part under certain conditions in the work of the EC. The degrees of development would be different but the structures similar. He says "we would thus create a synchronised movement going in the same direction and towards the same goal". We are of the opinion that if the Community is going to widen beyond the EFTA countries, the above proposal gives "food for thought" for a viable solution on which an integration model can be detailed.

The Lisbon Summit, while discussing further enlargement, took up the applications of Turkey, Cyprus and Malta as well and concluded that each application must be considered on its merits. With regard to Turkey, the European Council⁷⁶ underlined that the Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance and that there is every reason to intensify cooperation and develop relations with Turkey in line with the prospect laid down in the Association Agreement of 1963 including a political dialogue at the highest level. The European Council, the highest decision-making body of the EC, asked the Commission and the Council to work on this basis in the coming months.

Having discussed a fairly wide range of issues to provide a brief outlook of Turkey's historical ties with Europe and of the new European architecture still in the process of

⁷³ For instance, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, presenting an ambitious vision of a continent comprising two linked economic blocs, said the eastward expansion of the EC should stop with the accession of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Former Soviet states should form their own economic zone. Outlining what he called his "future Ostpolitik", he urged the EC to sign special treaties with the newly independent countries to help them rebuild their economies and develop a second economic group which could act as a "bridge from Europe to Asia". See The International Herald Tribune, 4-5 April 1992, p.5. for a full text of Kohl's statement.

⁷⁴ Italy's former Permanent Representative to the EC and former Minister of foreign Trade Ruggiero. His remarks made in a Geneva conference have been cited by Emanuele Gazzo, in Agence Europe Editorial "Enlargement and Enlargements: Worthwhile Contemplation", 16/17 March 1992, No.5690

⁷⁵ "Concentric Circles" of surrounding states has been envisaged by Jacques Delors. The first would consist of the rich EFTA countries as an inner ring of satellites, with the poorer Eastern European countries as an outer ring with associate membership status and the Mediterranean countries perhaps somewhere in between. See "EC Is Undecided: Should Its Doors Be open or Shut?" in German Tribune, 22 September 1991, No.1485, for an interesting discussion on this issue.

⁷⁶ "Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon Summit", June 1992, SN 3321/1192, p.4-5.

settling down, we may perhaps now proceed towards an analysis of the Turco-Community relationship as it stands with a view to establishing Turkey's place in the new European construction as well as to highlighting the future options ahead of both sides.

IV. AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE TURCO-COMMUNITY RELATIONS (1987-1992)

1- TURKISH REQUEST OF ACCESSION AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE.

a) Why Turkey Applied for Full Membership. The motive, on Turkish side, when Ankara applied for associate status back in 1959, was to join another European organisation, which would provide political, economic support and confirm its European identity. It is worth mentioning that the Turkish application had immediately followed that of Greece. The late 50's and early 60's were times when both political and economic circumstances were unusually favourable to such a connection in both Turkey and the Community. There were two unprecedented periods of prosperity, one due to the wheat boom and the agricultural development of the 50's, and the other due to the mounting European demand for Turkish labour.

This time, however, the reasoning was a bit more complicated, involving a variety of considerations. The 1987 bid for accession was generally seen as a conscious decision of the Turkish official think-tank. Historically, Turkey has been part of the European economic system. Anatolia's main trading partners have traditionally been European, whether Venetian, Ragusan, Genoese or English. From a strictly practical point of view, the essential objective for Turkey is not EC membership *per se*, but assured access to the European market. Turkey's powerful industrial, financial and business groups⁷⁷, resentful of the EC's growing protectionism in textiles, steel and agricultural products, have advocated strongly the case for a swift integration with the Community. They are convinced that their future lies in integrating with European markets as early as possible.

Trade, investment and economic cooperation are indeed more attractive to them than any inflow of the EC's structural or regional funds. About 60 percent of their trade volume is with the Community. The EC investors also provide 70 percent of foreign investment in Turkey. Obviously, they do not want to lag behind the 1992 Single Market, arguing that "European integration was proceeding steadily and Turkey was being left out because associate members do not have voice while full members do. In a few years it could be too late". For the Turks, it is also a question of being a full member of the Western Club in the face of instability in their volatile and unfriendly region. There is no doubt that political calculations, i.e. neutralising the Greek efforts⁷⁸ to exploit the EC mechanisms against Ankara, the Community's future security constellations, etc., have also contributed their

⁷⁷ The Economic Development Foundation (IKV) is the only Turkish organisation lobbying on the Commission, the Council and the EP for the cause of full membership and runs an office in Brussels for this purpose. Its membership includes almost all the large industrial and business conglomerates of Turkey.

⁷⁸ The absorption of Greece into the Community in the early 1980s and the active use Greece has subsequently made of its membership to press its disputes with the Turks was one of the major motivations. Rightly or wrongly, the Turks feel that Greece has used its EC membership to take the offensive against Ankara.

share to Turkey's decision to speed up the process of integration with the EC. Like in Greece, Portugal and Spain, some Turks seem to believe that the accession will act as the midwife for a whole series of political and economic reforms, extricating them from chronic internal problems and provide a sound framework of stability. On the desirability of membership, never before has there been such broad public consensus in Turkey with virtually all ideological and political groupings supporting the membership bid - except the Islamic fundamentalists who would rather see the establishment of an Islamic Common Market to counter what they consider the 'Christian crusaders'.

In fact, the Turkish application, when submitted in April 1987, did not come as a surprise at all since earlier signals had already been given to this effect. Some member states conducted a vigorous, but inconclusive, lobbying through their representations in Ankara to delay what has become the inevitable. On the day when the letter of the request of accession was handed over to Mr. Leo Tindemans, the then president-in-office of the EC Council, the Turkish prime minister declared that his country had set out on a "narrow, long and thorny path" towards accession⁷⁹.

The general reaction to the long-expected, but evidently unwelcome application from Ankara was rather cool in Brussels. The Foreign Ministers of the member states have decided by 11 to 1 (Greece) to refer the application to the Commission for an opinion in accordance with the routine procedure. The initial remarks underlined that the EC should "first resolve its internal problems before contemplating a new enlargement". The digestion of the Iberian enlargement had priority over any new enlargement. Some member states suggested the negotiation of a better Association arrangement rather than jumping into precipitous membership negotiations⁸⁰. Even in Turkey, most commentators found the application untimely, citing the argument that Turkey was not sufficiently prepared yet for the membership.

It was no doubt a well-calculated risk on the part of Turkey. Ankara knew perfectly well that, despite the remarkable progress made in the previous decade, the state of the Turkish economy was still far from being fit enough to fulfil the requirements of the Treaty of Rome, the 1987 Single European Act, the 1992 Internal Market and, above all, the Community's ambitious goal of the Economic and Monetary Union. In other words, the Turkish Government knew it had only ignited the trigger of a long drawn-out process. The feeling was, however, that the threshold of the Community membership would most likely be raised in the near future (As a matter of fact, the Maastricht decisions proved that point) and that the chance of getting on the EC train might be missed for ever, if not hurried at once. Today Turkey stands, in the league of full membership hopefuls, as the first country to register an application - a mark of foresightedness. Such a big move, it was thought, could pressurize the feet-dragging, evasive Community to face up the Turkish reality and thus, to give a serious consideration to Turkey's expectations.

From the statements of the Turkish political leaders, it became obvious that Turkey was not expecting its application to yield an immediate positive response. It recognized the EC's dilemma and its own internal problems for a smooth accession. What actually has been

⁷⁹ See Agence Europe, 14 April 1987, p.9

⁸⁰ See Agence Europe, 24 April 1987, p.10, for reactions of German, Dutch and French Foreign Ministers.

expected from the EC was - and remains - that it sends a political signal to embrace the oldest associate partner into its fold in the not-too-distant future - a green light. Turkey's quest for membership should also be viewed as a natural extension of its historic orientation towards Europe. Full membership would, from the Turkish perspective, confirm and reinvigorate the Western-looking, Atatürkist tradition, giving a valuable external boost to the democratic process in Turkey. Former Turkish Ambassador to the EC (now the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry), Mr. Özdem Sanberk summarized the primary Turkish motives as follows: "We felt it was necessary to remove the general uncertainty surrounding the EC-Turkish relations and reinforce the consensus about becoming fully European, in order that our political, economic and social policies might move forward. The opening of the membership negotiations represents to the Turkish people the first step in an irreversible chain of events leading to the full EC membership"⁸¹

b) An Evaluation of the Community Response. But the Community saw matters differently. On 5 February 1990, the EC Council of Ministers concluded, on the basis of the opinion of the Commission on 18 December 1989, that it was not appropriate that the "Community should accept any further membership applications, given its own changing shape", but reaffirmed the principle enshrined in the Association Agreement that Turkey was eligible for membership. In a plain language, the EC had taken three years to say 'not yet'. The specific reasons given at that time included the challenge faced by the EC over the next few years in completing the third enlargement, the implementation of the 1992 Single Market and the concern over the problems of absorbing Turkey with its current economic and political difficulties. The Council of Ministers decided that Turkey, in the meantime, should be assisted by a comprehensive cooperation package plus financial assistance - known as the **Matutes Plan** - with a view to helping prepare this country for future accession.

⁸¹ Quoted in "Turkey and the European Community", a background paper submitted by FORUM EUROPE to a conference in Brussels, 30-31 October 1991

At this point, it might be useful to briefly examine how the Commission had drawn up its opinion. The working method adopted by the Commission involved the establishment of an inter directorates-general working group, which would meet at technical level. (Note that in the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the working group had been set up at the level of Commissioners). The group gathered together all documents and studies about Turkey prepared by reliable national, international/public or private institutions, bodies or agencies. The Commission also invited Turkish officials and experts while at the same time sending fact-finding missions to Turkey. The Commission's draft report was supposedly devoid of any interpretation and assessment - merely a coherent set of data to be considered by the College of Commissioners for the final shape of the opinion. Yet it became clear that the Commission study was not merely a technical survey⁸². And the way in which it was handled by the Commission had aroused justifiable dissatisfaction on the Turkish side.

In October 1989, a Commission report classified as "*SECRET*" and highly negative on Turkey's application was leaked on purpose to the Turkish press⁸³ evidently to lower the expectations in Turkey as regards the immediate membership. The main conclusions of this report, which came to be known as "Rhein Report", were as follows: "If Turkey is granted accession to the Community, progress towards the Single Market will be seriously hampered. The goals of the EMU and EPU will also lose their momentum. Decision-making process will greatly suffer. Most of the Community resources will be channelled towards rectifying Turkey's difficulties. One-fifth of the EP seats will be occupied by Turkish MEPs. EC's internal harmony will be upset because of Turkey's predominantly Muslim population, Turkish nationalistic sentiments and so on...". This report had highlighted more or less what the formal opinion would look like.

The Commission opinion⁸⁴, which was officially announced on 18 December 1989 by the Commissioner, Mr. Abel Matutes, consists of thirteen articles and two annexes. The opinion stressed that enlargement, not only for Turkey, but also other potential candidates, could be contemplated only after the 1992 Single Market. Moreover, a detailed analysis of Turkey's economic and social development had clearly brought out that in spite of important progress since 1980 in restructuring and opening the economy to the outside world, a major gap still existed in comparison with EC levels of development. In addition, the report pointed to some human rights problems in the country. Long-running disputes with one particular member country, namely Greece and the situation in Cyprus were also cited as issues causing concern in the Community. According to the annexed report, the Turkish economy faces four major difficulties: "existence of important structural disparities in both agriculture and industry; macro-economic inequilibria; high protection in industry; and low social security". The financial burden which Turkey will bring to the EC is also analyzed. Concerns in this field are mostly related to the extension of structural & regional funds, additional budgetary expenditure and negative impact of the Turkish workers on unemployment problem already haunting the Community.

⁸² Interview with a Commission official, in charge of relations with Mediterranean countries, (DG-I), 29 January 1992, Brussels

⁸³ See Turkish daily newspaper "Hurriyet", 4-6 October 1989, Istanbul

⁸⁴ "Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request For Accession to the Community", Commission of the EC, Brussels, 20 December 1989, SEC(89) 2290 Final

The conclusion part of the Opinion⁸⁵ has clearly established the framework for future relations as well as formulating concrete proposals to be implemented. It reads as follows: "The Community propose to Turkey a series of substantial measures which, without casting doubt on its eligibility for membership of the Community, would enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration. These measures will focus on the following four aspects - * completion of the customs union, * the resumption and intensification of financial contribution, * the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and * the strengthening of political and cultural links.

These measures should be situated in the framework of the Association Agreement which currently governs relations between Turkey and the Community." The Commission proposals reflect the basic offerings of the 'Europe' Agreements - no more than them. The Community also undertook to review the arrangements for trade in Turkish textiles and agricultural products and suggested the adoption by Turkey of the common policies essential for the proper operation of the customs union scheduled to be completed by 1995. It was envisaged that the progressive completion of the customs union would give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey more closely with the Single Market, while taking into account the constraints imposed by the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community.

c) Current State of Affairs. Although the Turks had, as a preliminary reaction, expressed dissatisfaction at the Community response, the Matutes package has met with quite favourable interest from the Turkish government. Despite much discussion, the Community has not so far been able to flesh out this package and put into implementation due to a stubborn Greek veto. The ball still stays in the Community's court. The swift implementation of this package would give an added impetus and vitality to the currently stagnant state of co-operation between Turkey and the EC. There are nevertheless some encouraging signs that the package might soon be translated into action.

Now a quick review of how relations are evolving. The 32nd session of the EEC-Turkey Association Council was held in Brussels (September 1991) for the first time since 1986. Reviving the Turkey-EC Parliamentary Council took much longer because of widespread objections raised by Socialist, Liberal, Green and Communist MEPs to Turkey's political and human rights situation. Since the beginning of 1989 this Council has met eight times. Its work was strongly handicapped by the inactivity of the Association Council, which finally met on 30 September 1991 after five year's interruption. The meeting, the first since 1986, brought together EC foreign ministers and a Turkish government team led by the foreign minister to discuss the further development of Turkey's relationship with the EC. Both sides have clearly stated their political will to strengthen and deepen their relations.

The practical outcome of the meeting was the decision to relaunch regular sessions of the 'association committee' in which Turkish and EC officials will carry out detailed work on trade and economic issues⁸⁶. Protocols of adaptation of the Association Agreement to take account of Spanish and Portuguese accession were signed by the Council in July 1987

⁸⁵ The Commission Opinion, p.8

⁸⁶ "Turkey Newsletter", October 1991, published by the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the EC, Brussels.

and received the EP's assent in January 1988 and a similar protocol of adaptation was agreed with Greece in 1988. Based on that protocol, Turkey has begun to enjoy since 1 January 1989 access to the Greek market on exactly the same basis as in other member states - apart from Spain and Portugal where transitional arrangements will continue to apply for some years.

The Commission Vice-President, Mr. Martin Bangemann, paid an official visit to Turkey from 19 to 22 January 1992 and, during his visit, a technical co-operation programme was signed in Ankara. Mr. Bangemann, in his talks with Turkish leaders, expressed the hope to "welcome Turkey soon as a member of the EC" and added that "Turkey was on the threshold of membership", along with the Baltic States and that he considered it "inconceivable" for an EC without Turkey. According to Mr. Bangemann, the prospect of the Turkish membership is not just a vision; the following would in particular play in favour of Turkey's accession: "Ankara will gain more political importance in the post-Soviet era with its political links to the republics of the Caucasus and beyond into Central Asia as well as such projects as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone; it is also making considerable progress both economically and on the road to democracy⁸⁷".

His statements had evoked some harsh criticism, particularly from the Greek MEPs, who accused him of deviating the established Community position vis-a-vis Turkey. Mr. Bangemann's visit provided the first hints of a new thinking now reportedly taking shape in the Commission about Turkey. A similar line has also been taken up by Ms. Raymond Dury, the Belgian socialist MEP and the rapporteur on Turkey. After a two-day trip to Turkey on 13-14 March 1992, she⁸⁸ noted that the Turkish political scene had changed since her last visit in June 1991. She had the opportunity to meet the prime minister, Mr. Demirel as well as other political leaders and human rights organisations. Talks brought to light a willingness to bring about change and democratisation, she stressed. In her opinion, the question of Turkey's accession to the EC can no longer be seen in the same light as in the past and she thus recommended in her report⁸⁹ a new approach for improved EC/Turkey relations.

⁸⁷ See Agence Europe, 22 January 1992, No.5651, p.7.

⁸⁸ "Raymond Dury Notes Political Change in Turkey", in Agence Europe, 19 March 1992, No.5692, p.4 and a report in the Turkish daily Milliyet on Dury's statements, 18 March 1992

⁸⁹ The Dury report is expected to put to vote in the European Parliament in April 1992.

As the relations were about to make a turn for better, the 'Kurdish problem' has made an unwelcome entry onto the regular agenda of the Turco-Community dialogue. The EC has, for the first time and at German insistence, formally protested Turkey's handling of its Kurdish separatist fight. Germany urged its EC partners to "condemn Turkey's attacks on Kurdish civilians and to remind Ankara that as a NATO, Council of Europe and CSCE member, it was obliged to respect human rights"⁹⁰. (See **the Political Credentials** section for a detailed discussion of this issue and its ramifications on Turco-German relations).

The EP, too, debated in an emergency session, the 'Kurdish problem' and adopted a resolution on the Kurdish situation in Turkey, calling on Ankara to "respect human rights in its fight against terrorist actions and to take all the necessary measures so as to allow for dialogue leading to a 'democratic and peaceful solution'"⁹¹. The EP resolution called on the Council and the Commission to do "all that can be done, in the framework of the international community, with the aim of finding a definitive solution to the Kurdish question". Turkey has reacted sharply to the EC moves in this regard which it interpreted as 'an indirect encouragement of terrorism'. The Turks stressed that terrorism was the greatest obstacle to the democratization process and that the PKK terrorism and the wishes of the Kurdish people for greater democratic rights were two separate issues which should not be confused. Democratic rights and terrorism need to be distinguished.

The Turkish foreign minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin, has made in a recent interview⁹² what one may call a sober assessment of Turkey concerning the future orientation of the Turco-Community relations. He conceded that Turkey was unlikely to become a full member of the EC before the end of the century while at the same time emphasising that, no matter what happened, Turkey would pursue its long term objective to become "part of Europe and to be in all the institutions of Europe".

At a Gymnich-type meeting, held on 1 and 2 May 1992 in northern Portugal (Guimaraes), EC foreign Ministers agreed to reflect upon the means of strengthening links between the Twelve and Turkey through a "new approach" as a temporary answer to the request for accession filed by the Turkish government. The foreign ministers had entrusted Mr. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, with preparing a discussion document on the issue. In fact, after his visits to Athens and Ankara in prior to taking over the presidency, Mr. Hurd explained to his colleagues that Turkey was a "growing power" in a region where "instability reigns". In plain terms, according to Mr. Hurd, Turkey would be more than ever a "key element in the Middle East machine, notably regarding the Central Asian Republics" of the former USSR⁹³. Bearing in mind Turkey's relationship with these regions, the Community and its member states would be unwise to take Turkey's Western orientation for granted. Though Turkey is clearly keen to respond to a readiness to build up EC/Turkey relations, significant elements in Turkey still pull in the other direction and may be

⁹⁰ "EC to Protest Turks' Handling of Kurdish Revolt" in The International Herald Tribune, 4-5 April 1992, p.5.

⁹¹ "EP/Turkey: The EP Calls On Turkey to Respect Human Rights and Work Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Problem" in Agence Europe, 10 April 1992, No.5708, p.5.

⁹² "Turks pin EC hopes on British presidency", Robert Mauthner and John Murray Brown, in The Financial Times, 28 April 1992.

⁹³ "EC-Turkey: Considering a New Approach", in Agence Europe, 4 May 1992, p.3.

strengthened if the West appears unresponsive. It is in the interests of the Community and its member states to reinforce Turkey's Western orientation and to establish a stable basis for a broad and active relationship with the West. For reasons set out above, Mr. Hurd proposed a global Community policy for Turkey, arguing that the Community and its member states have a clear interest in developing a strategy which reflects the concept of Turkey as a regional power meriting a special, enhanced relationship with the Community. The plan of action proposed by Britain and supported by France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Belgium in varying doses envisages three basic elements to such a new relationship:

i) A more structured and developed political dialogue. This could take place at both the governmental and the parliamentary level, including more regular meetings of Ministers and senior officials, and maintaining and developing the existing dialogue between the Turkish and European Parliaments. The Political Committee should examine how to put political dialogue with Turkey on a firmer and more regular footing, particularly given the range of regional issues on which there are common interests. This should include arrangements with Turkey for more regular political consultations, perhaps once during each presidency, with the TROIKA of Foreign Ministers.

ii) A developing economic relationship. There is clear advantage for all sides in establishing closer economic links. We should aim for significant progress along the lines suggested in the Matutes Package. The Commission's 1987 opinion had emphasized the need to strengthen EC/Turkey relations by building on the existing Association Agreement. To that end, the Commission proposed in 1990 a Cooperation Package which included the completion of a Customs Union by 1996, technical and industrial cooperation, enhanced political dialogue and adoption of the Fourth Financial Protocol (originally initialled in 1981) worth 600 mn ECU (375 mn in budgetary assistance and 225 mn in EIB loans) over five years.

Turkey should also be eligible to benefit from the horizontal cooperation programme of the new Mediterranean policy which should now be implemented. Further delay on both points would risk calling into question the validity of the commitment of the Community and its member states to an enhanced relationship with Turkey across the board. It remains in both sides' interests to continue work towards a Customs Union. Turkey has already made progress on customs duties, but the Community needs to encourage movement in a number of areas, including agricultural preferences, intellectual property, transparency of external tariffs and the dismantling of import levies.

iii) A fuller security relationship. Turkey has long been a staunch member of NATO. As security conditions in Europe have changed so too have the structures for ensuring the Alliance's defence. Turkey's security relationship also needs to be modernised, going beyond membership of NATO to include active associate membership of the WEU. In this respect, the package adopted by WEU Ministers on 19 June 1992 was a promising basis for a closer and developing Turkish involvement in European defence issues⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ The main lines of the Hurd report were extensively covered in "Hurd report on Turco-EC relations", in The Turkish Daily News, 20 July 1992, p.3.

Ankara's initial reaction to the British-led search for an alternative solution to Turkey's accession underlined that the "priorities and timetables of work carried out towards the objective of full membership may be adjusted to prevailing conditions"⁹⁵. The Turks say that the British paper contains some very positive elements, but had not fully satisfied them due to its still evasive character vis-a-vis the prospect of future membership. Nevertheless, Ankara has for some reason been led to believe that the presidency of Britain would give some momentum in its relations with Brussels. As the month of July was entered, there was a general feeling that something could be in the offing this time as far as Ankara-Brussels relations are concerned.

A recent visit by Mr. Abel Matutes, the EC Commissioner in charge of relations with Turkey, and the statements he made in Ankara served to bolster these heightened expectations as well. Especially when Mr. Matutes intimated at the positive environment for Turkey resulting from London's taking on the Community presidency and the positive prospects in this context for a lifting of the Greek veto on the Fourth Financial protocol for Turkey⁹⁶. A detailed discussion of the Hurd report was deferred to September 12-13 when the EC Foreign Ministers did meet in Hertfordshire (Britain), during which a declaration was also expected on the subject of Turkey. The EC foreign ministers only discussed "informally and in a general way" the increasing role of Turkey and the need for further improvement of the Turco-EC relations.

The meeting's practical result proved to be yet another disappointment. The ministers agreed with Greece during the meeting that a declaration on upgrading political ties with Turkey before the third round of Cyprus talks in New York would give Ankara "the wrong impression"⁹⁷, repeating the traditional cliché that nothing much can be expected from the EC to Turkey until such time as the Cyprus problem is resolved. And as a result, although the ministers exchanged views on Turkey, the Hurd report was not formally discussed, thus dashing the hopes for an early upgrading of Turkish-Community ties.

Besides the ever-present Greek obstruction, the fact is that there is currently little room for Turkey in Europe's agenda, which is now taken up by the uncertain future of the European Union as foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty and the after effects of the Danish and French referenda. Then, there is also the question of the new eligible applicants to the Community as well as the status of the Eastern and Central European countries. Under such unfavourable circumstances, the question of the EC normalizing at the earliest its relations with Turkey is difficult to address at the moment in a way that might do justice to the general expectations in Turkey concerning these relations. This might be the case from Turkey's point of view, too, whose own agenda is full due to critical developments in its own region, be these in the Balkans, the Middle East or the Caucasus as well as in its southeastern region. All in all, Ankara does not appear obsessed with the EC membership as was the case in the preceding decade, making it clear that it is not putting all its eggs in

⁹⁵ "EC-Turkey: Ankara admits that priorities and timetables can be adjusted to real conditions", in Agence Europe, 20 May 1992, p.5.

⁹⁶ "Turkey-EC: All Too Quite Despite the Promises", in The Briefing, Issue 906, 21 September 1992.

⁹⁷ "Greece blocks EC discussions on enhancing ties with Turkey", in The Turkish Daily News, 15 September 1992.

the "EC basket" to the exclusion of all else. The interplay of various factors should be taken into account for a proper understanding and assessment of the Turco-Community relationship.

2- FACTORS AFFECTING THE TURCO-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

a) Economic Fitness. This is the number one issue. The EC, with its 345 mn population and an average \$ 14.000 per capita income, forms the core of the greater European market of 500 mn people. Turkey, an associate member of the Community since 1963, will take a bigger step along the road in January 1996, if things go right, since that is when it is due to move into a full customs union with the Community; but this presupposes Turkey's ability to remove the various charges it still imposes on imports from the EC, and the EC's willingness to drop the textile quotas it still, largely on Portugal's insistence, imposes on Turkey.

In any event, customs union will still exclude most Turkish farm products. It is also unlikely to bring free movement of labour in the 1990s. Nor will it bring Turkey inside the complicated machinery of the Single Market and the EMU; the Turks will just have to adapt themselves to the Single Market's rules. Before the realization of the full membership goal, there are many things the Turks have to do. Over the past four decades, the Turks have been trying hard to combine rapid industrialisation with improvements in living standards for its young population. The growth rate of the economy has been over 6 percent for the last five years. Manufacturing has long overtaken farming in the Turkish economy. Four fifths of Turkish exports are of industrial products, while agricultural goods are less than one fifth. Turkey's export profile is surprisingly diversified, ranging from cars and buses to ceramics, carpets, textiles and pharmaceuticals. Confidence in Turkish economy has noticeably grown in general.

During the last five years, enterprises of the EC have invested the lion's share in Turkey - from \$ 80 mn in 1980 to \$ 1.25 bn in 1990. The Community's share of foreign investment rose by half as much from 46.5 % to 70 %. These figures indicate a healthy trend rather than a passing phenomenon. Turkey has a modern network of communications and transportation facilities, coupled with organized industrial zones, due to the priority given to energy, telecommunications and transport infrastructure projects in the 1980s. In addition, Turkey offers a mechanism for foreign participation in turnkey projects. Created in 1984 and known as the "BOT" (build, operate, transfer) formula, it allows foreign firms to directly invest in large-scale infrastructure projects such as dams, airports, power stations, auto-routes and railways⁹⁸. Last year, there were nearly 2000 foreign companies in Turkish market with the EC companies operating principally in agriculture and forestry, textiles and leather, metal goods, machineries, electronics, chemicals and fertilisers as well as in banking and trading. Turkish investments in the EC countries are also on the increase. An interesting

⁹⁸ BOT schemes consign a project's design, financing, construction, management and maintenance to either a national or international consortium. Once loans are repaid and investor-capital recovered, the Turkish government purchases the project at market prices. This formula has already been successfully used, for example, to build Ankara's metro system and to complete extension of Istanbul's Ataturk Airport. Turkey's ambitious privatisation plans have also sparked great interest among foreign investors.

development is that in Germany alone there are 33.000 small or medium-size Turkish enterprises with a total turnover of DM 30 bn, employing a total of 105.000 people. The investments of the Turkish companies in Germany are about DM 6 bn⁹⁹ - a figure several times higher than total German investments in Turkey. Turkish banks continue to acquire shares in some European banks in preparation for the 1992 project. And the leading business and industrial holdings have established their presence in all the major European capitals.

The EC is very important for Turkey's foreign trade. In 1990, 53.2 % of Turkish exports went to the EC markets and imports from the EC countries amounted to 41.8 % of total imports¹⁰⁰. The volume of trade was \$ 4 bn in 1980 while in 1990 it reached \$ 16 bn. However, the Turkish trade deficit with the EC has widened from \$ 647 mn in 1989 to \$ 2.45 bn in 1990¹⁰¹, an increase of 270 % in only one year. This deficit is expected to further increase in 1992. As an exporter to the EC it was in 48th position in 1980, and in 18th in 1990, while as a market for the Community exporters it rose during that period from 27th to 12th. Germany tops the list in the EC as Turkey's biggest trade partner, absorbing nearly a fifth (18.7 %) of Turkey's total imports in 1989.

By much the same token, 14 % of Turkey's imports come from Germany. Ankara is pressing for a balanced trade situation to result from its negotiations with Brussels. The Turkish government has adopted certain measures in the overall context of bringing its trade policy more into line with the rules arising from the Association. In this respect, Turkey's reduction of customs duties and alignment to the Common Customs Tariff vis-a-vis the Community has been realized according to the schedule that was agreed upon in 1988. This accelerated calendar of tariff dismantlements and alignments has been regularly implemented until the present-day. The consolidated liberalization ratio regarding Turkish imports from the EC has reached 80 percent, thereby marking the irreversibility of free and unhindered trade between Turkey and the Community.

Some economists are inclined to compare Turkey with the star performer in the EC: Spain¹⁰². The average annual economic growth rate of Turkey over the past ten years has been about the double of the Community average and much higher than that of all the new

⁹⁹ "Thirty Years of Turkish Immigration", Dr. Ataman Aksoyek, in The Courier, No.129, September-October 1991, p.60-63

¹⁰⁰ The State Institute of Statistics of Turkey, Foreign Trade Statistics, 1987-1990, Ankara

¹⁰¹ "EEC-Turkey: Cooperation Rekindled", in European Report, No. 1707, 28 September 1991, p.3. In 1990, EC imports from Turkey reached ECU 5.943 bn (1.8 % of total EC imports) and EC exports to Turkey amounted to ECU 7.722 bn (1.8 % of total EC exports, according to the Commission statistics.

¹⁰² Prof. Pier Carlo Padoan said, in our discussion, that Spain was going to be one of the great powers in the Community because it has exploited very well the opportunities of joining the EC and also, the EMS. He pointed to the impressive economic performance of Turkey over the past years and asked the question: "Whether Turkey is going to be another Spain if it accedes to the Community ? " (Brugge, 14 February 1992). Few notes on how Spain was incorporated into the EC might be useful. A fairly big Spanish economy posed severe problems of adaptation. The transitional period was rather long. This incorporation meant a further aggravation in the regional imbalance and a strain on the CAP. It involved a change in EC foreign and trade policy towards new areas, namely Latin America. Fortunately, it coincided with a period of international economic expansion. The quick adaptation of Spanish economy to the EC contrast quite sharply with that of Greek economy, whose performance did not result in a successful reforming and adjusting process. In Spain, the foreign direct investment totalled more than \$ 5 bn for 1985-87 and fared better up till now. It is now becoming one of the major economies in the Community.

members. Based on fixed prices and exchange rates, the Turkish GNP growth rate from 1980 to 1989 reached 54.2 % while the same rate was 40.6 % for Spain, 25.5 % for Portugal and 15.4 % for Greece. According to the OECD figures based on purchasing power parities, Turkish GNP amounted to \$ 247.6 bn in 1989 as this figure stood at \$ 401.9 bn for Spain, \$ 72.1 bn for Portugal and \$ 72.4 bn for Greece. Similar comparisons are also made in relation to gross fixed capital investments. Such investments in Turkey reached \$ 12.19 bn, almost equal to the total investments of Portugal and Greece combined. In energy production, Turkey reached a level of 28.20 million tons oil value in 1988. The same year Spain slightly exceeded the Turkish production with 30.5 mn tons while the Greek and Portuguese productions remained at 8.65 mn and 3.99 mn tons respectively. The Turkish exports totalled approximately \$ 20 bn in 1989 representing a six-fold increase since 1975. In 1980 Turkish exports were about half that of Greece whereas it is today more than double¹⁰³.

Despite impressive performance displayed by Turkish economy since 1980, its current economic situation does not convince that the adjustment problems which would confront Turkey if it were to accede to the EC could be readily overcome in the foreseeable future. There is still a major development gap. A comparison of GDP per head reveals that purchasing power parity in Turkey is one third of the Community average. This gap does not seem likely to be reduced rapidly, given the rapid population growth (2,5 % annually) and in spite of efforts to slow it down. As long as these disparities continue to exist, there will be reason to fear that Turkey would experience serious difficulties in taking on the obligations resulting from the EC's economic and social policies. Also, the additional budget burden, the access of Turkish labour to the Community and the competition coming from Turkey's agricultural and textile products give rise to fears in the Community.

It is clear that Turkey has a comparative advantage in global terms with regard to agricultural production. If the Community were enlarged to include Turkey, the consequences would be that the useable agricultural area of the EC would increase by 22 %, the number of farms would increase by 41 % and the agricultural workforce would almost double. As in most newly-industrialising economies, the once dominating role of

¹⁰³ Figures are taken from "The Possible Effects of A Potential Turkish Accession to the EC: An Evaluation On the Financial Means of the Community, Especially in Terms of Regional and Social Structure Funds", Dr. Faruk Sen, in *Turkish Review*, 1990, p.78-94. This article investigates whether Turkey really represents a "bottomless pit" for the EC and concludes that Turkey can become a full member without placing a heavy burden on the coffers of the EC. Naturally, the opinions of the European and Turkish scholars in this context deviate strongly from each other.

agriculture in Turkey is gradually being eroded. While in 1962 agriculture's share in GDP reached 34.8 percent, it had shrunk to 16 percent in 1988. Notwithstanding the fact that a high proportion of Turkey's workforce is employed in agriculture, the rapid rate of urbanization and industrialization is causing a shift away from such concentration. Turkey enjoys a geo-climatic diversity which permits the production of a wide range of agricultural goods including both northern and Mediterranean type products. Its agricultural land is 37 percent of the Community total. This extensive land is, however, not being cultivated efficiently: labour productivity and physical yields remain below the Community norms. Apart from its position as a self-sufficient country in food, Turkey has been, and remains, a net exporter of agricultural goods.

While in 1978 the export of agricultural goods accounted for % 67.4 of its total exports¹⁰⁴, ten years later the share had declined to less than 20 percent versus 80 percent for industrial products. Participation in the CAP will have a great bearing on the Turkish economy given the sizeable share of agriculture in total employment and in national income. Turkey can no doubt expect to profit from the CAP. In considering the prospect of Turkey's adapting to the CAP, it would be well to begin by asking what lies behind the respective agricultural policies. Turkey has to feed a population of 60 million which is increasing by 2 % p.a. By contrast, the Community's population is stagnant and mountains of various surplus products are increasing in spite of highly subsidised exports. There would thus be a deep-seated divergence of interests. Whilst we would expect the Community to move towards containing and curtailing production in certain sectors, Turkey would want to increase production almost across the board.

There is, however, no automatic reason that Turkey should place unreasonable demands on the budget to implement the CAP. On more specifically agricultural issues, there will be opportunities for existing members as well as threats (a fairly large drain on Community funds for export rebates on Turkish agricultural exports to third countries) from Turkey's accession. Community customers will benefit from a wider range of products on offer to them. Its geographic position and range of agro-climatic zones will add further diversity to the Community widening the supply base for fresh products. These benefits will only be achieved if members are prepared to allow agriculture to share in the process of the creation of the Single Market. This is far from assured yet. Thus it is more likely that Turkey's contribution will be in terms of specific products, qualities or timing of sales. Many members will regard the enormous and rapidly developing Turkish market as a destination for their exports. With fast income growth and a relatively backward livestock sector, Turkey may provide good opportunities to EC exporters of dairy products, beef and poultry meat eggs. Turkey will occupy an extremely important position in the agricultural economy of the EC. The gross value of agricultural output, were she to join in 1988, was calculated to be \$ 20.2 bn¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁴ "The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey", William Hale, 1981, London, p.233

¹⁰⁵ For a more detailed information about the potential impact of Turkey's accession on the CAP, see "Turkish Agriculture and the EC policies, Issues, Strategies and Adaptation", a report prepared by Wye College, University of London, the Middle East Technical University and the Turkish State Planning Organisation, for the UNDP, December 1990, Ankara, p.119.

In referring to the Turkish agriculture, one should not pass without mentioning the gigantic **G.A.P.**, the Turkish acronym for the South-East Anatolia Project, the largest regional development project to be implemented in Turkey with an approximate total cost of \$ 23 bn. It is currently among the major development projects of the world in terms of its magnitude and objectives, evolving around 13 irrigation and energy projects to be built on the Firat (Euphrates) and Dicle (Tigris) rivers. The project includes the construction of 22 dams and 17 hydro-electric power plants. Two underground channels eight meters across will irrigate an area between the Tigris and the Euphrates roughly equivalent in size to that of the Benelux countries. Already climatic changes have followed the creation of new lakes and reservoirs. Upon its completion, over 1,5 mn hectares land will be irrigated and 34,780 Gwh hydro-electric power will be generated.

The GAP project is expected to make a profound contribution to the economy of Turkey's less developed regions. Agricultural production will be boosted by the irrigation projects (according to some projections¹⁰⁶, once GAP is fully developed, Turkey's agricultural capacity will be doubled by the year 2000) and industry will benefit from abundant and inexpensive energy sources. Turkey's relatively water-poor Arab neighbours are concerned that the vast plan will further diminish their lifeblood. Yet GAP has its Turkish critics too. Since the foundation stones were laid in 1981, the GAP has absorbed \$ 9.3 bn. By 2005 Turkey is set to spend a further \$ 23 bn while another \$ 10 bn will be needed to complete the project sometime in the next century¹⁰⁷. Many economists believe it has been the single largest factor behind Turkey's 70 percent rate of inflation. Because of the strong international passions the project has aroused, particularly in the Arab world, the financing has had to come, not from big international lenders like the World Bank, but largely out of Turkey's own budgetary means - every year GAP absorbs 10 percent of total government outlays, which does not include the subsidies and investment incentives given to private business to move to the area. The Turks presume that the Community's intervention and especially its financial support (EAGF, ERDF and EIB) would be helpful in easing the burden of regional policy on the national budget.

One of the main requirements for adhesion to the EC is certainly the achievement of macro economic stability which is characterised by external and internal balance. On the external side, the Turkish economy has undergone dramatic changes in the 1980s. The more outward-looking approach adopted by the government and the ensuing trade liberalization programme allowed Turkey to overcome its long history of balance of payments difficulties. For the last few years, the balance of payments have even registered a surplus with the help of growing exports and invisible transfers such as tourism revenues and workers remittances. Internal stability is, however, far from being achieved. After a brief period of comparatively low inflation during the mid-eighties, inflationary pressures have again gained momentum. At the end of 1991, the rate of inflation stood at 65 percent and is still

¹⁰⁶ "The Southeast Anatolia Project(GAP) - The Pride of Turkey", Nurettin Ozkose, in the Turkish Daily News, International edition, October 12-18, 1989, p.5

¹⁰⁷ "The Neighbours are suspicious", John Murray Brown, in The Financial Times, 21 May 1992, p.8.

showing an upward trend despite the commitment of the government to reduce it to a manageable level by 1993. The main reasons for such excessive inflation rate are the large scale infrastructure investments and the operating costs of the State Economic Enterprises, which also account for the public deficit.

The EC's representative in Turkey, Mr. Michael Lake,¹⁰⁸ lists the EC's expectations from Ankara by saying that much more should be done to achieve a level of economic development comparable to that of its European partners by combatting high inflation, improving general living standards and thus expanding the domestic market; properly protecting patent, trade marks and intellectual property; ending remaining discriminatory practices in banking, oil and pharmaceuticals; and by enhancing both regional and political stability. The member states of the EC have been traditional investors in Turkey. **Lake** advises the EC investors that they should now perceive Turkey as the "center of a newly democratising, secular region stretching from Yugoslavia and Hungary to China".

Turkey's drive towards integration with Europe has gained a new strength with the signing on 17 October 1991 of a free trade agreement with the EFTA countries¹⁰⁹ - the first in a series of similar agreements signed with Central & Eastern European countries as well - which covers industrial goods including fish and processed agricultural products. It was scheduled to be operational by April 1992, but the national ratifications in EFTA countries could be completed only on 2 July 1992. This agreement, currently in effect, is seen as the logical result of the increasing trade flow between Turkey and EFTA, totalled \$ 1.8 bn in 1990 (EFTA imports from Turkey \$ 584 mn and exports \$ 1.263 mn)¹¹⁰. By the end of the transition period in 1995, Turkey will progressively have abolished its tariffs on import from these countries. As a result of the Agreement, Turkish-EFTA trade will be put on the same preferential basis as trade between Turkey and the EC. In the overall trade, Turkey registered a big deficit - imports from EFTA rose to 1.2 bn dollars while exports remained at 600 mn dollars¹¹¹.

The agreement concentrates on the progressive, but asymmetrical, liberalization of trade in industrial goods. By way of an evolutionary clause the scope can however be extended to other fields, e.g. services, direct investments and etc. Agricultural trade is to be regulated in bilateral agreements between each EFTA country and Turkey since the EFTA do not have a common agricultural policy like the EC. Upon the entry into force of this agreement, the EFTA countries will grant Turkish exports, except for some sensitive products, duty-free and QR-free access to their markets while Turkey will, in turn, reduce import charges by 60 to 70 % for imports from the EFTA countries. This rate will be progressively increased to 100 % by January 1996. The list of sensitive products contains essentially textiles, clothing, footwear and leather products in which Turkey maintains a strong competitive edge. The Agreement has been designed to meet the economic

¹⁰⁸ "Doing Business Together: Turkey-EC", a speech delivered to a Brussels conference by Michael Lake, the Commission Representative in Turkey, 30-31 October 1991.

¹⁰⁹ "EFTA and Turkey Initial a Free Trade Agreement", in *EFTA Bulletin*, 2/92, p.2.

¹¹⁰ The figure is taken from "Turkey and EFTA Relations", a paper submitted to a Brussels conference, 30-31 October 1991, by Hanspeter Tschani, Director, Trade Policy Affairs, EFTA Secretariat, Geneva

¹¹¹ A critical analysis of the Turco-EFTA relations can be found in the Turkish weekly *Barometre*, "Free Trade Agreement with EFTA: A Success or Fiasco?" (in Turkish), Dr. Hasan Gurak, 13-19 January 1992

challenges of the 1990s in that it stipulates such provisions as competition, state aid, public procurement, intellectual property rights and dumping. These are all the basic subjects of the ongoing negotiations between EC and EFTA on the European Economic Area (EEA). Some Turkish economists¹¹² bitterly criticised this arrangement, questioning what Turkey stands to gain from the accord which keeps all the competitive Turkish industrial and agricultural products outside its scope while committing Turkey to remove all its tariff and non-tariff barriers for the EFTA products latest by 1996.

But we should not see this agreement in isolation from the goal of the customs union with the EC, which will be incrementally achieved by 1995. The establishment of the customs union in industrial goods would arguably be the most traumatic element for Turkey. Not only would it mean the removal of all tariffs on industrial products from EFTA, Mashreq and Maghreb countries, Israel, Malta, Greek Cyprus and what used to be Yugoslavia; the application of the GSP concessions for the developing countries; tariff-free entry for industrial products from Lome countries (plus symbolic aid to these states); and the adaptation to the Common Customs Tariff for imports from other suppliers. It would further mean the end of the quantitative restrictions - not to mention the non-tariff barriers - on various types of imports. To achieve such a complete liberalisation would require an unprecedented and painful restructuring of the economy. The shock to the industrial sector would be enormous.

However, Turkey has carried out most significant part of this liberalisation and restructuring programme since 1980. The difficulties that will arise when the customs union is completed by 1995 are in fact not insurmountable. In 1976 Turkey had stopped making the annual reduction in customs duties needed for the customs union and resumed since 1988 to make regular reductions. It has, however, reduced customs duties for all countries so that, according to the Commission, there has been no real preference for the Community. And if the Turkish tariffs vis-a-vis third countries were to be lower than the common customs tariff, the result could be a deflection of trade. Since 1984 Turkey has gradually introduced a series of taxes on imports that can be regarded as having the equivalent effect of customs duties. Under EC pressure, the Turkish government has, however, decided to incorporate taxes and charges having equivalent effect to import duties into customs duties ('Single Duty System'), which will further serve the creation and the protection of the Community preference.

The Commission says that Ankara has still not granted the Community any agricultural trade preferences. On the Community side, imports of Turkish textiles (the most vital component of Turkey's industrial production) are restricted under an informal agreement reached with the Turkish producers. Turkey has initially resisted the negotiation of an agreement under the MFA. It is difficult, for the Turks, to reconcile the existence of a quota arrangement with the spirit of the Association Agreement. Over the past 30 years, Turkey has developed quite rapidly in textiles. While in the initial stage it only produced and exported raw cotton, but its impressive modernisation drive in this sector has enabled Turkey to export cotton yarn and finally, as from the early 1970s, cotton fabrics. During the 1963-79 period the Turkish textiles production was primarily targetted at the domestic market. It is only in the 1980s that a significant increase in its export to foreign markets has

¹¹² Gurak, January 1992

been achieved. In EC markets Turkey enjoys an advantage over the MFA countries even though it mainly exports products covered by the MFA. It was not until September 1982 that an agreement had been reached with the Turkish government on restricting Turkish textile exports to the Community¹¹³. To keep up with the Community standards and requirements, the Turkish textile industry has already begun a new restructuring process involving the modernization of its machinery at an estimated cost of \$ 5 to 7 bn, the usual sources of procurement of which is the European suppliers. Current trade imbalance and anti-dumping charges are other hot topics preoccupying the negotiators on both sides.

Free movement of people, which is a fundamental tenet of the Community and which bears directly on the question of Turkey's Community membership, is in itself not a new issue. The 1963 Ankara Agreement has set out to progressively secure freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and the Community. The 1970 Additional Protocol has, furthermore, stipulated the free movement of workers to be realised in progressive stages between December 1976 and December 1986. The deadline had come and gone by. Although the issue has been shelved due to the well-known Community - and particularly German - sensitivity, it appears likely that Turkey will use this contractual right as one of the trump cards in its future negotiations with the Community. As a matter of fact, even without free movement, there are already more than 2.5 mn Turkish immigrant workers resident in the Community member countries. The EC countries are evidently not prepared to accept any fresh migrations of foreign workers, given the comparatively high unemployment, slow growth and anti-immigrant movements across Europe. Conscious of this situation, the Turkish side is instead giving priority to the EC's recognition of the right of the Turkish immigrants (Euro-Turks) currently resident in the Community territory to move freely as from 1 January 1993.

¹¹³ Talks with Turkish textile company representatives in Brussels, January 1992

There can be no doubt that the integration of Turkey into the Community would tend to reinforce the present regional imbalance inside Turkey. Now the west of the country is the centre of economic activity and the east is the periphery - a situation, which lies at the root of Turkey's southeastern question. To combat this problem, at least in part, Turkey will be able to benefit from the ERDF. Turkey would be a net recipient on the budget, at least in the early years of membership. Moreover, following the Portugal's example, Turkey may also apply for special assistance prior to membership to prepare her economy for the shock of membership. A study¹¹⁴ by the Commission in 1990 listed 40 sectors out of 120, which would most likely be affected upon the completion of the Single Market 1992. These sectors where non-tariff barriers impede intra-Community trade make up about 50 % of the industrial value added in the EC.

In this study, Turkey is compared to the Southern European country groups within the EC. Turkey, for example, has similar strengths as Greece in clothing, textile industries and knitwear, with Portugal in ceramics, various textile products and clothing, as it is with Spain. It should also be pointed out that all of these countries share strong tourism potential and are competitors in this sector. According to the 1991 TUSIAD Report, certain sectors in Turkey are classified according to their current competitive advantage and future developments. Locomotive sectors are singled out as follows: tourism, clothing and knitwear, ceramics, glass, processed food, construction, leather products, non-electrical machinery, tires, petro-chemicals, iron and steel and etc while sectors with high growth potential include non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, mining products, chemicals and electronics¹¹⁵. To sum it up in a nutshell, the current state of affairs in Turkish economy is still far away from justifying, on economic grounds, an immediate full integration with the EC, but it should be noted that Turkey has the capabilities to make up most of its deficiencies in the pre-accession period. Therefore, Ankara and Brussels should combine efforts to accelerate the pace of economic modernization and adaptation already initiated in Turkey, bearing the eventual goal of future accession in mind.

b) Political Credentials. The Europeans see, wrongly or rightly, the political freedoms and human right violations as an outstanding problem in Turkey. Ankara has been subjected to vigorous criticism from the human rights organisations, from the Socialist parties in Europe, from the members of the European Parliament and from most Western governments on the subjects of the ill-treatment of prisoners, the limitation of political freedoms and restrictions on Trade Union activity. The emergence of the 'Kurdish problem' in the political agenda of the relations has further worsened the situation. These issues act

¹¹⁴ Quoted by Faruk Sen, 1990.

¹¹⁵ "Turkey Towards the 21st Century", a TUSIAD (Turkish Association of Businessmen and Industrialists) report, 1991, Istanbul.

directly against the Turkish interests in the Community because the passage of any important agreements with Turkey including the financial protocols, the Commission's Matutes Plan and, of course, the eventual Accession Treaty will all depend on how the EP political groups interpret the situation in Turkey.

An increasingly assertive European Parliament is geared to play a decisive role in the future development of the Turco-Community relations since it has the power to slow down or, if wishes so, stop the cooperation process, not mentioning the accession treaty, irrespective of any political decision by the EC leaders¹¹⁶. For instance, last January the EP had blocked indefinitely loans and grants to Syria and Morocco in protest of what it termed as 'ill-treatment' in these countries. The 518 MEPs are becoming more and more concerned over human rights issues and tend to link any EC cooperation with improvements in that field. Many MEPs see their new power over international agreements, which they expect to gain from next January, as a useful lever to achieve their objective. Under the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union, MEPs power to approve or reject Association and Accession agreements with other countries was further extended to cover any international agreements that affect the EC's budget, institutions and legislations¹¹⁷. To say the least, that covers a lot. The EP has become a powerful force to be reckoned with in every step towards enhanced relationship between Turkey and the EC. If the Parliament says no and the Twelve governments say yes, then the answer is no.

As we already mentioned, the EP broke off official relations with the Turkish Parliament in the aftermath of the 1980 takeover. It was only in September 1990 when the Joint Parliamentary EEC-Turkey Committee has been reinstated upon the adoption of the Walter Report. Eight years had passed without any meaningful dialogue. The Greek MEPs, whose national feelings are often invoked whenever Turkish affairs come to the fore, always act as if they are on the battle front. Even after years after a return to civilian regime, some¹¹⁸ went so far as to claim that "there has been no change in the political situation in Turkey since the coup [of 1980]". There are of course varying views. Another MEP¹¹⁹ acknowledges that "without playing down the practical difficulties of the Turkish accession, we have no right to dash Ankara's hopes if we are committed to safeguarding the very security of the West".

The latest EP debates and our interviews with the MEPs have, however, indicated that the Socialist Group, which enjoys a good working relationship with the Turkish Social Democrat Populist Party - now the junior coalition partner of the government -, the European Democrats and some members of the European People's Party and Liberal and Democratic Reformists tend to voice a realistic, not always supportive though, position on most issues concerning Turkey. Most support comes from the conservative British MEPs. Faced with a relatively unfavourable audience in the EP, it is difficult to say that the Turks are effectively lobbying and informing the MEPs, who appear to have little (or

¹¹⁶ "One Parliament For Twelve: The European Parliament", EP Information Office, 12th edition, November 1990, p.19.

¹¹⁷ "Europe's Parliament Wakes", in the Foreign Report of the Economist, 12 February 1992, p.2

¹¹⁸ For the remarks of some Greek MEPs about Turkey, see "Debates of the EP on Walter Report", No: 2-368/112, 14 September 1988

¹¹⁹ See "Debates of the European Parliament", 14 September 1988, No: 2-368/105

misinformed) grasp of the Turkish affairs except their mostly one-sided acquaintance with the human rights issues in that country.

In parallel to the growth of the EP's power, an increasing number of businesses, regions and professional & trade organisations have understood the need to take an energetic in the activities of the EP. They are now trying to keep themselves well-informed about the Community activities of direct interest to them, and to influence decisions in these areas. In particular, they consider the advantages of establishing permanent presence in Brussels and Strasbourg. Most significantly, they also try to learn how to intervene effectively from the earliest stages of the decision-making process. Lobbying has already become an everyday reality in the Community institutions. Although they do not seem to have formed a sympathetic group of supporters yet in the EP, the Turks exert little effort, if any, in influencing the European legislators.

It is considered a **sine qua non**, if Turkey is intent on effectively intervening in the earliest stages of the EC decision-making process, for various Turkish groups¹²⁰ to establish a powerful presence in Brussels and Strasbourg instead of knocking on the doors of the EC establishment only for specific purposes when required. A wise Turkish lobbying and PR campaign should, however, not be seen as a polish-up exercise, substituting the necessity for comprehensive reforms in the economic and political spheres, but should rather serve It should serve as a supportive and complementary method. The veteran Euro-parliamentarian, Mr. **Willy de Clercq**, advised that "what is needed is a little more public relations, maybe a little more contact, not so much with your friends but with those who are opposed. That is the best public relations"¹²¹.

The experience that Turkey has amply acquired since 1975 in its dealings with the US Congress will no doubt be useful in hammering out a similar strategy towards the EP which must involve, among others, non-governmental bodies, private business, trade unions, universities and political parties, although the composition of the MEPs, their legislative & practical powers and procedures are quite different from the Congress, a fact which calls for a specially-tailored strategy. The Community's social partners including the European Trade

¹²⁰ Lobbying by private entities and parliamentarians has proved to be more effective than that of the government officials. Also, arranging visits to Turkey for the selected influential MEPs from all political groups help them gain a first-hand impression of the country.

¹²¹ "Turkey and the European Community", the proceedings of a Europe Forum seminar, ed by Mary Strang and Arlene Redmend, Brussels, 1992, p.179.

Union's Confederation also maintain concerns similar to those of the European Parliament and have made a point of stressing that greater liberty for Trade Union activities and better human rights performance in Turkey will continue to stay one of the preconditions for Turkey's possible accession to the EC.

On Turkey's political arena, several unprecedented events have taken place since 1987. Mr. Demirel, who has been seven-time prime minister until 1980, when he was ousted by the military intervention, made a victorious (perhaps unique in world political history) come-back as the prime minister once again in the November 1991 general elections. His junior coalition partner is the Social Democrat Populist Party, which used to be the main opposition party. The new government with a broad-based popular support has sparked high hopes among all segments of the society. Anxious to establish domestic stability and respond to the Western concerns, the Demirel government has embarked upon a series of sweeping, almost revolutionary, political reforms. Just to reflect on the new thinking of the coalition government on human rights and political freedoms, here is an excerpt from the coalition protocol: "The legal and practical shortcomings, obstacles and limitations that our citizens are facing in the freedom of expression, in the protection and development of their ethnical, cultural and linguistic identity will be eliminated in accordance with the spirit of the **Charter of Paris**"¹²².

The Demirel government has, during its first year in office, put the main emphasis on improving democratic structures and removing the last vestiges of the era of military rule. The major constitutional amendments have been agreed between the coalition partners and are now under discussion with opposition parties. The government is pushing on a broad front of political and legal reforms. A draft bill on human rights is on the agenda of the Parliament. Its main provisions aim to combat the prevalence of police ill-treatment, considered to be the single greatest factor tarnishing Turkey's image abroad. Labour laws are being tailored to bring the country in line with the ILO conventions. Although Turkey has covered significant distance in the field of human rights, a lot still remains to be done particularly on trade union rights, torture allegations and tense situation in the southeastern part of the country.

Since 1984, Turkey has been struggling with a guerrilla war in its south-eastern provinces, launched by a neo-Marxist separatist organisation (PKK). The Government, which has partially relaxed the atmosphere in that part of the country by acknowledging officially for the first time the political and cultural identity of the Kurds - until recently referred to as "mountainous Turks", has so far failed to prevent escalation of the PKK's brutal terrorist activities in the country. Violence and terrorism are once again threatening Turkey's stability at the very opportune moment when its strategic importance in a region which is in the throes of change has at last been recognized¹²³. The recent escalation of violence by the separatist PKK terrorists has dampened the expectations raised by the new coalition government that has promised to tackle the 'Kurdish Reality' in line with the Paris Charter and the entry into the Parliament of outspoken Kurdish-origin representatives. Last March, the Kurdish New Year was marked by mass violence, resulting in more than 60

¹²² For the Government Coalition Protocol, see Turkish newspapers in December 1991.

¹²³ "Turkey's Political Stability Under Threat", Nicole Pope, in the Guardian Weekly, 8 March 1992, Manchester, p.13

deaths¹²⁴. The Turkish security forces struck in response to a violent campaign by Kurdish militants, who wanted to rehearse an all-out uprising. From his camps in Damascus, the PKK leader, Mr. Abdullah Ocalan, declared that "if need be, 100.000 people will die this year"¹²⁵. **Gaffney** likens the PKK organisation and its ruthless methods to the notorious Khmere Rouge of Cambodia. Just like in the cases of the unceasing IRA, the Corsican or the Basque separatist terrorism, Turkey, too, has no other option, but to learn to live with this separatist movement for long time to come. It cannot easily be curtailed particularly at a time when the nationalism all over the world is on the increase and it receives encouragement and support from Turkey's regional adversaries.

The Turks are aware that a solution to the Kurdish terrorism based on reaction and anger will not prove lasting. The government's approach is to embrace the local people with affection, isolate the separatist terrorists and avoid resorting to non-democratic solutions¹²⁶. Perseverance and patience are needed in handling this delicate, long-standing problem within the boundaries of democratic mechanisms. The Kurdish issue has taken on an international dimension since allied intervention to help the Iraqi Kurds. The evolution of some sort of autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq under Western protection has aroused similar aspirations from Turkish Kurds. Recognising this, the Demirel government has worked out a new policy initiative. Apart from the political reforms, a package of economic

¹²⁴ See "Turkey's Civil War", an editorial in The Financial Times, 26 March 1992; "Iraqi Victim Kurds and the Kurdish Terrorists in Turkey", Frank Gaffney, in The Wall Street Journal, 24 March 1992; and The Guardian, 23 March 1992, p.24. for the most recent commentaries on Turkey's Kurdish problem.

¹²⁵ This statement was reported in interviews with Turkish correspondents just before the Kurdish new year and quoted also in TIME, "Caught in a Crossfire", 13 April 1992, p.40. Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP), declared in Ankara that he was "diametrically opposed" to the PKK methods and mentality in fighting for an independent Kurdish state. He said there was firm evidence that Iraqi intelligence had been supporting the PKK since 1990. He added that "Syria must be using the PKK as a tool to apply pressure against Turkey. The PKK is being used by foreign countries to settle scores." (quoted in "Kurdish Leader Hits Out At Militants", Jonathan Rugman, in the Guardian, 1 April 1992, p.6.). Of late the PKK has been hindering Turkey's humanitarian aid to, and border trade with, the Kurds of Northern Iraq. PKK and Iraqi Kurds are now in a head-on confrontation. Local Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq - Talabani and Barzani - launched a coordinated attack on PKK bases in their area, aimed at cleaning the Iraqi-Turkish border of the PKK guerillas. The presence of PKK elements in Northern Iraq had led the Turkish public opinion to increasingly question the political and humanitarian support provided by Ankara to Iraqi Kurds since the Gulf War.

¹²⁶ Some MEPs and Euro-writers have recently started to put forth the argument that Turkey should not be allowed to join the EC before it finds a solution to its 'Kurdish problem'. No Western government would have allowed such terrorist acts, irrespective of its purpose, to take place on its territory and the Turkish government is no exception. It is worth recalling that nobody had asked Spain and the UK, for example, to find a 'solution' to their Basque and Northern Ireland problems before their accession. The same holds true for France's Corsican and Greece's Turkish minority problems, although the nature of these problems may differ. The neo-Marxist PKK organisation, whose leader, Abdullah Ocalan, made it clear (in an interview with the Turkish daily Milliyet, 25 March 1992) that they receive support from Syria, Iraq and Iran, exploits the sympathy created in the West towards the Kurds suffering under Saddam's regime in Iraq. The oppression of the Iraqi Kurds should not be viewed in the same category. In Turkey, the conception of nationality is based on secular citizenship, not on "blood" or ethnic origin as is the case with Germany. Turkey has, on many occasions, embraced the Iraqi Kurds and extended them all kinds of humanitarian assistance when the European countries shied away from responsibility and concentrated only on rhetoric. Another interesting note: it is no coincidence that the escalation of the PKK's terrorism comes at a time of comprehensive political and economic reforms introduced for the region by the Turkish government. Their acts enhance the hands of those elements in government, who vigorously oppose democratic reforms arguing that terrorism will further escalate in a freer environment.

measures is being introduced to tackle the south-eastern region's high unemployment and low investments. However, the ongoing terrorist activities and the resulting climate of uncertainty have caused an almost halt in investments in southeastern Turkey. The already scarce investments in the region have declined 95.8 percent¹²⁷ in the first seven months of 1992. In the meantime, Kurdish Institutes and two Kurdish newspapers have been established. The government proceeds cautiously on cultural autonomy, which it fears may provide an environment where the institutional framework necessary for future prospect of independence could develop. This is what underlines Ankara's resistance to the notion of such autonomy¹²⁸.

On the other hand, there are plans to give unemployment insurance to 700.000 young people in the region (an easy target of the PKK that recruits its guerrilla force through abduction and offers of salaries), the minimum wage is to become exempt from tax, and promises concerning regional investment would be kept. The government's junior partner, the SHP, is now openly debating the broader constitutional question of devolved powers¹²⁹, reinforcing the powers of local assemblies, as a means to win back moderate Kurdish opinion and undercut support for the separatist PKK. The President has been for some time urging Mr. Demirel to introduce Kurdish television and radio broadcasts for the south-east region. Mr. Demirel has reportedly commissioned an opinion poll as well, which showed that 70 percent of people in that region wanted to stay part of Turkey¹³⁰.

The government, faced with the difficult problem of how to combat terrorism while honouring the commitment to democratic human rights, underlines that what is needed is to distinguish between the normal democratic demands of Turkey's Kurdish-origin citizens and the PKK terrorism. The 'Kurdish problem', it seems, will continue to be a painful issue preoccupying Turkey's domestic and external politics for a long time to come, with obvious ramifications also on Turkey's relations with the EC. A Turkish accession will be out of question unless and before this question has been peacefully - perhaps, as some intellectuals suggest, along the lines of the Spanish model which has greatly achieved to pre-empt the appeals of the ETA - resolved.

It must be noted that the pressure that the Community and the Council of Europe have kept on Turkey since the 1980 military intervention for greater progress in human rights situation has indeed yielded positive results and a full membership will no doubt reinforce this process a great deal, making the process irreversible. As a matter of fact, politically all latest accessions - Greece, Spain and Portugal - have had at least one strong political element in common: weak and fledging democracies with a recent history of either fascist or military dictatorships. The democratic credentials of an aspiring member are naturally one of the most important pre-requisites to entry. And Turkey is required to live up to the EC standards. Although Turkey has not yet attained a fully equal degree of

¹²⁷ "PKK Strikes Blow to Development in Southeast", in ANKA Review, 22 September 1992, p.13.

¹²⁸ "Southeast and Human Rights Still Harm Turkey's Image", Semih Idiz, in The Turkish Daily News, 12 September 1992, p.1.

¹²⁹ The deputy-prime minister, Mr. Erdal Inonu, announced during his visit to Paris that the government was considering a de-concentration of public administration in the country with a view to enhancing the status of local administrative units along similar lines to that of the French model.

¹³⁰ "Demirel Plans Reforms in Kurd Areas", Jonathan Rugman, in The Guardian, 3 April 1992, p.4.

democratic maturity comparable to that of the Community standard, it has certainly come far enough to date and it is solidly on the way to becoming just as democratic as any EC country. Unlike most EC partners, Turkey has found herself over the past few years in a difficult situation facing a wide range of dramatic economic, political and, more seriously, security challenges. Internal political wranglings, too, tie the hands of the government in a variety of issues. For months the government has been trying to pass the law on court procedures and regulations on detention, a legislative act designed to improve Turkey's human rights record.

There are complaints that whatever has been done ever since the arrival of the coalition government nine months ago has been more in the sense of "window dressing" than substantial actions¹³¹. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that Turkey's geo-strategically sensitive location dictates her to be on constant vigilance towards fundamentalist and separatist designs & threats. No one likes any government breaching civilized norms whatever the pretext might be, but more credit should be given to the attempts of Turkey in the twentieth century to move in the direction of a modern, secular, democratic and free market state. That she has not gone as far as some would like is due to tremendous economic and social problems, plus security concerns (situated in the very center of the increasingly unstable Balkans-Transcaucasia-Middle East triangle), which must be effectively addressed. Democracy is difficult, perhaps the most difficult, to operate and preserve of all known forms of government. It arose in a limited region, among the peoples of western and northwestern Europe, and was transplanted by them to their colonies overseas. It has flourished, or at least survived, in some other places. According to **Lewis**¹³², only in one country of the Islamic world has democracy continued, despite many difficulties and setbacks, to function and even to flourish. He underlines that in Turkey democracy was neither bequeathed by imperial rulers, nor imposed by victorious enemies. It was the free choice of the Turks themselves.

We tolerate too easily the shortcomings of other European states and are too ready to condemn Turkey out of hand at every possible opportunity without looking at the mirror. Europe, acting out of selfish & narrow interests, has itself failed the human rights test in most instances, notably in the Bosnian case. We would therefore do better to regard Turkey as Europe's most eastern state and encourage, rather than rebuff, the efforts made by the Turks to fulfil their 'historic vocation' in Europe. The fact that an exception was made for the last three entrants and that the three of these countries have proven themselves worthy gives rise to the Turkish argument that why not the same thing should not be offered to Turkey.

c) Security and Defence Dimension. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat, which was the principal concern of the Western Alliance in its forty-three years has disappeared in the North Atlantic area. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and security risks remains to confront the Western Alliance. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to allied security are now multi-directional in nature, which makes them hard to predict and assess. Risks to allied security

¹³¹ "Democratization should be in actions", Ilnur Cevik, in The Turkish Daily News, 28 August 1992, p.3.

¹³² "Rethinking the Middle East", Bernard Lewis, in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, p.118.

are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the NATO, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, political and social difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. Viewed from this angle, Turkey has an indispensable role to play in the post-Cold War European security architecture.

A little bit recent history of Turkey's pre-Cold War role in European defence might be helpful to better understand its present position. Before the Cold War began to wind down, Turkey played a number of critical strategic roles for the Western Alliance. It helped to deter a Soviet attack on NATO's central front because its forces could threaten Warsaw Pact forces in the Balkans and in the Transcaucasia. If deterrence failed, this potential threat from Turkey could have impeded Soviet capacity to reinforce the central front. Installations in Turkey made it possible to detect, intercept and limit the projection of Soviet airpower into the eastern Mediterranean. At sea, Turkish control of the Bosphorus had blocked the projection of Soviet naval power into the warm waters. The importance of this waterway is emphasized by the fact that in recent years the Soviets had made over 18.000 ship transits a year through the Turkish Straits, through which passes 60 percent of their exports and 50 percent of their imports¹³³. As for contingencies outside the European theatre, Turkey's land mass and its bases had effectively deterred Soviet ambitions in the Gulf.

The Gulf War and the Soviet & Yugoslav disintegration have amply proven that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was not on the decline at all. The potential sources of instability that figure rather largely for European security may now be related to the Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, to the former Soviet Union and also to the Middle East. The contribution of Turkey, which is located in the very heart of these areas of crises, instabilities and uncertainties makes its vital role in the new European security architecture even more relevant and any European security arrangement without Turkey hence becomes practically impossible. The Gulf crisis erupted at a time when Turkish perceptions about the restructuring of the European security system were tinged with considerable pessimism and concern.

Turkey's cautious response to the transformation of the bipolar international system stemmed from Ankara's apprehension about the future of the NATO, the US security role in Europe and Turkey's 'value' to the Western Alliance¹³⁴. Highly publicised discussions in European capitals about NATO's lessening influence and its possible replacement with alternative security arrangements had created considerable anxiety among Turkish policymakers. Western press reports and analyses similarly echoed the view that the shifting political map in the former Soviet bloc might come at the expense of Turkey and that the country could fare growing isolation from the West¹³⁵. Europe has failed the test in the eyes of the Turks - the test of a broader vision - whose feeling was that the close political and cultural affinity and rapport that had grown out of four decades of ideological bonding and security co-operation was forgotten as soon as the common enemy disappeared, paving the

¹³³ "Turkey and the West", Bruce R. Kuniholm, in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991, p.38.

¹³⁴ "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis", Sabri Sayari, in The Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.1, Winter 1992.

¹³⁵ "Turks Fear Changes Undercut Ties to Europe", Clyde Haberman, in The New York Times, 10 December 1989.

way for Europe to recover its own sense of security and unity. Turkey had been largely pushed aside by the dominant political forces in Europe¹³⁶ in the early post-Cold War era. A shift in emphasis of Turkish defence priorities, too, from traditional lines in the Balkans and the Caucasus to new risks in the Middle East, including those emanating from Syria, Iran and Iraq, as well as the activities of Kurdish separatists on Turkish territory, has pointed to a further differentiation of Turkish and European security interests. Threat perceptions have considerably changed. Although security on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is relevant to European security broadly defined, this is actually an area in which Europe prefers a leading US role.

Developments in the former Soviet republics are pushing Turkey towards a more active and partisan role in the Caucasasia and the Central Asia. In both cases, a re-orientation of Turkish foreign and security policy eastwards would be unavoidable. Whether or not Turkey's bilateral relationship with the US will acquire additional significance depends on the extent of Turkey's frustration in its relations with Europe. Over the next decade, there will certainly be a desire for a "more mature" relationship with the US in which security assistance in the traditional sense and defence co-operation play a less prominent role as political and economic ties come to the fore. This has already taken the form of an "expanded strategic relationship" during the visit of Mr. Demirel to Washington early this year.

In recognition of Turkey's new strategic importance for the defence of Western interests in the Middle East, the Caucasasia, the Central Asia and the Balkans, the EC leaders have prompted to extend an associate membership status for Turkey in the Western European Union during the Maastricht Summit last December. As a matter of fact, Turkey does not regard the associate status as a permanent substitute to its eventual full membership of the Union, arguing that the offered status should not be 'full member obligations without full member rights'. There are two specific articles in the WEU Treaty 'disturbing' Turkish defence planners. One is the article 5, which undertakes to support automatically a member state against the aggression of a third nation. Ankara is worried that when Greece becomes full member (while Turkey is kept on hold), it may encourage Athens to engross in 'provocative' action in a bid to take advantage of its membership status.

The main concern stems from the scenario of a possible outbreak of Turco-Greek hot confrontation if Greece extends its territorial waters to twelve miles - a hypothetical action, which Turkey considers **casus belli**. Britain, The Netherlands and Portugal have attempted, within the WEU, to accommodate Turkey's concern in this regard, concentrating their efforts on solutions which will preclude the use of the article 5 by Greece against Turkey. Another 'thorny' item was the Article 9 which stipulates that any dispute between

¹³⁶ "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing A Dilemma", Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, in The International Spectator, Vol. XXVII, No.1, January-March 1992, p.25.

members of the Union should be resolved in the Hague International Court of Justice. Ankara would expectedly sanction this article, as it contravenes with its traditional policy of 'solving its disputes with Greece through bilateral dialogue'. Turkey's view is that since the issues are political, rather than legal, it cannot be solved through a legal medium. Athens' view is just the opposite. The terms of an associate member status for Turkey have been further clarified during the WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers' meeting, which was held in Petersberg near Bonn last June.

These terms set out that, if Turkey assumes associate member status, it will have to guarantee the use of peaceful means to solve problems with other member countries such as Greece. Similarly, Greece's claim of 12 miles of territorial waters in the Aegean will not come on the WEU agenda because of the Article 5 in the WEU Treaty. This is to say that Athens will not be able to use the WEU as a shield against Turkey in the bilateral disputes. Turkey is also invited to participate in WEU Foreign & Defence Ministers' meetings, working groups and committees. She will also be entitled to join in with the planning cell, the main decision-making body, as diplomatic parlance has it, "within the framework of continual relations procedure".

What is the Turkish viewpoint on the new European security architecture? Ankara supports the evolution of a stronger European dimension, but underlines that a European defence identity should be conceived as the 'European security pillar' of NATO¹³⁷. The Atlantic alliance, the CSCE and the WEU are seen as three specific security pillars of the continent, each making its own contribution to the new European architecture. The NATO of the future, according to a senior Turkish diplomat¹³⁸, should link Europe and North America in the search for the coordinated and complementary policies required to ensure successful responses to the multi-directional challenges already confronting or awaiting its member nations. President Ozal warned that "one should not create two different categories of European members with the same alliance: those who are within the EC and WEU, and those who are only within NATO". His explicit statement that "Turkey should not be expected to accept only the responsibilities of the defence of the Continent without

¹³⁷ "President Turgut Ozal's Speech at the Paris WEU Meeting (5 June 1991)", reproduced in Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Summer 1991, Vol.5 No.24, Ankara, p.85-97

¹³⁸ "Managing the Change: European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship In a time of Change in Europe", Speech made by Turkish Ambassador to NATO, Tugay Ozceri, at Eurogroup Seminar, Bonn, 9-11 April 1991, reproduced in Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Summer 1991, Vol.5, No.24, Ankara, p.5-15.

participating fully in the making of the new Europe" actually reflects the core of the Turkish thinking with respect to the future shape of the European security architecture.

The threat perceptions having changed, now the major security risks to Turkey come from the southeast: Iraq, Syria and, to a certain extent, Iran. Transcaucasia has also emerged as a militarily troublesome spot, differently from the Soviet era, for Turkish defence strategists. This shift has already been reflected in Turkey's new defence strategy. Its geographical location dictates its continuing strategic importance to the West. Turkey shares borders with countries that support religious fundamentalism, harbour territorial claims and instigate ethnic terrorist activities, that have missiles with ranges in excess of 1000 km and that do not participate in negotiations on disarmament and arms control¹³⁹. Syria, for example, is talking peace with Israel on the one hand while acquiring intermediate range missiles in collaboration with Iran on the other.

Thus, Syria, while seeking to improve its standing in the West by joining peace efforts and siding with Egypt and Saudi Arabia against Iraq, clings at the same time to such cards¹⁴⁰ as: its backing of militant Palestinian groups; its tactical thaw with Yasser Arafat; its links with Iraqi opposition groups and, more importantly, (at least from the perspective of this paper) its support for the Kurdish Worker's Party [PKK]", which is allowed bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. This support justifiably infuriates¹⁴¹ the Turks who are battling Kurdish separatists in the southeast of Turkey since 1984. Surrounded by countries that are undergoing massive upheavals, and which are often antagonistic toward each other, the Turks increasingly realize that cautious diplomacy leaves them out in the cold, while an activist but prudent diplomacy - consistent with their self-image as an emerging regional power - requires tough choices, which always involve risks because one's allies tend to determine one's enemies.

According to NATO's new risk assessments, Turkey is in the most exposed position in the Alliance, namely in the center of a risk triangle consisting of the Caucasus, the

¹³⁹ Turkey, while having one foot in the European system, has the other in the ordeal of the Middle East. It is Europe which is intent and ready to disarm, not the Middle East. Turkey's main perception of military threat is no longer what used to be the Soviet Bloc. It is the eastern neighbours of Turkey, which keep building up enormous weapons arsenal. Iraq and Syria possess missiles that can hit the Turkish capital. Although Turkey has the fifth largest army in the world (the first in European NATO), it is still considered inadequate considering the area Turkey has to defend and the potential military threat. Its geography dictates high defence readiness at a time when Europe is fast disarming and cutting back defence expenditures.

¹⁴⁰ "No Queues Form Outside Syria's Newly Opened Door", Tony Walker, in The Financial Times, 18 March 1992, p.4.

¹⁴¹ The Turkish Interior Minister, Mr. Ismet Sezgin, before his departure for an official visit to Damascus, made a very important statement: "I am going to Syria to warn Syria for the last time to withdraw its support from the terrorist activities directed at the territorial integrity of Turkey". He added that if a positive response was not elicited from Damascus, the government would discuss the issue and "do what is considered necessary". (Quoted in the Turkish daily Milliyet, 8 April 1992). The deal, which Mr. Sezgin had struck in Damascus with his Syrian counterpart, stipulated the expulsion of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan and his guerrilla camps from Bekaa Valley and expert meetings every three months to review the progress in cooperation against terrorism. In a follow-up visit by Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin, to Damascus early August, top Syrian leaders confirmed their pledge that they would fully cooperate with Turkey in its efforts to combat separatist terrorism. It is yet to be seen whether Syria will keep its word.

Balkans and the Middle East. Military strategists¹⁴² stress that the central front of NATO has shifted to Turkey from Germany, as the new strategic center of the Alliance. In fact, Asia Minor has been, for a very long time, a critical piece of real estate strategically and militarily speaking for the defence of Europe. This is all the more so today because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technology in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance. The area is also the scene of many ethnic outbursts. This point was reaffirmed in the Rome Declaration of the NATO Summit last November. The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner¹⁴³, said on one occasion that "the role that Turkey will play is now more important than before.

Three recent crises, i.e. the Gulf War, the Yugoslav civil war and the Soviet disintegration, occurred in the countries neighbouring Turkey. These events alone have demonstrated the importance for the West of a stable and democratic Turkey. In addition, new geo-strategic facts have increased the significance of the southern flank of the Alliance." Just as Turkey's post-war geopolitical importance depended on its being seen in a European as well as a Middle Eastern context, so its new importance in the aftermath of the Cold War will depend on its being seen in a European, Middle Eastern, Balkan, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian context. But that vision will also depend on Turkey's being accepted as a full-fledged member of Europe¹⁴⁴. If it is, Turkey will be an important model to those Muslim and Turkish states in the Middle East, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union that contemplate what it means to be a secular, democratic, free market state.

¹⁴² "The Military Future of the NATO Alliance", General Sabri Yirmibesoglu, in the Turkish Daily News, International Edition, 5-12 January 1991, p.4

¹⁴³ "Woerner Stresses Turkey's Role", in the Turkish daily Milliyet, 16 February 1992

¹⁴⁴ Prof. Cromwell said that if the whole Middle East region begins to settle down and becomes more stable and the muslim republics of the ex-Soviet Union do adopt the Turkish secular path, then that would be a favourable factor with regard to Turkey's EC membership because then Turkey would be able to play a positive and constructive bridging role without at the same time raising the risk of involving the EC countries in Middle Eastern and Central Asian instabilities.

As for the Balkans, one should note that, as a key player of the peninsula, Turkey is forming a new Balkan policy in the face of the events which have upset the balances prevailing in the peninsula for the last 45 years. It has expedited the efforts aimed at enhancing security and defence relations on the one hand and the economic and trade ties on the other with all the Balkan countries. Ankara signed military cooperation agreements with Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. Particularly, the emergence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in international scene and the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project has provided the Turkish diplomacy and economy with the possibility to re-evaluate its Balkan policy in a manner to gain greater weight in the region - a development which worries Greece a great deal. However, the continuing human tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Nagorna-Karabakh impasse serve to highlight the magnitude of the future difficulties that a greater regional role might create for Turkey.

d) Greek Obstruction: How Long May It Continue? Any examination of the Turco-Community relations would obviously not be complete without reference to the negative effects of the dispute between Greece and Turkey as well as to the situation in Cyprus. After gaining membership in the EC in 1981, Greece has consistently opposed any progress in the Turco-Community relations. Athens' opposition continues to serve as an impediment, not only to Turkish membership in the EC, but also to a normal functioning of relations at the current level. It also managed to forge an explicit linkage between Turkey's improved relations with the EC and the Cyprus issue as a result of resolute diplomatic initiatives at the Dublin Summit, which adopted the position that progress on Cyprus was a prerequisite for improvement in Turkey's relations with Brussels. The Turks categorically ruled out any linkage between the two.

It is, in this context, important to recall once again the Commission's Opinion on the implications of the Greek membership (January 1976), which emphasized that "the prospect of Greek membership introduced a new element in the balance of the EC's relationship with Turkey and Greece and that, therefore, the EC is not and should not become a party to the disputes between Greece and Turkey". This opinion was shared by all the EC governments at that time and made known to Ankara with a view to alleviating its concerns, but never reflected in the Community behaviour towards Turkey. Most observers argue that the Turco-Community ties should not be taken hostage to the 'short-sighted intransigence' of one member country and, instead, be viewed from the global perspective of the Community interests as a whole.

At the root of the Turco-Greek disputes lies mutual and historically deep-seated mistrust¹⁴⁵. An optimistic assessment suggests that this situation may be changing for two reasons. First, there are tentative signs that both Athens and Ankara have recognized that institutional expressions of the Greco-Turkish animosity may no longer serve the interests of either country in a less tolerant, post-Cold War environment. This observation applies to both NATO and the EC, and is reinforced by the perceived importance of being "members

¹⁴⁵ On the outlook for Greek-Turkish relations, see "Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects", Ankara, Foreign Policy Institute, 1989; "Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey - Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security", James Brown, London, Brassey's, 1991; and "The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences", Dimitri Conostas (ed), New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991, with contributions by both Greek and Turkish authors.

in good standing" at a time of strategic flux and economic stringency. Second, as NATO enters a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish involvement in the EC can serve to anchor and stabilize the Greek-Turkish relations, already discussed in moderate circles¹⁴⁶, may gain wider currency. With the important exception of the Turkish minority in Greek Thrace¹⁴⁷, the outlook for the Greek-Turkish relations across a range of historically troublesome issues is no worse, and may possibly be better, than at any time in the recent past. To say that current disputes have to be settled at whatever cost before Turkey could join the Community is to misapprehend one of the main purposes and strengths of the EC. The Community was founded largely with the purpose of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war with each other again - as they had with devastating effect on three occasions in less than 100 years. This objective has been triumphantly achieved, and it would have been worth building the Community for this purpose alone.

This result has been achieved because fellow members by definition feel differently about each other to what they feel for other countries and because their economies are so intertwined that going to war against one another would be in some sense like going to war against itself. We can see no reason at all why the same should not apply to Turkey and Greece, both as regards the elimination of hostility¹⁴⁸ and as providing the best mechanism in which current problems could be resolved. The shift to a conservative government in Greece is a positive development. Early this year, Turkish and Greek prime ministers, both old friends from 1960s and 70s, had agreed at the Davos Summit to prepare an agreement on 'friendship good-neighbourliness and cooperation', which was to be signed during the Mitsotakis's visit to Istanbul in June 1992 for the Black Sea Co-operation Zone Summit, but postponed to a later date due to an uncertainty over the ongoing UN-led negotiations on Cyprus. With the Davos meeting, the two leaders have given the message to the world that they were eager to solve their long-standing problems through peaceful means and dialogue. Both leaders also reviewed the Cyprus problem and agreed to support the efforts of the new U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Ghali in this direction. The Davos meeting is, of course, not intended to settle all the points of contention at once, but such meetings at least offer a pathway towards reconciliation. Calling to mind Kennedy's famous maxim: "Never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate", it is hoped that this trend will continue and

¹⁴⁶ "Turkey and the West After the Gulf War", Ian Lesser, in The International Spectator, Vol. XXVII, No.1 January-March 1992, p. 39.

¹⁴⁷ The Greek officials are reluctant to admit that ethnic Turks live in Thrace. They speak inaccurately of a single Muslim minority. Greek blurriness over the Turkish minority reflects a persistent anxiety that the ethnic Turks might start demanding self-determination. Accusations by human rights groups that the Turks of Thrace are systematically discriminated against bring angry denials. Turkish applications to build new houses, open shops, elect their own 'imams' or repair the local Mosques are usually rejected. The government now plans to settle thousands of Fontians, ethnic Greek immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union, in Rodopi Province, where majority of population are Turks. ("Race in Thrace", in The Economist, 2 March 1991).

¹⁴⁸ A good start, in eliminating mutual mistrust and hostility, might be to rewrite the biased school textbooks in both Turkey and Greece with a positive approach, cleaning up all the references in the textbooks, which feed continually a sense of animosity among the young brains of the two nations. Past is full of bitter memories on both sides. But the time has come for a historic reconciliation. Faces should therefore turn towards common future. Our concern is that new generations are being brought up on both sides of the Aegean Sea in a hostile environment with unfriendly, rigid thoughts about each other, having little opportunity to benefit the first-hand human experiences and know the viewpoints of one another. Unless the prevalent atmosphere of mistrust and prejudiced approach is soon eliminated through concrete deeds, the future does not offer a promising prospect for the Turco-Greek relations.

build up progressively an atmosphere of mutual trust. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and Greek Cypriot leader Vassiliou have both had talks with Boutros Ghali and the representatives of the UN Security Council permanent member states in the past few months. They sat for a series of substantive talks once again late October in New York. The hopes are high for a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus by the end of this year.

In view of the new developments and the growing discontent of its intransigence inside the Community, Athens may be tempted to pursue a more reconciliatory line of policy vis-a-vis Turkey in the Community, particularly at a time when this country has itself been seized with serious problems in the north over the Macedonian issue and severe economic setbacks at home. Ankara has tried to defuse Greek objections to its full membership bid by pointing out that Turkey's EC membership would in fact favour dialogue between the two countries and would force them to search for realistic solutions. The Community would have strong leverage on both countries for inducing them towards a political settlement. The unsettled picture of the Balkans gives concern to both countries as well, necessitating a close co-ordination of policies.

Geographically isolated from other member countries of the EC and having a hard time in its economy, Greece has a lot to gain from entering the vast and high-income Turkish market. Few trade figures may illustrate the current state of bilateral economic interactions, which is far from reflecting the true potentials of both countries. In 1987 only 1.6 % of Greece's exports went to Turkey and 0.34 % of its imports came from Turkey. And Turkey sent only 0.43 % of its exports to Greece while buying 0.74 % of its imports from Greece¹⁴⁹. A glance at the map is enough to tell that there is considerable potential for growth in the trade flows between these two neighbours. Cooperation in tourism is another promising area on which both sides can build mutually beneficial ventures. Starting first with an intensified co-operation in economic and tourism fields, political confidence can be progressively built up in both countries. Over seven years after its accession to the EC, which entailed accepting the whole of the *acquis communautaire*, Greece was still not a party to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement and remained a third country as far as its trade relations with its neighbour were concerned. This anomaly had been corrected in 1988 with the conclusion of a protocol to this effect.

Now the experts of both countries are working together to give the final shape to the 'friendship and good neighbourly relations agreement'. The favourable atmosphere which Turkish and Greek prime ministers had tried to establish since their meeting in Davos last February, however, tends to show some signs of deterioration once again with the Greek government officials starting to use a strong language against Turkey because of what they perceive a "lack of progress" in Cyprus¹⁵⁰. Turkey's becoming an influential regional power

¹⁴⁹ See the European Parliament Doc. C2-33/88 for further details

¹⁵⁰ There is now an ongoing peace process between the two communities on the island under the good offices of the UN Secretary General. Hopes are high that a political settlement can be found to this long-standing problem on the basis of political equality of both parties by the end of this year. It is important that the international community should adopt a policy of strict neutrality between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and should not confer economic or diplomatic advantages such as recognition on one to the exclusion of the other. Linking the revitalization of the Turco-Community relations to an early solution of the Cyprus problem takes little account of Turkish psychology. A further weakening of relations with Turkey is more likely than a Cyprus settlement to result from such ill-calculated tactics. The Community should play rather a constructive role, preserving its credibility in the eyes of both sides.

in the wake of the latest transformations in the former Soviet Union and Balkans has also caused a sense of irritation and apprehension in Greece and the Mitsotakis government, which has a narrow majority - by a two-vote margin - in Parliament, is currently having a difficult time in the face of various domestic and external pressures¹⁵¹. Athens also feel surrounded by countries in the Balkans having close relations with Turkey. But it is clear that Athens needs stable relationship with the Turks, particularly at a time when it has to confront new challenges at home and in the Balkans. The same holds true for Turkey as well. It is in the long-term interest of Ankara not to exploit the difficult situation that Greece is now passing through at home and abroad.

Because of the persistent Greek obstructions, according to a Commission official, Turkey has remained "the only country between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Sea of Japan" not to benefit the EC's financial programmes¹⁵². This is not expected to go on long. There are already bitter opposition from within the EC against its problematic attitude, the latest example of which being the Macedonian case. The Greek inflexibility on Turkey, in the words of an Economist commentary¹⁵³, **maddens** ministers from other EC countries as it continues to block aid to Turkey worth 600 mn ECUs. However, Mr. Mitsotakis, who seems aware that any Turkish isolation from the new European architecture will arguably worsen the prospects of settlement of disputes between the two countries and drift Turkey away from the European sphere of influence, has changed tack on Turkey. He has been told by other EC leaders that the Community wants to promote closer ties with Turkey.

Without saying so in Athens, he has duly dropped a Greek veto on EC financial support for cooperative projects between Mediterranean countries including non-EC members like Turkey. But he still retains Greece's veto applied since 1984 on a \$ 750 mn EC loan to Turkey. He says he is preparing to sign a friendship treaty with Turkey, something no Greek prime minister has ever said in the past 40 years, which he linked to a breakthrough in the UN-sponsored talks in New York on Cyprus. It can be asserted that Greece has come to a point where it faces a critical choice in its relationship with Turkey. Its redefinition of national interests and policy instruments vis-a-vis Turkey is likely to determine the future course of the Turco-Greek affairs.

¹⁵¹ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 7 March 1992

¹⁵² "Turkey Switches Tactics in Bid to Join the Community", David Buchan, in The Financial Times, 9 March 1992.

¹⁵³ "Greece: The Sick Man of Europe", in The Economist, 9 May 1992, p.27-28.

e) **Religious 'Bias': Islam versus Christianity?** It can hardly be argued that religion plays a decisive role in shaping the EC's general attitude vis-a-vis Turkey. In official documents and talks, one cannot trace any mention of religious considerations having an effect on the relationship. The EC does not want to be accused of, or seen as, prejudicing Turkey because of its different religion. After all, "is not the EC a secular Community of nations?" and "nowhere in the Treaties of Rome can be found a reference to religion"¹⁵⁴. Most European politicians would categorically deny that they even think about religion when making their political decisions or inactions, but the evidence, as in the cases of the support for "Catholic" Croatia and Slovenia against "Orthodox" Serbia and to some extent, of "Christian" Armenia against "Muslim" Azerbaijan, seems to tell a different story.

Furthermore, some Islamic countries tend to interpret the current Western immobility against the brutal mass killings by Serbs of Bosnian Muslims as a war by "Christian" Serbs against a "Muslim" people. For instance, Iran is now articulating the need for a strong Islamic involvement in what it perceives as: "the US and the West more generally are covertly backing Serbia as part of an overall Western war against Muslims; the European powers are united in their opposition to seeing an independent Islamic state, Bosnia, to consolidate itself on the European continent"¹⁵⁵. The belief is that if Bosnians were of Christian faith, the Western reaction could have been more different and be easily translated to a rapid military action. The most fundamental reason for the Western inaction on Bosnia is not, to our mind, anti-Islamic prejudice or conspiracy; nor is it, as many seem quick to suggest, the timidity of politicians as such. It is the reluctance of major powers to accept the risks and costs, in lives as well as money, of a commitment to defend the newest European state. Yet, religious sympathy is most of the time deep-down there dormant in the hearts whether explicitly pronounced or unpronounced. It is indeed hard to draw a distinct line where religion starts having an influence and where politico-economic motives prevail over all the others.

In several West European countries, including Germany and Italy, the dominant political party still calls itself 'Christian Democratic' and it is unlikely that the leaders of those parties see that self-identification as completely insignificant in a foreign policy context¹⁵⁶. Most of them belong to the Roman Catholic Church, a transnational organisation whose spiritual leader makes frequent pronouncements impinging upon international relations, including many in which the terms 'Christian' and 'Europe' are closely

¹⁵⁴ Interviews with several Commission officials, DG-I, January 1991, Brussels. Religion is being treated as a highly sensitive matter and all whom we interviewed were careful in getting across the message that religion has no bearing on deliberations concerning Turkey's accession.

¹⁵⁵ "How serious is threat of Muslim intervention?", Professor Fred Halliday, in The Guardian Weekly, 16 August 1992, p.9. There is nonetheless some amount of validity in such a religious concern. According to Prof. Halliday, first of all, it is not Muslims but Christians who have defined the conflict in religious terms. It is the Serbs and Croats, Orthodox and Catholic respectively, who have invaded the sovereign state of Bosnia and deliberately forced millions of Muslims from their homes, killing and imprisoning on the way. The rhetoric of these two sides, when not directed at each other, stresses their "Christian" ancestry and supposed legitimacy. Muslims of Bosnia are not religious extremists. But they are fast being radicalised. In the words of Paddy Ashdown, the leader of the British Liberal Democrats (in The Guardian Weekly, 23 August 1992, p.8), if Europe fails to act, "we should realise that we are creating Europe's Palestinians of the future".

¹⁵⁶ "Christianity and Islam", Edward Mortimer, in International Affairs, No.67, 1-1991, p.7-13

associated.¹⁵⁷ What happened in Poland on the eve of the political revolution is also an illustrative case at point¹⁵⁸. It is hardly any coincidence that the Christian Democrats in each European country are invariably found among the most fervent partisans of European Unity or that the three national leaders who laid the foundations of the present Community - Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman - were all Christian Democrats and devout Catholics. So is Mr. Jacques Delors, the strong president of the EC Commission, according to **Palmer**¹⁵⁹.

This is of course not to suggest at all that religion was and is a primary motivation in their perception of the EC. Sir Bernard Burrows, in an address to the Anglo-Turkish Society few years ago, challenged the assertion that Christianity was at the basis of the European idea, what the EC essentially had in common. In his opinion, it was fallacious on two accounts: Far from being a source of unity in Europe, the Christian churches in Europe for hundreds of years spent most of their effort in fighting and persecuting each other, as their adherents still do in Ireland. Secondly, the present decline of Church membership and attendance throughout Europe suggests that whatever may have been the case in the past the Europeans do not now attach much importance to religion as a guiding principle in politics.

Contrasting this view, there are many who believe that Europe is defining itself in terms of, not perhaps of Christian belief, but certainly of Christian heritage and is emphasising as sharply as possible the distinction and the frontier between itself and the world of Islam¹⁶⁰. This is justified on the ground that "if Europe is to function successfully as a political entity, its members will need some sense of a common heritage and some criterion for deciding where Europe begins and ends". For one thing, the tide of the East European immigrants inspires less alarm in Europe, precisely because it is assumed that their Christian heritage would make them assimilable in the Community in a way that Muslim North Africans or Turks are not.

¹⁵⁷ Mortimer, 1991

¹⁵⁸ See The European, 19-25 March 1992, p.8 for a wide coverage of the Roman Catholic Church's role in the political process bringing down the socialist government.

¹⁵⁹ "Sin, Mr. Clean and a Constant Diet of Crises in Brussels", John Palmer, in The Guardian, 21 March 1992, p.3.

¹⁶⁰ Mr. Ali Sirmen, a Turkish foreign policy analyst, portrays the issue of religious confrontation from a different perspective. He puts the dark-haired against the blond-haired in his simplified analogy. The blond-haired, who happen to live in the economically advanced Christian world, attempt to keep away the black-haired from its own wealth and civilized world or to exclude him even while living side-by-side. The blond-haired is Christian; but he is different from the Christian of the Crusade era. He rarely goes to the Church; the worldly benefits concern him more than the heavenly promises. The blond-haired is reluctant to share his wealth with others in need. He needs some kind of reasoning to keep the black-haired away from his life while at the same time wishing not to be seen as racially or religiously biased. Perhaps unconsciously he believes that whatever belongs to him is a sign of superiority. He perceives the Christianity versus Islam in this mind-frame, too. The blond-haired needs such a perception for the undisturbed pursuit of his happiness. Faced with such a situation, the dark-haired, who generally failed in his efforts to resolve his basic problems, to break the chains of underdevelopment and to establish the institutions of a modern social and political life, finds it easy to complain that all his misfortunes are due to the wrong-doings of Christians against Muslims. Mr. Sirmen warns that this contradiction disguised under a religious cover will unfortunately continue to deepen, instead of being eradicated, in the next century. ("Musluman-Hiristiyan" (Muslim-Christian), Ali Sirmen, in Cumhuriyet, 14 May 1992)

The fact that the Community is focusing its attention first on EFTA and then Eastern and Central European countries for the next round of the enlargement process is cited by some conservative political circles in Turkey as another sign of the EC's religious bias. They believe that this lies behind many of the more technical or circumstantial reasons given for opposing or, at least delaying, consideration of Turkey's candidature for full membership. Can this view be discarded easily? We would like now to look a bit more into the implications of a possible cleavage between a 'Christian Europe and a Muslim Crescent' and try to fit Turkey in this picture.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Islam - colonized, defeated, stagnant - could easily have been written off from history and the future. At the dawn of the 21st century, Islam - resurgent, confident, 'militant', 'fundamentalist', very much alive - is, however, poised to become a global force to be reckoned with. Whether it is seen as a force for liberation or as an authoritarian step back to the Middle Ages, it is beyond any doubt that Islam cannot be ignored. From the outside, that is from the perspective of the West, only a certain variety - the most overt, vocal and aggressive - of the whole diverse array of Islamic revivalism appears to be visible. To establish an ideological Islamic state has been the fundamental goal of all contemporary Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan and Jamaat-e Islami in Pakistan. All experiments in the establishment of a romantic Islamic state have turned out to be theocratic (Iran) or totalitarian (Pakistan, Sudan) regimes.

The struggle for power in Algeria has been, after Iran, another forceful reminder to Europeans that they are surrounded by the 'Islamic Crescent'¹⁶¹, a crescent that extends from the former Ottoman Empire and the soft underbelly of the former Soviet Union, from the Maghreb in the west to Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines in the east and down south into the heart of Africa. According to a UN report, there will be 1.27 bn Muslims by the turn of this century, or nearly a quarter of the world's population. The vitality of Islam far outweighs, in theory and in practice, the historic experiment of Leninism and socialism in the Third World. It is an active world religion that sees man, society and politics as indivisible. Europe, not only encircled by Muslim neighbours, also hosts millions of Muslim immigrant population. Muslims constitute three to five percent of the total populace in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands.

Over the past few years, as the economic hardships started to bite, attacks by racist, fundamentalist groups on Muslim immigrants in Europe have steeply risen across the Continent. A xenophobic upswell has delivered new support for the far right. In Italy, anti-immigrant 'Lombard League' is gaining strength. In Belgium's general elections last November, the anti-immigrant 'Flemish Block' won a quarter of the votes in Antwerpen. In France nearly a third of respondents told opinion-pollsters that they agree with the leader of the 'National Front', Jean-Marie Le Pen, on immigration issues¹⁶². The latest election victory of the extreme right-wing parties in Germany has been seen as a political earthquake.

¹⁶¹ "Algeria and the Crescent of Islam", Herbert Kremp, in Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 19 January 1992

¹⁶² "Europe's Immigrants: Strangers Inside the Gates", in the Economist, 15 February 1992, p.21.

Continued violence against foreigners and hostels for asylum applicants is casting an increasingly dark shadow on the picture Germany presents to the world.

There are another two emergent Muslim-populated countries in the heart of Europe. After 23 years of brutal Stalinist suppression, Albania's communist rulers had failed in their policy to eradicate Islam. A newly elected democratic government is currently in place in Albania, where an estimated 80 % are Muslims. The painful emergence of a new Muslim Republic in Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, has changed the delicate balances in Europe and particularly in the Balkans. The European leaders seem to be uneasy about the creation of a Muslim state in Bosnia, but had to recognize it early April after long bargaining on the constitutional arrangements (while deferring its decision on Macedonia to a later date). All this is to say that Islam is a powerful force both inside and outside the European Community.

It is therefore very important that a more enlightened, more pragmatic, more holistic, more broad-based and secular-oriented Islam should emerge and "crumble the fundamentalist stance under its weight".¹⁶³ But the main problem here is that most Europeans tend to associate almost all Islamic countries with the Iranian-style militant Islamic fundamentalism and view Islam generally as a major threat targetting at the very foundations of the Western civilization. This is a grave mistake. The implications of this need to be considered very carefully. If the price to be paid is to make every Muslim resident in the Community feel that (s)he is at best a tolerated alien and every neighbouring Muslim state feel that it is looked on by Europe as an enemy, then that price, needless to say, is too high. Europe should learn how sensitively to handle its relations with the Islamic world, abandon its religious-oriented and "narrow-minded expectations"¹⁶⁴ and accept that it faces a new challenge, a challenge more than power, than any it has faced this century because it is fundamentally a challenge of spirit. Vilification by the West of Islam¹⁶⁵ asserting that this religion is synonymous with backwardness and authoritarian regimes serves no purpose, but only deepens the mutual mistrust.

Before or if such a cleavage outbreaks, Turkey as the "model of a Western state, which combines modern capitalism and secular democracy with a moderate brand of Islam"¹⁶⁶, could find a credible role for itself as a bridge between the two communities. A recent survey of Turkey in the Economist¹⁶⁷ gives the most likely outlook for the world of the next 15 to 20 years: "*The Russian danger has gone away, until and unless Russia reassembles the economic strength. There will be economic friction, and bad temper, between*

¹⁶³ "Islam and the Future", Ziauddin Sardar, in Future, Special Issue on Islam, Vol.23 No.3, April 1991, p.228. The articles contained in this journal provides a wealth of comparative insights into contemporary discussions on religion.

¹⁶⁴ Kremp, 1992, p.3

¹⁶⁵ See "A Perspective On the Post-Sacred World: Christianity and Islam", Gianni Baget Bozzo, in The Contemporary European Affairs, Special Issue 'Politics and Religion', 1989, Vol.2, No.4, p.99-115, for an in-depth comparison of Islam and Christianity in politics.

¹⁶⁶ Robins, 1991, p.117

¹⁶⁷ "Turkey: Star of Islam", in the Economist, 14-20 December 1991

the winners of the Cold War, America, Europe and Japan. Eastern Asia contains both the last remnants of defeated Marxism and the world's most efficient examples of victorious capitalism, but no great crisis between them is in prospect: eastern Asia's ideological wars were won and lost a generation ago. Only a nuclear North Korea might make that untrue. Southern Asia may have to live through an attempt by India to become the local superpower, but the new world order (and India's own internal disorder) can probably contain that. Latin America and Africa at last have chance to concentrate on their enormous private business." That leaves, according to the survey, only one large stretch of the world notably liable to produce turmoil: the crescent-shaped piece of territory that starts in the steppes of Kazakhstan and curves south and west through the Gulf and Suez to the north coast of Africa. This western part of Islam is a potential zone of turbulence for a depressing variety of reasons. With one admirable exception - not counting non-Muslim Israel - the area does not yet have a single working democracy. *"This economically unhappy, politically prickly stretch of the world sits next door to a Europe that has a chance, for the first time in its life, to be democratic all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals. Europe and Islam have had a difficult time with each other over the past 1300 years. The fear and hatred are still there",* it concludes.

Turkey's chief value is to be an example to the region around it - a living demonstration of the proposition that a Muslim country can become a prosperous democracy, a full member of the modern world. One has to admit, however, that there is a certain degree of anxiety about a Muslim state joining the EC because of the above mentioned misconceptions about Turkey and Islam. Due to the continued Middle East crisis, there has been a tendency, right or wrong, to associate the growth of terror during the past twenty years with groups which happen to come from the Islamic world - Iran, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. So there is a very crude mixing of these factors together in the minds of Europeans. What is important to add here is that Europeans in general do not realize that Turkey is a secular state in which religion remains excluded from state affairs, although 95 % of its population is Muslim; and that Turkey does not share the views and behaviour of all of its neighbours.

On the contrary, it considers the spread of the Islamic fundamentalism as a great threat to its own security and strives, to the best of its ability, to curb its growth in the region. To dispel any doubts about its credentials, Turkey needs to project its secular and modern image more forcefully because prejudices and misperceptions are deep rooted in Europe. People's perceptions of one another take quite a long time to change. Turkey should, as a first step, build up a network of fairly knowledgeable, sympathetic constituency in the Community member countries, which it currently lacks. A Turkey firmly anchored in the European Community would most tellingly disprove the stereotype notions that "there is an inherent incompatibility between Islam and values such as democracy, modernity, secularism and free market economy" and confirm that the EC is not based on religious conceptions, but is a community of secular nations. It would, in the final analysis, constitute a concrete case for demonstrating that the Western ideals and values are universal.

f) New Opportunities in the Central Asian & Caucasian Turkish Republics and the Balkans. Once one of the world's great imperial powers, Turkey - like Britain and France - has never lost its conviction that it has a special role to play in international affairs. Yet, in spite of its strategic position at the hinge of Europe and Asia, these ambitions have

been frustrated since the final collapse in 1923 of the Ottoman Empire, by Turkey's nascent economic development, its political instability including three military interventions in the last 30 years and the restraints imposed on its freedom of action by the military might of its former Soviet neighbour. The end of the Cold War era has resulted in Turkey becoming a major regional power to benefit most from the break-up of the ex-Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Between 1945 and 1991, Moscow was the predominant power in the Balkans to the west of Turkey and in the Caucasia and Central Asia to the east.

Today there is a truly power vacuum in these areas, in which Turkey is best positioned to play a leading role¹⁶⁸. Post-Cold War hopes for peaceful coexistence across the world mean Turkey's active economic, political and military participation in this new era. Turkey will be called upon to participate in new forms of multi-dimensional cooperation involving the Western Europe, the new democracies of the Central & Eastern Europe, the independent republics emerging from the old Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and, finally, some nations of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. With its pluralistic democracy, secular state and a free market economy, Turkey is not only a model for those countries, but with all its historic experience, is also a moderating & stabilising factor in the region. Such a role would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Its unique assets hence make Turkey one of the leading countries in laying the foundations for economic, political and security interdependence in this vast region extending from the 'Adriatic coasts to the Chinese border' in the Far East.

Turkey, while lacking contiguous borders with the predominantly Turkish Republics¹⁶⁹ of the Central Asia, feels deeply the developments in these new countries. Turkey's role in the Trans-Caucasia, the Central Asia and, to a certain extent, the Balkan peninsula, may be compared to the geo-strategic equivalent of Germany's attraction for most of the old Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Turkey matters so much in those regions - as Germany does in Europe. Under the headline The Sick Man Recovers, the **Times** editorial¹⁷⁰ depicts Turkey in the following words: "No sooner has Germany begun to stretch its muscles across Central Europe than another historical ghost is emerging to the south. Turkey not only boasts a vigorous growth rate; it is now actively intervening in the economies of its sickly neighbours". Turkey is already the largest single source of foreign investment in both Bulgaria and Romania. From Brussels, the **Times** notes, "Turkey is still a developing country, well behind the economic and political development of the EC. But

¹⁶⁸ See "Ankara Stands to Gain in Vacuum Left by Moscow", Patrick Cockburn, in The Independent, 3 April 1992; "Rule of the Ottoman Empire", John Palmer, in The Guardian, 3 April 1992; and "The Turkish Question", an editorial in The Independent, 1 April 1992, p.26. for various interpretations of Turkey's growing role in the formerly Soviet-controlled regions.

¹⁶⁹ Most of the people who live in the six Central Asian Republics of the ex-Soviet Union are ethnically and culturally related to the Turks and speak a Turkish dialect. Their population almost equals Turkey's population of 60 mn. Turkey is beaming Turkish-language television programmes to them by satellite. The Turks have also set up a new institute in Istanbul to try and regularize a form of Turkish which would be more completely comprehensible by all the Turkic-speaking nations. They also send all kinds of assistance, advisors and encourage investments there. See "The emergence of Central Asia", Graham E. Fuller, in Foreign Policy, Spring 1990, No.78, p.49-67, for a fairly detailed analysis of the Central Asian Turkish republics from an American perspective.

¹⁷⁰ "The Sick Man Recovers", in the Times, full text reprinted in Newspot Turkish Digest, 13 February 1992, p.2.

seen from Bucharest or Taskent, it is a dynamic regional power. They see in Turkey's well-stocked shops, thriving agriculture and developing infrastructure a new Germany to pull them out of stagnation. Turkey's role in promoting regional stability where the West has little influence or experience could be invaluable". There is a widely held view in Brussels that the EC should explore ways and means of contributing to the process which Turkey started in respect of setting a Western-style model to the newly emerging democracies.

Through Turkey, the influence of the Community could be extended up to the steppes of Central Asia, which is to bridge Europe with the Far East and the Pacific region. The West needs to begin thinking of greater Central Asia as a new and potentially active part of the world politics, one that will begin to establish a new presence in the Asian, the Middle Eastern and the Eurasian politics. It is in the EC's own self-interest to support a secure, peaceful and Western-oriented development of the Eurasian world. For a wide range of reasons, which are subject of another study, the EC interests will be best served by engaging in this vast, extremely diverse, but surprisingly little known region through a close and constructive partnership with Turkey. However, the internal dynamics of the EC's foreign policy-making and various constraints - financial, conflicting member state interests, competition with other policy areas and geographical priorities - may hinder the development of an effective Community policy towards this region. As Mr. Mark Eyskens, the former Belgian Foreign Minister, once remarked, the EC is currently an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. This judgement was confirmed by the EC's failure to deal with the on-going crisis in ex-Yugoslavia - a European state on its doorsteps. Before it could play any significant role in determining the course of events in Eurasia and beyond, there would have to be a major restructuring and redistribution of power within the EC and that, for the time being at least, would be strongly resisted both at home and abroad. In an overall evaluation, if the EC is ever going to play a role of global power, this region remains to be the first testing ground.

On the other hand, the emergence of a kind of crescent of Islamic states in the southern parts of the former Soviet Union - the Central Asian & Caucasian Turkish republics, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey - may understandably cause a sort of European apprehension that with Turkey as a full member of the EC, it could involve the Community in Central Asian and Islamic problems & uncertainties. This, however, represents a narrowly-focused approach. If Europe declines to take on global responsibility in that vast part of the world, the vacuum will be filled by anti-Western powers. The choice is to be there or not. The **Konsomolskaya Pravda**¹⁷¹ writes that the acceptance of a 'Turkey model' for the Central Asian republics would be looked upon positively by the Slavic republics as well¹⁷². The article stresses the view that Iran, as a fundamentalist Muslim state, is also trying to increase its influence in the region and concludes that Turkey's influence is the 'best of all choices' and that Iran's, based on radical Islam, would be a negative factor not only for the Slav republics, but also for the balance of power in Europe. Although Turkish

¹⁷¹ Quoted in the Turkish daily Tercuman, 14 January 1992.

¹⁷² Russia is in fact one of the world's largest 'Muslim' states, ranking with such countries as Saudi Arabia and Syria. In terms of population, this means 12 million Muslims, or about 10 % of Russia's population. A large part of Russian borders, too, is surrounded with Muslim states. Russia is therefore keenly interested in Turkey playing a moderating role in Central Asian Turkish Republics. For a more detailed analysis of this subject, see "Russia, Threatened by An Islamic Revolution in Central Asia", A. Portansky, in the Izvestia, quoted in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XLIII No. 48 (1991), p. 12.

leaders carefully note that Ankara is not in competition with any other country for a regional leadership role, it is clear that Turkey remains the only country capable of curbing the growth of an Iranian-style Islamic radical movement in this region¹⁷³. The Turkish Republic exerts every effort to restore the links, long since broken, with their Turkish brethren to the east and to share with them the Turkish vision for the future.

A host of other players, too, with competing aims and agendas are plunging into a replay of the "Great Game". Some regional neighbours - India and Pakistan among them - see opportunities for trade and commerce in the liberated republics of Central Asia. China borders on three of the Turkic Republics and seeks to extend its influence there as a counterweight to Russia. Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan would like to build Islamic republics on both sides of the border. Syria and Libya have already opened consulates there. Saudi Arabia is engaged in a fierce rivalry with Iran to establish its own version of Islamic fundamentalism in the area. Even Israel has won noteworthy initial success in cultivating good relations with these republics through technical and agricultural aid of various kinds. The big powers, the US, the EC, Japan and Russia, are politically hanging back at this stage of the game, while their firms are actively exploring economic potentialities. Russia, because of its current internal problems, is at least for a while out of the game. But we have no doubt that Moscow will be back - a country with the size, the numbers, the resources, the talents, the experience, the ambitions of Russia will not stay out definitely. There will be a hard time, which may last well into the 21st century, but sooner or later Russia - under whatever kind of regime - will be back as a major player in the international game.

In the 1970s and 80s many Western analysts looked to Islam as the force that would undermine communist rule. There was constant talk of the Soviet Union's soft Muslim underbelly. Now Islam, notably Islamic fundamentalism¹⁷⁴, is viewed as replacing communism in the front. For 40 years communism was the perfect ideological opponent of the West. But now that communism has been exorcised, who is to play the role of the 'devil'? **Ian Mather**¹⁷⁵ argues that Islam fits the bill to some extent. This, too, looks like an oversimplification. It is particularly wrong to present the current Islamic revival as a global ideology that, like communism, is competing with democracy, has to be struggled against. Islamic radicalism is not, as it is often portrayed, a plague threatening to infect whole populations; it is a disturbing, but limited, response to national or personal humiliation inflicted by incompetent or careless rulers. It flourishes in places where no opposition is allowed; it also flourishes on martyrdom. If the political systems were opened up, the militant Islamic opponents in the Moslem world might lose much of their appeal. As for the

¹⁷³ A key issue to determine the orientation of the Central Asian Turkish republics is the alphabet. Until they came under Soviet power in the early 1920s, Central Asians used Arabic script. But Stalin insisted on giving them the Latin alphabet on the model of the reforms of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Later, to bind them further to Russia, Stalin ordered the switch to Cyrillic. Now the question is back on the agenda and some observers see it as a vital pointer as to whether the region will follow the secular Turkish model or succumb to Islamic influence. Most republics including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have already decided to adopt the Latin script. Others, with the exception of Farsi-speaking Tadjikistan which will probably adopt the Persian script, are expected to follow suit.

¹⁷⁴ "Fundamentalism" is Christian short-hand that evokes born-again Protestants who insist on the literal truth of the Bible; since neither the word nor the concept exists in Arabic, a translation had to be invented. (The Economist, "Islam Resumes Its March", 4 April 1992, p.55).

¹⁷⁵ "Menace in the March of Islam", Ian Mather, in The European, 20-26 February 1992.

Central Asian Republics, most people in these countries seem willing to 'give the market economy and political democracy a chance'. They are aware that talk about an Islamic state will scare off Western investors and push them out of the international system at a time when the Western assistance is of paramount importance for tackling the severe problems inherited from the Soviet past. The danger of religious revival, predicts **Steele**¹⁷⁶, is to rise in a decade or two, just as it did a generation after independence in Algeria and Egypt and 25 years after the Shah started his modernisation effort in Iran. If economic and social problems are not effectively tackled, only then will the Islamists have a real chance. Eliminating the vestiges of a totally different regime and frame of mind in these fragile democracies will undoubtedly require time and perseverance. Therefore, transition period for the newly emerged states towards democracy and free market may last longer than expected.

The sheer size of great expectations pinned on Ankara by these republics simply exceeds Turkey's capabilities. It cannot alone cope with the economic and political challenges there. It certainly requires a joint Western effort. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin, told in a CNN interview on 7 March 1992 during his official visit to Central Asian Republics that the EC, the US, Japan¹⁷⁷ and Turkey should enter this region together so as to ensure a peaceful transformation in those young, inexperienced members of the international community. During a recent tour of the region, the prime minister, Mr. Demirel has extended to them some \$ 1 bn worth of loans and export credits. Ankara also offered help to modernize the Central Asian states' telecommunications and transport networks.

An ambitious Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) has been set up to coordinate every kind of assistance, investment or project designed to support the "newly-independent Turkish-speaking and neighbouring republics".¹⁷⁸ In nine months, nine Turkish Embassies have been opened in CIS countries. Turkish leaders are aware that Turkey's own contribution can be no more than a drop in the ocean compared with the total Western financial aid required by the region and that the problem is further complicated by the priority that has been given by Western donor countries to aid for other "politically more important", European parts of the former USSR. After visiting Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well as Belarus and Ukraine late February 1992, the EC's External Affairs Commissioner, Mr. Frans Andriessen, said the EC should show the world a lead in stabilising the longer term economic future of the CIS and that Brussels should not be seen to demote the Central Asian republics to second place, behind European CIS republics, but should negotiate trade

¹⁷⁶ "Uzbeks Return From Communism to God and Mammon", Jonathan Steele, in the Guardian, 18 March 1992, p.5.

¹⁷⁷ A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said that Tokyo sees a "strategic opportunity" in Central Asia for its own diplomatic and economic goals. (see "Japan to Help Former Soviet States", Akihiro Tamiya, in The Nikkei Weekly, 11 April 1992, p.2). Japan had long refused to extend full-fledged aid to the ex-USSR demanding that their territorial dispute over islands off Hokkaido first be resolved. Now Japan believes that the aid to the Central Asian states might be used as a "bargaining chip" against Russia.

¹⁷⁸ See "Turkey sets up Agency to support Turkish republics", in ANKA Review, 28 July 1992, p.6-7, for more information about the TICA. The purpose of this organization is to prepare, organize and realize, through bilateral and multilateral programmes and projects, economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational cooperation between Turkey and the former Soviet Republics with special emphasis on the neighbouring and Turkish speaking ones.

and cooperation deals with all of them¹⁷⁹. The EC Council founded the TACIS programme, the equivalent of PHARE for the ex-USSR countries in December 1990 in order to "support the ongoing process of economic reform and development in the 11 states of the CIS and Georgia". The TACIS is the main EC funded technical assistance programme, whose function and structure is similar to that of PHARE. In 1991 TACIS disposed of a budget of ECU 400 mn¹⁸⁰ and the 1992 programme is based on individual projects prepared for each of the newly independent states, which would reflect their specific economic reform priorities and objectives. By September 1992, ECU 205 mn had been signed or sent out for tender under the TACIS programme. For the Community, which has limited influence over the region, it would evidently be preferable to see these republics being nurtured by Turkey, than by an Iran in which fundamentalist mullahs still exert a powerful influence. The US and Japan have also expressed interest in launching joint projects involving Turkey in these republics. The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, too, in a recent Brugge lecture¹⁸¹, underlined a similar approach, stressing that an equal treatment of all the former Soviet republics is essential in order to ensure a Western influence in these countries.

The Central Asians' economic prospects also vary widely. For instance, Turkmenistan is sitting on gas reserves larger than Algeria's and now that it no longer has its profits taken away by Moscow, its tiny population could become as rich as any Gulf state.

Natural resources are plentiful in these republics. Azerbaijan is one of the major oil producers. So is Kazakhstan. The world's biggest cotton fields lay in Uzbekistan. Czarist Russia and the ex-Soviet Union absorbed Central Asia gradually, from the mid-1800's until the 1920's, and built a colonial-style economy. They developed agriculture - including massive wheat and cotton belts - and intensive mining. But Central Asia can process few of these resources, trading raw or semi-finished commodities at low prices to the Slavic dominated republics in exchange for more expensive finished goods. Central Asian republics are eager to end their decades of Soviet-imposed isolation, expressing confidence that access for their commodities to world markets will offer a base for intensive economic development. Western companies are more distant and unused to business methods there. The West has remained aloof, investing only \$ 300 mn in the former Soviet Union in 1990 - a minuscule total in comparison with about \$ 2 bn invested in Hungary. Of 1500 foreign-Soviet joint ventures established in 1990, more than 1000 were in Russia and only 25 in Central Asia according to a study¹⁸² by the World Bank.

Turkey feels it has a headstart in these republics, especially in the Turkish-speaking ones, as a trade conduit for Western companies and a political and diplomatic counterweight to Iran. Turkey is well placed to arrange off-take deals, using the republics' natural resources as collateral for trade financing, similar to the Soviet gas pipeline deal¹⁸³.

¹⁷⁹ "EC Foreign Ministers Urge Patience in CIS Aid Effort", David Buchan, in the Financial Times, 3 March 1992.

¹⁸⁰ Reported in The East-West Fortnightly Bulletin, No.533, 17 September 1992, p.4-5.

¹⁸¹ "Future Security of Europe", a lecture delivered on 2 April 1992 at the College of Europe, Bruges.

¹⁸² The figures and the World Bank study are quoted in "Central Asia's Ties That Bind", James Rupert, in The International Herald Tribune, 18 December 1991.

¹⁸³ The volume of trade between Turkey and the ex-Soviet Union had risen from \$ 477 mn in 1987 to \$ 1.9 bn in 1990 with a projection of \$ 5 bn by 1995.

Commodity trading may provide Turkey with some business, although over the longer term, with the shortage of foreign exchange, Turkish traders will have to look at barter deals. The target for the year 2000 is \$ 12 bn a year. Clearly, finance will remain the main obstacle, at a time of mounting budget problems at home¹⁸⁴.

Meanwhile, Ankara is at the same time exploring vast Balkan, Russian and Ukrainian markets as well - through the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone. The idea of a 'Black Sea Economic Co-operation Region'(BSECZ) is a new form of multilateral co-operation. This project, pioneered by Turkey, is certainly connected with the profound changes in Europe in the past few years. Economic progress is the main concern for all the Black Sea littoral countries. They share many convergent interests, based on their neighbourliness, complementary economies and their extended bilateral relations. The project is neither presented as an alternative to the EC, nor is it believed that it will become an impediment to EC membership for its individual member states.

The Co-operation project has been guided, according to Turkish strategists, by the three main considerations of (1) how to achieve the integration of this region into the world economy; (2) how to turn to best use the advantages accruing from the geographical proximity of and the traditional ties between the Black Sea countries both with respect to one another and vis-a-vis third countries in Asia, the Middle East and Central Europe; and (3) how to develop a model of multilateral economic co-operation and trade liberalization that can ensure a smooth and effective transition to a market economy. The project brings some 316 mn people together of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova. Besides the littoral countries, Albania and Greece also joined this project when the heads of government and state had met in a historic summit in Istanbul on 25 June 1992 to sign the final document.

It is hoped that the economic power which will be resulting from the project will also facilitate political cooperation and mitigate the effects of extreme nationalism, helping member countries overcome political tensions and promoting closer political cooperation as it increases the presence of each member in the other's trade & investment matters. By creating greater vested interests among the member states, it is thought by those who pursue political motives to raise the political profile and awareness of members' political and economic sensitivities. It would also help foster a more stable and predictable trading & economic environment for the partner countries to allow for greater specialization and to encourage rationalization of the industrial structure within the region, which would be to the benefit of each member and the region as a whole. It could also act as a stepping stone to freer future trade as it will provide member states with a structural adjustment mechanism which could later on make the political decision to pursue multilateralism easier to achieve. On

¹⁸⁴ "Turkey Struggles to Make Sense of Trade With CIS Republics", John Murray Brown, in the Financial Times, 3 March 1992 and "le modele turc a l'epreuve", Ann Bernes in EUROP 66, July/September 1992, p.8.

a negative note, it might reduce the political and economic desire to seek and offer further access to world markets, resulting in the balkanization of world trade into regional blocs. The agreement envisages at a later stage the free movement of people, goods, services and capital as well as enhanced intergovernmental cooperation. A permanent secretariat will soon be set up in Istanbul. A distinguishing feature of this agreement is the prominent and active role assigned to the businessmen of the region who would determine the terms of cooperation. Within a broader perspective, this project could combine the three hinterlands of the region: the Balkans through Ukraine and Turkey; the Central Asia through Caucasia and the Eastern Mediterranean through Turkey.

On another front, in Tehran, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan met on 5-6 February 1992 to inject fresh blood to the 27 year-old Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), welcoming Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as new members and Kazakhstan as observer. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), the ECO's precursor, had become moribund following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The three founding member states with a combined population of 220 mn, close historical ties and a foreign trade turnover of nearly \$ 100 mn, had vast scope for cooperation, which could bring a sea change in the economies of the three countries if the cooperation could lead to the retention of even % 10 of that turnover within the region.

The RCD was reactivated in 1985 under the name ECO. The February 1992 meeting had also witnessed the signing of a protocol relating to a preferential customs tariff between the member states. The protocol envisages a % 10 reduction in customs duties for various customer goods, chemicals and the like¹⁸⁵. It was also stressed that efforts would continue for the lifting of all obstacles with regard to tariffs and state subsidies for exports¹⁸⁶. During the recent visits late October by the Turkish prime minister to Islamabad and Teheran, it was decided that the ECO would be the real "dinamo" of the intense economic cooperation incorporating Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. This should be seen in the context of Turkey's other regional economic co-operation initiatives - not as an Islamic Common Market as speculated by some commentators. Iran also launched, following on the footsteps of Turkey, a Caspian Sea Co-operation Area grouping together the littoral states of the Caspian Sea.

Turkey's active involvement in the former Soviet states could be a good thing or a bad thing, depending on from which perspective one views it. The good possibility is that Turkey will help to lead these places, too, towards a free-market, democratic and secular future. The danger is that, for some Turks, the reappearance of this Turkish family to the east opens up an alternative to the west-looking policy of the past 70 years. The fears are spelled out that the family, instead of being pulled by Turkey into new ways, may pull Turkey back into old ones. Arguing that the future merging of Eastern and Central Europe into the West European system may complicate, or even defeat, Turkish aspirations to join the Community, a Belgian MEP¹⁸⁷ asked "might not Turkey find important compensation in economic and political influence in Turkish Central Asia and Caucasia?". This question has been voiced by a number of Europeanists who prefer to hold Turkey at arm's length. For 70

¹⁸⁵ "ECO Summit in Teheran", in The NEWSPOT Turkish Digest, 27 February 1992, p.1.

¹⁸⁶ "Untapped Potential", in The Far East Economic Review, 5 June 1992, p.24.

¹⁸⁷ Interview, 14 January 1992, Brussels.

years, the iron curtain separated Turkey, as it separated Germany, from the cousins to the east. The argument goes that there was nowhere to look but westward. Now the iron curtain has gone; the family can meet again. The author believes that it would be an exaggeration to call this 'family re-union' danger as talk in Turkey of pan-Turanism, a Turkish Commonwealth, is still confined to the wilder shores of right-wing romanticism¹⁸⁸. Turkish nationalism, as enunciated by Kemal Ataturk, had been focussed on the present-day Turkish territory, whose frontiers drawn by the 1921 National Pact and had never adopted claims to historic Turkish territory further east. It will be as big a pity for Europe and the USA as for Turkey itself if it gets diverted from the course it set itself 70 years ago¹⁸⁹. This is highly unlikely given Ankara's strong Western vocation since early 1920s.

Talking of Turkey's regional role, one should also make some mention of its Balkan dimension. The Balkans has, throughout the history, been the opening window of the Turks to Europe. They have been deeply rooted in the Balkans for more than 700 years. Although no parallelism exists, there are important similarities between the events that have taken place in what was the Soviet Union and the ex-Yugoslavia except that the process of disintegration in the Soviet Union ran smoothly without, to a great extent, bloodshed. But in the former Yugoslavia demands for independence caused enormous tension and resulted eventually in a bloody civil war which still takes its high toll.

Turkey has not hurried to recognize the republics breaking away from Yugoslavia until it became firmly convinced that the political and geographical map of Yugoslavia has been irreversibly redrawn. Ankara has recognized all the former Yugoslav republics, arguing that being selective would add to the instability in the Balkans. The Bosnian crisis has put the Turkish leadership in the center of diplomatic efforts to find an early solution. The Turkish government has called for a military intervention by a UN-mandated force, which could be provided by NATO in order to "make the peace" in this case and not "keep the peace" as has been the case for previous UN forces. Ankara announced that if necessary Turkish troops¹⁹⁰ could be sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina if the world decided to act and intervene in the fighting to stop the bloodshed. As matters stand, there is very little chance at this stage for such an intervention given that the countries who could lead such a venture -

¹⁸⁸ The Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman said that it would be wrong to look for secret motives in the efforts to develop relations with these republics. While developing its relations with these countries, "we will never have an opportunistic attitude. Our policy is not based on an ideology, such as Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamism", she said. (Turkish Embassy Press Review, 9 January 1992, Brussels). Turkey has conducted an active diplomacy aimed at helping secure memberships of the CSCE, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Economic Co-operation Organisation and the UN for the Caucasian and Central Asian Turkish Republics. Ankara's attempts to involve these newly independent countries in the network of international relations have greatly contributed to peace and stability in the Eurasian region.

¹⁸⁹ Editorial in the Economist, 14 December 1991, p.5

¹⁹⁰ There is little enthusiasm in the West for the idea of Turkish troops taking part either in the UN contingent or in any other international force to be sent to the former Yugoslavia. The question of what advantage the presence of Turkish troops will bring in a Balkan country whose history is so closely linked to that of the Ottoman Empire - and not necessarily in a positive sense - has been raised by many commentators. In plain terms, the suggestion is that Turkish troops might inflame matters rather than having a soothing effect. The Turks responded to that by saying that "there was no question of Turkey being over-enthusiastic about posting its own soldiers to Bosnia or anywhere else in ex-Yugoslavia" (in Briefing, 14 September 1992, Issue 905, p.9-10).

the US and the EC - have no real motivation in doing so. The best that Turkey can in fact hope to do at the present time is to act as the conscience of the world and keep the question of finding a just solution to the plight of the Bosnians alive in every international platform that she is in.¹⁹¹ The disaster in Bosnia is indeed a serious blow to what Turkey stands for in the world. The chief victims of the crisis are of Bosnian Muslims - 45 percent of the population, but presently left with barely 5 percent of the land. From other Islamic nations come a growing protest that Europe does not care what happens to Muslims, while hurrying to the help of Christians. That complicates Turkey's attempt to orient other Muslim countries towards a modern, democratic, friendly-to-West future. It seems that after hundreds of thousands of Iranian, Afghan, Bulgarian Turk and Iraqi refugees, Turkey is now about to face a serious influx of Bosnian refugees, specially given the fact that something like 5 percent of Turkey's 60 mn people are of Bosnian descent, who will no doubt press for more support to their kinsmen.

The traditionally tense relations between Bulgaria and Turkey are now relaxed and the two countries have concluded a network of treaties calling for economic, political and security co-operation.¹⁹² As a consequence of military dialogue, Ankara has decided to cut back significantly the number of the Turkish troops deployed in Thracian region along the Bulgarian border. Turkey has also concluded similar agreements with Albania and Romania. The Romanian Foreign Minister told the author during his Bruges lecture last March that the relations between Ankara and Bucharest are currently in an "excellent" state. Turkey has been one of the few countries in Europe, which maintained good economic and political relationship with Albania during its isolationism, while at the same time supporting the rise of a democracy movement there. The conditions in general are now perceived as quite favourable for Turkey to enhance its economic and political presence in the Balkans. The emergence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (with considerable Moslem and Turkish populations) in international scene as independent states provides the Turkish diplomacy the possibility to form a new Balkan policy.

Kohen¹⁹³, a senior diplomatic columnist, writes that the historical, cultural, religious and ethnical ties with the peoples in these two republics will create an atmosphere conducive not only to better bilateral relations with these countries, but also set up new balances in the region. By following a sensible and cautious policy and taking due account of the sensitivities of the peninsula, Turkey is destined to play a more influential role in the new equations of the region. And Turkey's eventual integration with Europe will largely depend upon its integration with this historic basin of the Balkans in the next decade, which

¹⁹¹ "What can Turkey do for the Bosnians?", in BRIEFING, 3 August 1992, Issue 899, p.7.

¹⁹² A commentary in The European, Jonathan Eyal, 24-30 January 1992.

¹⁹³ "Balkanlar'da Yeni Firsatlar Doguyor (New Opportunities Are Rising in the Balkans)", Sami Kohen, in Milliyet, 10 January 1992. Also, see an editorial by Hasan Cemal in Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1992 to find out how the Turks interpret their new role in the Balkans.

constitute a geographical whole for link with other EC countries. So they took the lead of launching the Black Sea regional integration project. The Turks are also conscious that they have to act prudently in their relations with the newly independent Turkish republics and the Balkan states, avoiding any impression that they may be patronizing these young states as the 'big brother' or that they act as 'an agent of the Western imperialism' - an image that Iran is trying to portray.

Greece follows these developments with growing uneasiness because Turkey, in a vast area stretching from the Adriatic coasts to the Chinese border, has now the chance to thread a new network of relations, the progress of which Athens is unable to influence as it does in the European context. The crisis in the Balkans, generally speaking, caught all major Greek politicians unprepared. Greek politicians saw themselves mostly as players on a predominantly European stage, belittling the 'petty' Balkan issues. But the Balkan dimension of Greece's foreign policy is now likely to dominate politics in the immediate future. Beside the economic implications of the crisis (60 percent of Greek exports to Europe pass through the Yugoslav motorways), Greece has been alarmed by the reopening of the Macedonian question on its northern borders. As **Ozdalga**¹⁹⁴ suggests, Ankara and Athens have to settle their differences and resume mutually beneficial co-operation in bilateral relations as well as in the context of the EC and the Balkan politics. The uncertain post-Cold War environment dictates a rapid rapprochement between Ankara and Athens, particularly in the Balkans and the EC context because a blind zero-sum game between them means losses on both sides.

g) The Concerns of the Community Institutions. Many critics of the new enlargement have stressed its likely impact on Community institutions and argued that, unless radical changes took place before any new members were admitted, the Community decision-making mechanism might slowly grind to a halt. Fears about the ability of the institutions to survive yet another round of enlargements have been expressed by most member states and Commission officials. The experience with Greece, which has paralysed the workings of the Community at times, compels the EC institutions to take an even more cautious and reluctant position vis-a-vis Turkey - a country, which is several times bigger than Greece.

Turkey would expect to enjoy representation in the Community institutions equal to that of the big four - Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. If present rules remain still in force, this will mean two Commissioners, 81 Euro-MPs in the parliament, one judge in the Court of Justice, a Vice-President in the European Investment Banks and so on. The Turkish accession would also in the long term raise another issue. Amongst the member states of the enlarged EC, Turkey would be unique in having a population growing by over 2 % (or one million) per annum. Moreover, with each enlargement, the question continues to resurface: with 20 to 23 members, would it ever be possible to decide anything using the current system of voting? The whole machinery might be deadlocked altogether.

¹⁹⁴ Haluk Ozdalga, in *Cumhuriyet Weekly*, 15-21 November 1991.

Another question is whether the Commission as a bureaucracy can survive yet another massive entry of new officials and what effects would this have on its efficiency as an institution. This seems to be a legitimate worry, particularly since bargaining among national governments over the allocation of posts has become almost institutionalised and rather crude¹⁹⁵. The whole Brussels 'Eurocracy' will be subjected to more fierce criticism as its efficiency and ability to cope with the challenges may decline. Observers of the Community scene indicate a gradual emergence of a distinct North-South grouping within the EC policies.

The recent two enlargements have shifted the centre of gravity of the Community towards the South. The weight of the Mediterranean countries (including France) in the European Parliament, for instance, increased from 35.9 % to 52.2 %, in the Commission from 29.4 % to 47.1 % and in the Council of Ministers from 32.9 % to 50 %¹⁹⁶. Although Community practice has so far acted against the formation of long-term blocks, the possibility of future alliances among Mediterranean members of the EC cannot be entirely discounted. Can the Northern countries support a Turkish membership which would disturb further the balance in the Community decision-making machinery? They would naturally prefer to see the accession of those countries, which share similar characteristics with themselves - Scandinavian and Nordic states before Turkey is considered. Perhaps this may lead to the possibility of negotiating a package deal in which all candidates will be considered in the final equation.

One last point worth mentioning is the Turkish language and adaptation to the **acquis communautaire**. The translation service would be stretched to the limits by the addition of Turkish to the other official languages. The Turkish is relatively less used in Western Europe and it would be practically quite difficult to find a corps of qualified interpreters and translators able to work from Turkish into their mother tongues. Thus, the addition of Turkish would be yet another reason for reorganising the system in Brussels. Following its request of accession, the Turkish government has, in cooperation with the Commission, embarked on a comprehensive programme with a view to adapting to the *acquis communautaire*.

Twenty-four inter-ministerial sub-committees were set up to cover such areas as EC institutions, budget-finance, agriculture, industry, free movement of workers, social policies, competition, transport, EMU, external relations, environment, research and development, etc. Most legislation and constitutional amendments, which will ensure conformity to the EC standards, have already been drawn up, waiting to be enacted by the Parliament. Given the great requirement for qualified staff at every level well versed in EC affairs, a personnel master plan has been put into effect, which will train 21.100 EC experts from 1988 to 1995. The number of civil servants already trained in Turkey or abroad amounts to 5000 persons from November 1987 to June 1991.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ "Second Round of Enlargement and the Mediterranean", Loukas Tsoukalis, in Greece and the EC, London, 1979, p.162.

¹⁹⁶ "The Challenge of the Southern Enlargement of the EC", George Yannopoulos, in Il Politico, September 1987, No.3, p.430.

¹⁹⁷ Figures are taken from various Turkish State Planning Organisation publications.

h) How Major Community Member States View Turkey's Place in Europe?

Though Greece¹⁹⁸ is known to be the strongest opponent of a Turkish membership in the Community, there are a number of other EC member states with serious reservations on Turkey's possible accession. The wide-spread belief is that the others are comfortably hiding behind the well-known Greek objections and that an improvement in the Turco-Greek relations may remove the first line of opposition and unmask those countries so far seeking refuge behind Athens' disapproval.

The chief objector at the moment is Germany, which is having so much trouble with right-wing xenophobia that it does not want to contemplate even more Turkish workers in its economy. Germany holds the key to Turkey's membership. All other obstacles including the veto card of Greece can be overcome in time. But the EC shall continue to add new obstacles, as it has done in the past, unless Germany reconsiders its cost-benefit analysis of a Turkish accession. With the arrival in power of a center & social democrat government in Turkey and due to the convergence (or, as some would argue, divergence) of economic, political and security interests in the new architecture of the Balkans, the ex-Soviet Union and the Middle East, some has hoped that the Turco-German 'special' relations could revive and start moving in the right direction once again.

Both Kohl and Genscher, after their meeting with the Turkish foreign minister in Bonn early this year, had lent, in a joint declaration, their support to Turkey's quest for membership of the Community. Yet how this political statement will be translated into reality remains to be seen. The latest development in what was once termed the "historic and special relationship" is that Germany suspended supplies of military equipment to Turkey and harshly criticized the government in Ankara for its attacks on 'Kurdish settlements' in the southeast of the country. Mr. Genscher called on the EC to condemn the Turkish actions, which he described as in "total contravention" of the Helsinki Final Act and contrary to its commitment as a member of NATO and the CSCE. German reaction was stoked by alleged evidence that former East German military equipment supplied by Bonn had been used in the raids against Kurdish terrorists, and by a Turkish accusation that Germany was harbouring the separatist PKK terrorists¹⁹⁹.

It is worth noting that this strongly-worded German reaction has been delivered at a crucial time when the new government has, in its first 100 days, launched comprehensive reforms for improvements in human rights, democratic freedoms to satisfy Kurdish aspirations. The German-Turkish relations, always sensitive because of the 1.5 mn Turks who make up Germany's largest population of foreigners, have been especially tense since the Gulf War, when Bonn publicly hesitated before saying it would live up to the commitment to defend its NATO ally in the event of an Iraqi attack. The fact that both countries share a history of active economic, political and strategic cooperation is a complicating factor, raising expectations, but also producing certain wariness on both sides. The perceived tardiness of the German response in contributing to the Allied Mobile Force

¹⁹⁸ We believe that Turkey's full membership will be in the best interests of Greece for reasons of its economic, political and security benefits. Most Greek diplomats and scholars whom we interviewed have concurred with this point, while at the same time stressing that Athens will try to make best use of its veto power in extracting Turkish concessions on Cyprus and Aegean issues.

¹⁹⁹ See The Financial Times, The Guardian, Le Monde and International Herald Tribune, 27 March 1992, for commentaries on this issue.

deployments to Turkey during the Gulf crisis has left a negative impression on Turkish public opinion - an impression that had not been erased by subsequent contributions (indeed, the swiftness of the German assistance to Kurdish refugees in Iran only reinforced the impression that the problem was not the Bonn's constitutional difficulty in committing forces outside the Central Region, but the political reluctance to commit German forces in defence of Turkey)²⁰⁰.

The latest sharp confrontation between two countries came at a time when geopolitical weight of both countries has been much increased by the end of the Cold War: Germany's by unification, Turkey's by the re-opening of its cultural and economic access to the basically Turkish-speaking Central Asian and Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union. They also take a differing look at the new formations in the Balkans. Germany is currently playing a locomotive role in the process of the EC enlargement negotiations with five members of the EFTA - Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland - and three East European countries - Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which will separate into two distinct entities on 1 January 1993, Poland and Hungary - before Turkey is considered. As far as Turkish membership is concerned, Germany is widely seen in the Community circles as the only country that could engineer a favourable response from its other EC partners. In the absence of German (or French) involvement, progress toward full membership seems quite unlikely.

The two-day visit last July of the new German foreign minister, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, has contributed to a somewhat relaxed atmosphere between the two countries. "Turkey is an integral part of Europe", Kinkel announced at the end of his visit to Ankara²⁰¹. He added that Bonn supported the Turkish full membership to the EC, but there were issues, like the free movement of Turks, to be worked out. He refrained, however, from giving a possible timetable for full membership. Mr. Kinkel's words in Ankara were seen as more "diplomatic" than his and his aides' statements to the German press in Bonn. For example, he said on his return to Bonn that while Germany supported "enhanced relations" by way of implementing the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and the EC, the prospect of full membership was not likely in the near future.

The Mediterranean countries, whose agricultural and labour-intensive sectors will have to face strong competition from Turkey, reflect mixed feelings. Most Mediterranean countries, along with Ireland, known as the "cohesion countries" are aware that they will have to share the benefits of the EC regional and structural funds with Turkey. Owing to the low figures of Turkish income, Turkey would have valid claims on a very large share of the cohesion funds which the Community distributes, with consequent scaling down of what other countries now receive. This would naturally diminish the availability of the Community funds. The Iberian enlargement has already raised a number of adjustment issues, particularly for the agricultural and semi-industrial regions of the Mediterranean members. The Community was then compelled to introduce what it called the Integrated

²⁰⁰ In an interview of 24 January 1991 with a German television, President Ozal termed Germany "an unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the Alliance for 40 years and was now unwilling to stand by Turkey in its time of need. He went on to criticize the role of German firms in supplying chemicals to Iraq which used them as chemical weapons on the Iraqi Kurds. These remarks reflect an acute sense of frustration over German policy and attitudes.

²⁰¹ "Kinkel visit highlights human rights", in BRIEFING, 20 July 1992, Issue 897, p.4.

Mediterranean Programmes in 1985 as an instrument for tackling the structural economic problems of the whole Mediterranean region who had most to fear from the imminent competition of the newly acceding economies²⁰². There is no doubt that, should Turkey join the EC, the "cohesion countries" will try to extract a IMP-like compensatory package from the wealthier countries and insist on rather long transitional periods from Turkey on a number of sectors. From a different perspective, Turkey, with its 60 million-strong population and hence vast attractive market, might be regarded as an asset by the "Intra-Community South" to counter-balance the predominance of the "North" led by Germany in the EC.

Britain favours widening the EC, partly to curb the growth of federal power under an EPU and an EMU, and partly to delay the transfer of power from member governments to the Commission in Brussels. London also tends to view the further enlargement of the Community from the perspective of new opening markets, trade and investment opportunities. The British attitude concerning a possible accession of Turkey to the Community, apart from what has been listed above, appears also to have been influenced by geo-strategical considerations - Turkey as an indispensable ally of the Western Alliance in a critical region. Just prior to taking over the six-month term presidency, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, was in Ankara promoting the notion that his country would do all within its power to ensure that relations between Turkey and the EC should be revitalised.

Mr. Hurd prepared a report on the subject containing a series of recommendations on how to improve relations between Ankara and Brussels. The US²⁰³, too, sees Turkey's EC membership in its own interest. As a matter of fact, the US Administration had reportedly approached some European capitals in the past (last time during the Bush-Kohl summit at Camp David in March 1992) and advocated the case for Turkey not to be excluded from the Community architecture. **Nixon**, too, in his memoirs Seize the Moment urges the Community to incorporate Turkey in the EC and the WEU for compelling geo-strategic reasons. Given the well-known European allergy for pressures coming from Washington, this kind of interventions may not serve the purpose and indeed can be counter-productive, highlighting the impression that Turkey may become another **Trojan Horse** within the EC to enjoy 'special relationship' with the United States.

The French officials are now recognizing the need that Paris should cooperate more with Italy and Spain to promote the Mediterranean interests inside the EC at a time when Germany is geared to fight for the East European and EFTA member countries. France, as the leader of the "Club Med" nations, is seriously concerned that Germany would dominate the EC when the EFTA members and the newly democratic East European states were offered membership. France and its neighbours also worry that enlarging the EC would retard the building of strong federal institutions for at least another decade. But, since the

²⁰² In fact, the main 'raison d'etre' of the IMPs was not so much the economic development of geographically defined areas with common problems, but rather to organise a new operation of financial redistribution among the member states comparable to the creation of the ERDF after the first enlargement of the Community. For a wider discussion, see "The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in the Context of Community Regional Policy", Bruno De Witte, EUI Working Papers in Law No. 90/8, October 1990, Florence, p.20.

²⁰³ Interview with Prof. William Cromwell, January 1992, Bruges

EFTA enlargement seems now inevitable soon after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaties, the French line of thinking may tilt towards seeking strong allies to counter-balance the predominant position in the Community of Germany. In a hypothetical equation, Turkey fits the definition. Some Turks hope that the French will break away from the general European line-up against Turkey's admission. The French have duly noted Turkish signals that any country which supports its application will be favoured in the allocation of attractive defence and other big contracts in the large Turkish market. Some big government contracts are already known to have been awarded to French companies with such an expectation in mind. France is now on the way to become the biggest foreign investor in Turkish economy.

At present, there are 110 French companies doing business in Turkey as opposed to only 10 in 1989. Trade exchanges totalled FF 12 bn in 1990. A cultural project is also under way to set up a university, which will use as a medium of instruction the French language. In political relations a great distance has been covered towards full normalization after a period of troubled relationship in the late 1970s and early 80s. Mitterrand's recent visit (13-14 April 1992) to Turkey has ushered in a new era in the Turco-French relations. Before his visit, some Turkish newspapers headlined: "France instead of Germany". Mr. Mitterrand was given a warm welcome in Ankara. It appeared as if France has gained the sympathy of the Turks due to a comparison of his stand on EC and Kurdish issues with that of Germany. As for the Turkish-Community relations, Mr. Mitterrand stated: "*La Turquie quie releve de l'espace europeen, si ce n'est au sens geographique exact, du moins dans ses acceptions economiques, culturelles, militaires et politiques. L'Europe se dessine comme une vaste communaute de valeurs et d'interets qui ne saurait etre limitee par des prejuges culturels*"²⁰⁴. President Mitterrand went a step further and declared that it was impossible that France will oppose Turkey's full EC membership in political terms²⁰⁵, but cited some economic factors including the free movement of labour as a major problem which needs to be sorted out before the realisation of membership. He also said that after the 1992 Single Market, the Turkish application would be considered along with other EFTA membership hopefuls.

Italy, Spain and Portugal are unlikely to table strong opposition to Turkey's joining the Club if France and Germany give their blessing, although their economies will face strong competition from Turkish textile and agriculture. Obviously, to enlist the support of these countries, Turkey should be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive give-and-take package deal with them.

²⁰⁴ "M.Mitterrand a souligne la communaute de valeurs et d'interets entre la Turquie at l'Europe", Claire Trean, in Le Monde, 15 April 1992, p.6.

²⁰⁵ "Mitterrand's visit to Turkey in French press", in Newspot, 23 April 1992, p.2.

Having said all these, what is expected of Turkey is to devise a membership strategy addressing convincingly the sensitivities of major Community countries and commence a high level shuttle diplomacy carefully targeted at each individual EC capital in putting forth its case for full membership. An all-out publicity campaign, backed up by a series of meaningful political and economic reforms, aimed at winning the support of, not only the EC governments, but also of the European public, will be helpful to get the key message across that Turkey, if acceded into the Community, is not going to be an economic and political liability, but is a modern, secular, economically fast growing, culturally rich country, which will contribute its own share to the Community.

V. FUTURE PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS

Throughout the paper, we tried to elaborate on various aspects of the Turco-Community relationship, pinpointing the weaknesses and strengths on both sides in a newly emerging architecture and arguing for a relaunching of the long-ignored relationship in view of the transformations both in Europe and in Turkey. Reservations about the extent to which Turkey can be absorbed into the Community still top the agenda. However, the Community has increasingly become aware that it has a fundamental interest in intensifying, without further delay, its relations with Turkey so as to prevent any possible Turkish alienation. To reconcile both sides' interests in a balanced and realistic fashion requires, in our opinion, a skillful engineering of a **sui generis** status for Turkey. Rustow, in analyzing the **prospect ahead** for the Turco-Community relations back in 1984²⁰⁶, asserted that perhaps a newly-favourable conjunction of economic and political circumstances, in future years, will give a new impetus towards the goal of Turkish full membership in the EC. Numerous, unprecedented changes have taken place since then. A clear answer to the question "are we in a position to say today that the current conjuncture is favourable for such a leap forward?" is not in sight yet.

In view of the newly emerging, but still unsettled architecture of Europe and Turkey's changing priorities, economically and politically, we believe that there are good reasons to reconsider favourably Turkey's place in Europe. Things have all to be re-evaluated, though there are still a number of variables which remain largely unchanged - i.e. free movement of Turkish labour, integrating Turkish agriculture into the CAP system, competition in textiles, considerable burden on Community budget (who will pay for it?), how to distribute structural, regional and future cohesion funds evenly among the relatively poor southern members, etc. Beyond economic hesitations, doubts about Turkey's

²⁰⁶ "The Mediterranean Challenge: Turkey and the Community", Dankwort Rustow, Sussex European Research Center, 1981, p.38

democratic and European credentials indicate that there are still more problems that the Turks must work hard to solve. A democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is still to be found. Another impediment, not insuperable though, is the fanatically tenacious resistance put up by the Greeks, who have a decisive veto power on Turkey's accession to the EC, as a trump card to extract concessions on Cyprus and Aegean problems from Turkey. The Greeks will no doubt resist all the moves towards upgrading the Turco-EC relationship, but they cannot for ever be allowed to dictate a relationship that transcends them. The major Community players are obviously not without suitable instruments to overcome or, if need be, bypass the Greek obstructions. For a longer term stability in the relationship it is, however, essential that the Greek public should be persuaded to the argument that a Turkish accession will serve the interests of Greece in general, economically and politically - an arduous task given the deep-seated mistrust originating from the legacy of more than 600 years of shared history. This requires the prevalence of a new, good-intentioned and far-sighted thinking on both sides.

Progress towards further enlargement in general and Turkish accession in particular will depend primarily on three governments: the French, the British and the German. It is clear that the three, who between them represent two-thirds of the EC's economic strength, hold Europe's future in their hands in a way that other member states do not. Nothing decisive can happen in the Community unless they do agree. Among the three, only Britain, which has problems of its own in the EC, appear to have a relatively more favourable opinion of a possible Turkish accession and repeatedly declared its public support for it, while the French does not want to be seen neither supportive, nor obstructive due to its delicate political and economic calculations. In the aftermath of President Mitterrand's visit (the first state visit in 23 years), no major objection or hindrance is expected from Paris. The key country is, no doubt, Germany which worries most about the freedom of movement of Turkish workers in the Community.

The German leaders, too, are nevertheless careful in their public announcements to lend their support to Turkish membership of the Community. In his talks with Turkish leaders in Ankara, the new German foreign minister Kinkel has signalled that Bonn will support "enhanced relations" between Brussels and Ankara on the basis of the Association Agreement. In the wake of the serious crisis in relations between the two countries over the handling of the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, some analysts speculated that Paris may attempt to profit the deteriorating relationship between Bonn and Ankara. It would therefore not be wrong to argue that all the deals in respect of Turkey's relationship with, and eventual accession to, the Community will be worked out behind the closed doors of Bonn, Paris and London.

Through increased interaction, mutual understanding between the EC and Turkey would increase. This may allow Turkey to be considered in a manner that is perhaps less filled with misunderstanding than the manner in which Turkey is perceived today. Turkey fully expects to achieve its goals on its own merits. However, since the world economy is continuously converging to a high level of interdependence, the re-evaluation of Turkey would be most productive if done in a spirit of open mindedness and objectivity. For a variety of complex economic, political and cultural reasons, the EC, increasingly co-terminous with the European continent itself, is keen to keep Turkey at arm's length. It has become evident that Turkey will be overtaken in the race for EC membership by states only

recently thought to be without aspirations, such as the EFTA countries and perhaps the states of Central Europe. If Europe becomes increasingly defined by a common mix of Occidental culture and Christianity in an attempt to grasp some common characteristics which bind it together, then Turkey's exclusion would be more pointed. The view that Turkey is part of the Middle East could, ironically, become more deeply entrenched in Europe, even though it is with that region that its dealings are so acutely uncomfortable. However, in the EC capitals, the current feeling is that Turkey can no longer be taken for granted and that the days when its appeals for closer links with the EC could be easily dismissed out of hand are now a thing of past. The Turkish government is also aware that just as its importance is increasing, that of Athens is in precipitate decline. Europe needs Turkey now much more than it did in the past and as much as Turkey needs Europe. This new balance of interests needs to be reflected in the EC's attitude to Turkey's request for full membership.

Turkey had invested a great deal of hope in the Lisbon Summit last June, which adopted the Commission's report on "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement". The report, in its concluding section, recalled the 1989 Commission Opinion on Turkey's request of accession and reaffirmed that in order to speed up Turkey's overall development in the coming years, the Association Agreement should be more actively and effectively applied. Recalling the proposed measures to complete the customs union, to undertake wide-ranging sectoral cooperation, to resume financial cooperation and to raise the level of political dialogue, it also drew attention to Turkey's growing geo-political importance and "the role which it can play as an ally and as a pole of stability in its region" and urged the Community to take all appropriate steps to "anchor Turkey firmly within the future architecture of Europe". Despite such praiseworthy expressions apparently pleasing the Turks, it seems that the Community still lacks, in essence, a clear-cut and practical approach vis-a-vis the well-known Turkish aspirations. Rhetoric is still the order of the day rather than concrete, specified measures, which will help take Turkey towards future accession.

If not offered immediate full membership in the foreseeable future, what path Turkey can follow? For Ankara, a Turkey excluded from the EC, but completely dependent upon the USA in the region can never be a viable alternative²⁰⁷. There are, in many areas, a considerable divergence of opinion and interests with the US. Plus, the historical experience attests that such a closely dependent relationship with the US may also mean putting Turkey's domestic and foreign economic & political relations under the mortgage of a superpower. The Middle East and the Islamic world, too, do not offer a viable alternative. In fact, such an integrated bloc does not yet exist.

Furthermore, Turkey's fundamental *sine qua nons* such as democracy, secularism, free market are non-existent in those regions. The Islamic countries are important to Turkey as far as its economic and trade interests are concerned. Turkey, instead of seeking alternatives, is therefore bound to further improve its relations with the countries around it including those of Europe and to form a power focus of economic, political and cultural linkages in its own region. New Turkish Republics in Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia, Black Sea littoral countries, Balkans and the Middle East are generally considered the

²⁰⁷ "Avrupa'dan Dislanan Turkiye'nin Onundeki Secenekler" (Options In Front of Turkey that Remains Excluded from Europe), Prof. Erol Manisali, Turkish daily "Milliyet", 21 December 1991

natural sphere of influence for Turkey. The argument has it that Turkey can gain an enhanced status and power vis-a-vis Europe and other major powers only by threading a delicate network of relations and enhancing its economic weight in the region around it. The same holds true for its neighbours as well. They, too, can take part in the new international order only by fostering political and economic cooperation with regional countries. Such a policy orientation should not be seen as counter to the furtherance of the Turco-Community relations; on the contrary, the increase in Turkey's regional power will contribute positively to an enhanced Turco-EC relationship. If Turkey does not enter a rapid process of rapprochement with regional countries, it might be pushed to a weak position vis-a-vis the USA and Europe and become heavily dependent upon these two centres of power.

Turkey had suffered long enough by following the way that the EC had pointed in the past - the improved Associate status. It has not worked as envisioned. All the concessions granted by the Community have been extended later to the third countries (The Lome Convention, the Mediterranean Programmes, ext) thus effectively emptying its content and upsetting the balance of the Association relationship. The EC has not taken Turkey's calls to restore this disturbed balance seriously - a reason which prompted Turkey to an early application for full membership in 1987. The government is under pressure that the EC proposal to zero customs tariffs and quotas by 1995 should not be seriously considered without the achievement of full membership.

It is argued that the customs union not supported by membership benefits could undermine Turkey's uncompleted industrialisation and hamper the pursuance of independent development strategies. At this juncture, Turkey, while putting into effect its independent development and industrialisation strategies on the one hand, should follow closely the developments still unsettled in Europe and strive for intensified political, security and cultural co-operation as well as better economic, trade and technological ties irrespective of what the final decision of Brussels would be. The basic goal should remain to be the continued economic & trade liberalisation as well as maturing its democratic development. Turkey's Western orientation is a historical evolution and a basic choice, independently of other external factors²⁰⁸. There is no doubt that the decision will be a political one based on member states' perception of the new Turkey that emerges politically, economically in a strategically important region. A number of factors has to be carefully weighted in reaching the fateful decision.

An updated assessment should take note, among other matters, of Turkey's growing leadership role in the volatile regions, which are so crucial for the perceived economic and security interests of the Community. Turkey's full integration with the Community will certainly enhance the status of the EC as a global power, by extending its spheres of influence up to the borders of China. In these respects, Turkey has arguably strengthened its case for accession. The goal of EC membership is important for the Turks, independently of whether or when it actually joins. That means that orientation towards the EC provides the compelling public political framework and motivation for the country's modernising and democratising policies and their fundamental rationale.

²⁰⁸ "Relations with the EC: Quo Vadis?" (in Turkish), Prof. Ali Sait Yuksel, in *Milliyet*, 25 October 1991.

Options for Future Relations: On the Turkish side, despite the unfortunate history of relations in the past 28 years, there has been a firm resolve to receive a positive response from the Community. This is of course not to say that the Turks expect full membership to be realised in the immediate future and at whatever expense. They appear to have grasped the complexities and the weaknesses of the Community machinery as well as the major worries of the member states as regards a possible Turkish membership.

The main concern is that its current level of economic development would require massive injection of funds from the Northern countries in the form of CAP subsidy, structural, regional and cohesion funds while at the same time its agricultural and manufacturing sectors causing strains due to competition with most Mediterranean countries. The Turks should hence make sustained efforts to allay such fears by counter-arguments with a view to persuading sceptics on why the Turkish membership would also be in the best interests of the Community as a whole. The recent statements by Turkish leaders that Turkey wants to join the fold of the EC club as a dignified and worthy partner on equal footing and not as a burdensome country have not yet produced any positive reflection on the part of the Community partners because the perennial question of how this will be achieved are yet to be given a credible answer.

The EC's December 1989 decision to postpone negotiations until at least 1993 rules out the possibility of full membership in the near term. The longer-term prospects for membership will therefore be shaped not only by economic and political developments in Turkey, but also by the evolution of the EC itself. A Community of roughly its current size and composition, concentrating on the deepening of existing institutions and arrangements, is unlikely to encourage the formal integration of Turkey. On the other hand, a wider EC, having embraced some or all of the EFTA and Eastern European countries, is more likely to see the benefits of Turkish membership. More precisely, this would be an EC in which the problems of Turkish adjustment would be submerged beneath a much broader task of integration. Turkey's accession largely depends on how the new enlargement strategy adopted in Lisbon will be put into practice.

It is true that half of Europe did not have the chance to join in the European integration movement when it started in late 50s for obvious reasons, but the welcome change in their fortune should not now displace a country like Turkey which had the chance and opted for it, in contrast to many others which have, up till the present time, declined long-standing invitations. It should also be noted here that Britain was rejected twice before finally joining at the third attempt. The Commission report on the Greek application was also unfavourable; but, it was overturned on political grounds. Spain's application took in all about seven years. In light of the above considerations, let's now speculate what the possible options for the future Turco-EC relations could be:

a) In an optimistic scenario, the Community will agree to open negotiation with Turkey. It is beyond doubt that this decision will be a purely political one based on the member states' perception of the new Turkey that has been emerging politically, economically and militarily in a volatile region so crucial for the economic and security interests of the Community. Many considerations, primarily of economic nature, seem to make it appropriate to envisage a precise target date for Turkish membership. The horizon

of politicians is about five years at the most. Just as Turkey will be asked to accept an *acquis communautaire*, which does not yet exist, so the other members will be asked to accept a Turkey whose precise characteristics will depend on evolution running beyond this horizon. Somehow or other there will have to be devised a guaranteed progression from one stage to the next, including accession in a specified number of years. If decision will come out positive, then the Commission, under a negotiating mandate from the Council of Ministers, will open official talks with the Turks.

Negotiations would take some time from six to ten years, according to earlier precedents, and so will not probably be concluded before the end of this century. It would indeed be unrealistic, given the many difficulties involved in a Turkish membership, to expect that they would be completed in the shorter time. As a matter of fact, both the Turks and the Community might find it more convenient and beneficial to have a longer span of time with a view to adapting themselves to the new requirements without a hurry-up. The Community is likely to insist on a lengthy pre-accession or preparatory period before formal membership. This could be a period following the successful conclusion of negotiations, or it could overlap with them if the EC also determined on a set of pre-accession measures to prepare Turkey for membership. Thus a pre-accession period, which is unlikely to be less than 10 years in duration, could start in 1995, or possibly not until 2000. An interim arrangement should govern Turkey's relations with the Community during the negotiation process, but avoid the pitfall that existed in the 1963 Association Agreement. Formal membership would then ensue in the year 2005, or possibly not until 2010. Even after a lengthy preparatory stage, the EC is likely to insist on the normal transitional period of ten years, plus five or more additional years for sensitive items such as a complete freedom for Turkish agricultural and textile exports and free movement of labour.

Thus final full membership, with Turkey assimilated to the Community system, is unlikely to come about before 2020 to 2025. With the decisions taken at the Maastricht Summit last December towards the EMU and the EPU, the threshold for joining the EC has been further raised and the timetable predicted above might therefore have to be adjusted accordingly. It must also be noted that this forecast is itself subject to enormous uncertainty. Many events could occur, meanwhile, inside Turkey, inside the Community or in the outside world, that could slow down or speed up the process or make it entirely irrelevant. Turkey might adopt a more patient attitude in the face of a long time scale. Even if many of the long delays are inserted into the process to suit the reservations of the current members, Turkey can at the same time exploit them to protect its own vulnerable sectors while gradually improving its capacity to compete with the more efficient industries of the Community. It does not have to tie up its hands by strict Community discipline at a time when Turkey can sustain its impressive growth rate and expand foreign economic and trade relations without stringent EC regulations and controls. This last point should be considered against the background of Turkey's burgeoning special ties with the newly independent, resourceful states of the former Soviet Union, which would provide a strong stimuli to the Turkish economy for a rapid expansion.

b) If the Community were to reject outright a Turkish accession in a pessimistic scenario, the consequences could be severe for both sides. The basic economic and political significance of this decision will be that Turkey would be left outside the European mainstream. It will be forced to become a major power capable of establishing a regional

grouping of its own or link with the US, not only in economic sphere, but also in the political and defence fields. In fact, it is already discovering a new geo-political role for itself. The Soviet break-up has offered it the opportunity to build up a new domain of political and economic influence, not just in the neighbouring ex-Soviet Caucasus, but also among the 60 million Turks in ex-Soviet Central Asia. Ex-Yugoslavia presents another venue for greater Turkish influence as well. This role may not always converge with the interests of the EC if Turkey decides to opt for a Turkic-centric orientation in its political relations.

The consequence of this might be the birth of xenophobia and a certain revival of what it is sometimes called "the Turkish-Islamic synthesis", which would also have, according to some Western commentators, the political aim of a vague Ottoman revivalism as a counter-weight to a Europe which will by then be viewed not as a friend but as a competitor, if not an adversary. In such a case, Turkey may consider reducing its military commitments to Europe to a minimum without leaving the security guarantee of the NATO, like a few other current members of the Alliance. Turkey might also have to consider its own version of a "*force de frappe*", since the European security guarantees for Turkey will no longer be considered as credible. The demise of the former Soviet Union and Turkey's close relations with six Turkic Republics has already created in some countries a feeling of concern and even fear that this new development may whip up "Turkism"²⁰⁹ at home and abroad. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics, overwhelmingly populated by Turkic peoples, offer some hope of the sort of community of states based on strong common characteristics.

A Turkic Commonwealth might become a possibility. Some observers believe that this would be attractive to Turkey, especially in view of its repeated isolation, perceived and actual, over many issues in the international community. According to **Robins**²¹⁰, the emergence of a Turkic Commonwealth, which looks to Turkey for leadership, as the Commonwealth once looked to Britain, is not a flight of fancy. However, in the short and medium term, Central Asian, Black Sea regional or even Middle Eastern links cannot constitute an alternative to membership of the EC, which already offers a duty-free market for 53 percent of Turkish industrial exports and has provided the imports for its economic modernization and political democratization in the past and particularly over the last decade. The real problem is how long Turkey will be kept waiting on the doorsteps of the EC club. Failing an assurance that at least the groundwork for eventual membership is being prepared, Turkey might indeed be forced by its internal dynamics to drop its unresponded European aspirations in favour of the eastern promises. In such an event, Ankara would probably become an uneasy ally for the West and its working relationship with the EC is likely to get stiffer. Its strategic relationship with Washington may in turn become even more important. In time, this would certainly make it more difficult for the Community

²⁰⁹ See "Turkism", Turkkaya Ataov, in The Turkish Daily News, 1 August 1992, p.7, for a discussion of this issue.

²¹⁰ Robins, London, p.116.

governments to play a go-between role in disputes between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus and in the Aegean. The same goes for areas that will increasingly be influenced by Turkey. But this is the most unlikely scenario.

c) One realistic solution would be the concept of "multi-tier integration" leading to a *sui generis* Turkish status midway between the 'Europe' Association and the full membership with a pledge of future accession in the not-too-distant future. Such a status will prove to be extremely difficult to negotiate for the EC, which has to think of its precedent-setting impact for other hopeful candidates. It would probably be a solution containing elements of membership where they are essential for Turkey and can reasonably be accepted by the Community, while ruling out sectors in which one side or the other is unable to stomach the consequences of full application of the *acquis communautaire*.

This would amount to a better access to the EC markets for Turkish agricultural and industrial products with the completion of the customs union by 1995 (after integration in trade, the incentive to join the ERM and eventually EMU will increase, according to **Padoan**), an effective integration, and an improvement in the rights, of those Turkish immigrants who already reside in the Community territory, a financial compensation package to postpone the right to free movement of labour, a reasonable access to the Community's structural & regional development funds and an effective participation in all decisions directly affecting Turkey's political, defence and economic interests. In other words, Turkey should be invited to take part in the EPC and the WEU under a specially-formulated status while the long process of accession to the Community proceeds. The formal difficulties, political or legal alike, that will inevitably arise can be overcome if there exists on the part of the Community members the necessary political will to do so²¹¹.

The notion that membership will be possible eventually is itself a catalyst that will act as a spur to improvement not only in terms of democracy and human rights, but also in respect of the economy. Europeans' attitude, however, fails to take this side of the coin properly into account. As a matter of fact, the Maastricht Treaty has developed several ways of guaranteeing "the exceptions", most of which being of transitory nature. One finds forms near to an '*Europe a la carte*²¹²', of a "multi-tier Community" like in the EMU or specific exceptions of an "*Europe a geometrie variable*" in areas like the environment policy. The social policy provisions are of a specific new character - from the legal point of view, a strange set-up. The current talk of a two-speed Europe as a reaction to tight discipline of the Maastricht system is also relevant in this context. These forms might help certain partners to reduce their initial opposition, but the trend towards a communitarization of these areas will not be stopped. The alternative view is that these provisions against the Community orthodoxy

²¹¹ "The Strategic Relevance of Turkey-EC Relations", Maurizio Cremasco, in the International Spectator, Vol.18, January-June 1983, p.61

²¹² *Europe a la carte* implies that not all participating states agree as to the final objective to be achieved in common; but those which reach such an agreement may move forward towards it with the assent of those not participating. *Geometrie variable Europe* is sometimes also referred to as 'differentiated Europe'. These terms have been used to describe joint action by states which are nevertheless pursuing differing goals on differing time-scales.

lead dynamics towards a "Europe of several circles" which would be reinforced by a membership of new countries²¹³. Generally speaking, the proposals contained in the British presidency paper and the Matutes Package form the minimum basis (food for thought) needed for a re-launching and upgrading of the Turco-Community relations.

Both in Ankara and Brussels, there are some officials arguing that the 1963 Agreement, largely of economic nature, has over time lagged behind the modern requirements of the relationship - a situation, which calls for a new agreement to be negotiated with the Community to take account of cooperation in the new fields of foreign policy, security, immigration, culture, environment as well as of the challenges of the post-Maastricht era. Another body of thought voices opposition to such a suggestion in the fear that renegotiating the Ankara Agreement would be like opening the Pandora's Box, which might lead to some erosion of the hard gained concessions i.e. free movement of labour and prospect of eventual full membership. Furthermore, the process of negotiating and ratification for such an agreement is likely to hit the strong waves of Greece's traditional obstructionism. Turkey would inevitably consent to entering a comprehensive package deal with Greece only once: that is, when she sits down to negotiate with the Twelve the terms of full membership - certainly not for an intermediary status.

On its part, what steps are Turkey expected to take, in the meantime? The first priority should be to ensure an uninterrupted and orderly functioning of the Association arrangements with a view to get the Turco-Community train moving towards the "finalite". Ankara should work harder to put its house in order, sorting out its economy & finances and achieving full democratization, which should include a peaceful settlement of its 'Kurdish Problem'. Turkey should start acting as if it is already part of the Community by accelerating the pace of its adaptation process to the *acquis communautaire* and by developing its own positions on main Community issues.

Furthermore, Ankara will be wise not to bet on one horse only. The free trade agreement with the EFTA countries, which entered into force last July, has given the Turks a foot into the European Economic Area (EEA). Once the EEA has come into existence, the EC and EFTA will make up the largest and most important integrated economic area in the world comprising 19 countries with 380 mn people²¹⁴. The EEA will make it possible to realize the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital (the "four freedoms") on the basis of the EC's existing legislation as it has evolved over the past 30 years, subject to a few exceptions and transitional periods. This will mark the first step on the way to membership for those EFTA countries which have already decided to make, or which are now considering, an application for EC membership. Given its commitment to complete the customs union with the EC, Turkey should make every effort to join the EEA as well by paving the ground for negotiations after 1995 with the EFTA and EC member countries. The interlocking regional initiatives led by Turkey i.e. the BSECZ and the ECO are also thought to enhance Turkey's hands vis-a-vis the EC negotiators. Ankara's regional

²¹³ "30 Thesis on the Treaty on European Union: The Results of the Maastricht Summit", Wolfgang Wessels, February 1992, Bonn/Brugge, p.13-14

²¹⁴ "EEA, an important investment", Hansjorg Renle, in The EFTA Bulletin, 2/92, p.1.

leadership role in a vast area from the Adriatic to the Chinese border further strengthens its overall standing in the West. More comprehensive and frequent dialogue is desperately needed at the highest political level to cover every dimension of the relationship. A shuttle diplomacy to be conducted by the Turkish president and/or prime minister is highly desirable in order to enter forcefully into the European agenda and embark upon a newly-defined and sound relationship.

Given the strong historical, cultural, security and economic stakes in the relationship, often imbued by emotions, the future appears more likely to be one of unresolved and largely misunderstood tensions and disputes. Perhaps the first issue is to count the cost. Just how much importance do both sides attach to the relationship? How much sacrifice will they accept to strengthen relations? It is primarily the answer to these questions which will determine whether one should pursue a strengthened Association, full membership or an intermediate *sui generis* solution.

In reconsidering the Turkish application for accession, the EC member states and the Community institutions have to weigh carefully all the factors that we tried to expound with a multi-faceted approach as a whole against the inevitable burdens that they would be accepting in the medium-term before Turkey catches up with the same level of economic development. The political statements attest that both sides are conscious of the stakes involved in their interdependent relationship, which is to bring about mutual benefits while at the same time entailing mutual sacrifices. It is generally acknowledged that there is no doubt that the EC should offer Turkey, the oldest associate and first applicant partner, a meaningful and practical alternative to the immediate full membership while it falls on the shoulders of Turkey to speed up its economic and political transformation with a close eye on the prospect of the eventual membership in the not-too-distant future.

It is indeed a serious challenge in front of both Turkey and the Community, which must be met without any further delay. Europe cannot any longer afford to ignore the Turks. It is in everyone's interest that so large and important a country should be accorded a decent place in the new European architecture that satisfies its aspirations as both a European and a regional power. Turkish and EC leaders should sit around the negotiating table to chart a mutually satisfactory future path of the Turco-EC relations. The prevalent atmosphere of uncertainty and evasiveness needs to be replaced by a sober, multi-faceted and forward-looking assessment of Turkey's place in Europe. The author believes that if Turkey is excluded from full participation in the new architecture of Europe and is compelled to retire into an alternative path, Europe will be rethinking its misjudgment before the year 2000.@

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